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Abstract 
This paper tests the accuracy of Roe’s (2003) claim that ‘social democracies’ tend to have 
insider-orientated corporate governance systems, for two extreme cases concerning Roe’s 
independent variable: Switzerland and Sweden. Starting from a position in which both were 
clearly insider-orientated systems, there was a significant weakening of insider control in 
Switzerland during the 1990s, but no comparable change in Sweden up until the early 2000s. 
These developments occurred against the background of contrasting political contexts in the 
two countries: in Switzerland, change took place in a context of stable dominance over the 
political arena by centre-right parties; in Sweden, no change took place despite the fact that 
centre-right  parties  managed  several  times  to  break  the  traditional  social-democratic 
dominance over government. Thus it would seem that political power relations as such do not 
explain the observed trajectories of these two corporate governance systems. Instead, the 
different  trajectories  are  explained  by  the  different  preferences  of  central  political  and 
economic actors. The Swiss labour movement, which was traditionally under the dominance 
of a strong employer side, had important incentives to favour increasing external shareholder 
control  over  firms.  Conversely,  the  Swedish  labour  movement,  which  had  played  a 
considerable part in the shaping of the Swedish corporate governance system, had no such 
incentives.  Also,  as  Swiss  banks  started  to  reorientate  their  strategies  towards  financial 
market-related  activities,  they  became  a  very  important  pro-shareholder  reform  force  in 
Switzerland. Swedish banks, which were part of business groups in which financial interests 
did not necessarily prevail over industrial interests, did not play any comparable role. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Different  variables  have  been  singled  out  in  the  comparative  corporate 
governance  literature  in  order  to  explain  the  existence  of  insider-orientated 
corporate  governance  regimes  with  concentrated  ownership,  shallow  equity 
markets, and low levels of legal protection for minority shareholders. One of the 
more convincing explanations is Mark Roe’s (2003) ‘partisan theory’, which 
explains  concentrated  ownership  –  and  hence  shallow  and  illiquid  capital 
markets – by the strength of ‘social democracy’ in a given country. The stronger 
the left at the political level, so the argument runs, the more reluctant traditional 
shareholders will be to sell off their majority stakes. 
 
A  logical  consequence  of  the  partisan  explanation  of  corporate  governance 
structures is that corporate governance change happens when the political power 
relations change, that is, when a country stops being a ‘social democracy’ we 
can expect its corporate governance regime to become more investor-friendly 
and the ownership structure of its firms to become more dispersed. 
 
In  this  paper  I  investigate  into  the  accuracy  of  the  partisan  explanation  by 
analysing the changes in the corporate governance systems of Switzerland and 
Sweden during the last twenty or so years. The choice of these two countries for 
the comparison is justified by the fact that they constitute – in some sense – 
extreme  cases  concerning  the  partisan  variable:  while  both  countries  were 
traditionally  characterised  by  insider-orientated  corporate  governance 
structures,  with  concentrated  control  over  companies  and  legal  frameworks 
which protected minority shareholders badly, they are situated at opposite ends 
of the right-left spectrum concerning the political arena. Sweden is certainly the 
ideal-typical  ‘social  democracy’,  with  a  social  democratic  dominated 
government in power for most of the 20
th century. Switzerland, on the contrary, 
has  always  had  a  clearly  centre-right  dominated  government  with  the  social 
democrats and other left parties hardly ever having obtained more than 30% of 
the seats in the Federal parliament. 
 
Corporate  governance  arrangements  were  exposed  in  both  countries  to 
considerable pressures for change at least since the 1980s and the legislator has 
in both cases at some point revised the existing regulatory framework. On the 
basis of Roe’s partisan theory, we would expect Switzerland to experience little 
change in corporate governance structures as the left was  and has remained 
weak,  whereas  we  would  expect  in  the  Swedish  case  a  more  ‘politicised’ 
process of corporate governance reform as changes in governmental power give 
different actors the opportunity to change the rules for corporate governance   2 
according to their preferences. Yet, the empirical evidence, which I present in 
this paper, contradicts these predictions: despite stable political power relations, 
Switzerland experienced – starting from an extremely low level – a considerable 
increase in the shareholder-orientation of its corporate governance system. No 
similar changes can be observed in Sweden. 
 
This outcome is explained by the fact that the same stakeholder groups had – 
contrary  to  a  fundamental  assumption  of  most  mainstream  theories  –  very 
different preferences in the two countries. Most importantly, the preferences of 
the  Swedish  social  democrats  were  fundamentally  different  from  the 
preferences of the Swiss social democrats. 
 
This divergence can be observed not only at the level of the legal framework for 
corporate governance, but even more so at the level of changes in corporate 
practices. In fact, while the Swedish legislator was obliged – mainly due to EU 
legislation – to adapt its legal framework somewhat to international standards 
(which meant increasing minority shareholder protection) despite the absence of 
any significant domestic impulses to do so, Swedish firms resisted changes to a 
much larger extent than Swiss firms. 
 
I argue that the differences in the trajectories of Switzerland and Sweden hint at 
the  need  to  include  supplementary  variables  in  the  political  explanation  of 
corporate governance advanced by Roe (2003). I do not reject the importance of 
political  power  relations  for  explaining  corporate  governance  as  such,  but  I 
argue  that  more  attention  has  to  be  paid  to  the  determinants  of  actors’ 
preferences and – related – to the heterogeneity within different stakeholder 
groups that are generally treated as homogeneous groups. In other words, as 
many recent studies on corporate governance reform show1, the ‘left’ is not 
invariably an anti-shareholder force and the ‘right’ is not unambiguously pro-
market.  Including  concepts  of  preference  formation  in  the  explanatory 
framework of corporate governance allows us to understand why certain groups 
of actors do not necessarily want the same thing in different national contexts 
and why – consequently – a given set of power relations does not invariably 
lead to the same outcome. 
 
My study also shows that a more accurate political explanation of corporate 
governance regimes has to take into account the inter-relation between changes 
in the legal framework and the actual changes of corporate governance at the 
level of individual firms (see for a similar point Culpepper 2007). My analysis 
of the Swiss and Swedish cases suggests in fact that corporate practices are a 
central determinant of actors’ preferences and that we need to take into account   3 
such practices in order to fully understand what actors want in the political 
struggles over legal reforms. 
 
I  find  that  three  factors  explain  the  presence  of  pro-shareholder  reform  in 
Switzerland and the absence of such reforms in Sweden: firstly, the preferences 
of  the  centre-left  actors  were  fundamentally  different  because  the  Swedish 
social  democrats  had  much  more  influence  over  the  terms  of  the  corporate 
governance arrangements than the Swiss social democrats. Secondly, the type of 
banks  that  prevailed  in  both  countries  explains  to  an  important  extent 
differences in the trajectories of the two countries. Thirdly and more generally, 
the type of ‘insiders’ and the way in which they controlled ‘their companies’ 
was another essential determinant of economic actors’ preferences and hence of 
political  reform  dynamics.  More  precisely,  I  show  that  the  central  issue  in 
understanding  the  differences  between  the  corporate  governance  reforms  in 
Switzerland  and  Sweden  is  the  fact  that  in  Switzerland  insider  control  over 
corporations went together with a high ownership concentration, whereas it was 
based in Sweden, to a much larger extent on controlling minority structures 
(CMS), such as ownership pyramids and voting right distortions. 
 
Theoretically,  this  finding  hints  at  another  often-neglected  point  in  the 
comparative  corporate  governance  literature:  insider-orientated  corporate 
governance systems show a much greater variety than outsider systems. In fact, 
while the typical Anglo-American outsider system is characterised by dispersed 
share ownership and the categorisation of (external) shareholders vs. managers 
is  rather  straightforward,  systems  with  concentrated  ownership  vary  greatly 
concerning the identity of the ‘blockholders’. Thus, blockholders in Germany 
are often industrial companies, insurance companies and banks, in France the 
state used to be an important ‘blockholder’, whereas in Switzerland and Sweden 
the blockholders were mainly the traditional families, which held their shares in 
Sweden through the intermediary of closed end investment funds (CEIF)2, but 
held them directly in Switzerland. It is precisely the neglect of the analysis of 
who the ‘insiders’ are in different insider-systems, which has made it difficult to 
fully  understand  (legal  and  actual)  corporate  governance  reforms  in  certain 
cases. Therefore, as Culpepper (2007: 784) has pointed out for the Italian case: 
‘the  focus  of  inquiry  needs  to  turn  to  the  political  resources  of  those  who 
support the existing system: managers and large shareholders’. As I will show 
in this paper, identifying who supported the traditional system in Sweden and 
Switzerland and analysing their political resources is key to understanding the 
different preferences of seemingly similar groups of actors in Switzerland and 
Sweden  and  explains  ultimately  why  corporate  governance  reforms  were 
different in the two countries.   4 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents Roe’s partisan theory of 
corporate governance and derives from it predictions for the Swiss and Swedish 
cases. Section 3 analyses the evolution of the dependent variable – that is, legal 
minority shareholder protection (MSP) – in the two cases using a 10-variable 
shareholder  protection  index  (SPI)  and  different  country-specific  elements 
concerning the shaping of a company’s capital structure and the transferability 
of shares. Part 4 explores political variables in order to test the accuracy of the 
predictions derived from Roe’s (2003) partisan theory in the two cases. Section 
5 analyses the political processes which have led to the changes analysed in 
section 3. Section 6 compares the two country cases in order to single out the 
determinants  of  central  actors’  preferences  in  the  two  cases.  Section  7 
concludes. 
 
2. Theory: The Power of Political Forces and Corporate Governance 
Mark Roe’s work contributed greatly to the inclusion of political variables in 
the explanation of the cross-national diversity of corporate governance regimes 
(Roe 1994; 2000; 2003). More precisely, Roe (2003) stresses the importance of 
the left vs. right divide in a society – and by extension in the party system – and 
explores the link between the power of certain political forces and corporate 
governance structures. He finds correlations between the strength of centre-left 
parties3 in a given country and the concentration of ownership. He explains this 
correlation by the claim that where labour interests are strong, they give voice to 
additional  claims  on  the  firm’s  assets  to  those  of  shareholders  and  thereby 
increase agency costs, which deters investors from acquiring minority stakes 
and  blockholders  from  selling  out  their  controlling  stakes.  Roe’s  central 
argument is hence not that centre-left parties cause blockholding because they 
prefer it per se, but because in social democracies agency costs are potentially 
higher in transparent and public companies as claims for wage increases are 
stronger and managers pursue less profitable strategies. More precisely, Roe 
(2003: 33) argues that in a ‘social democracy’ strong pressures exist that push 
managers to pursue – in the name of high job security – risk-adverse expansion 
strategies. Since  managers are risk-adverse anyway, they easily give way to 
these pressures and side with workers but neglect shareholders’ interests. In 
Roe’s  model,  managers,  are,  as  a  result,  ‘[…]  somewhere  in  between 
shareholders and employees, pressed to side with either one or the other group’ 
(Cioffi & Höpner 2006: 465). In this situation controlling shareholders will be 
reluctant to abandon control and public companies with dispersed ownership 
will therefore be rare. 
   5 
Therefore, Roe’s argument is not primarily a policy argument; he sees reasons 
for managerial behaviour which is contrary to shareholders’ interests in other, 
fundamental characteristics of a country, such as social norms and culture (see 
Roe 2003: 36). This is illustrated by the Swedish case, where social democratic 
power has led to concentrated ownership despite (relatively) high levels of legal 
MSP (Roe 2003: 94ff). The inclusion of other factors than legal rules in the 
explanation of concentrated ownership also implies that the ownership structure 
is deeply rooted in a country’s context and hence not likely to change quickly. 
As a result, it would be wrong to attribute to Roe’s work too mechanical a view 
of  the  link  between  changes  in  formal  mechanisms  of  minority  shareholder 
protection (as legal rules) and the outcome at the level of ownership.  
 
However,  his  theory  does  contain  an  explicit  claim  that  social  democratic 
politicians will not pursue pro-market and pro-shareholder orientated policies. 
This is most clearly expressed concerning transparency: Roe (2003) considers 
that the potentially strong pressures on companies to increase wage levels when 
business  is  going  well,  has  led  in  social  democracies  to  low  levels  of 
transparency  as  blockholders  and  managers  do  not  want  employees  to  be 
informed  about  financial  figures.  One  could  therefore  expect  the  left  to  be 
favourable  to  increasing  transparency,  as  this  would  reduce  information 
asymmetries between them and corporate insiders. Despite this genuine interest 
in increased transparency, Roe (2003: 41) states that the left does not impose 
higher transparency standards on firms, as this would at the same time increase 
minority shareholders’ control over firms: 
‘Social  democratic  politicians  have  little  interest  in  promoting 
shareholder wealth-maximizing transparency: they would not want to 
make  the  accounts  sufficiently  transparent,  such  that  distant 
shareholders  could  better  understand  the  firm  and  thereby  be 
equipped to press managers to re-position non performing factories.’ 
Left-wing politicians, so he argues, therefore prefer pro-employee policies other 
than  transparency,  which  have  less  ambiguous  effects  for  labour.  More 
generally, Roe (2003: 46) expects a general reluctance of the left to promote 
instruments of control – such as profit-based compensation for executives and 
measures favouring takeovers – which at the same time favour shareholders’ 
interests. Thus his model suggests that changes in power relations between left 
and right are necessary to make pro-shareholder policy possible. Concerning 
change in policy, he considers that  
‘[It is not] assured that a social democratic polity could commit itself 
to  such  pro-capital  institutions  [as  profit-related  executive  pay  and 
pro-takeover  measures]  if  it  were  temporarily  so  inclined.   6 
Realistically,  the  polity  would  have  to  shift  rightward  for  that 
commitment to be credible.’ (Roe 2003: 46) 
Following  this  reasoning,  we  would  expect  a  weakening  of  the  Social 
Democratic Party to be crucial in order to make both increases in legal MSP and 
in the level of diffused share ownership possible. Where a centre-left dominated 
polity shifts rightwards, we would expect legal MSP to increase, companies to 
become more investor-friendly, and financial markets to flourish. Without such 
a change in political power relations, we would expect levels of legal MSP to 
remain stable. 
 
I show in this paper that, contrary to these expectations, the Swiss corporate 
governance system appears to have changed towards a more outsider-orientated 
system  already  during  the  early  1990s,  whereas  the  Swedish  corporate 
governance system remained largely stable up until the late 1990s. The next 
section shows this point concerning the evolution of the level of legal MSP in 
the two countries since the 1980s. 
 
3. The Evolution of Legal Minority Shareholder Protection in Switzerland 
and Sweden during the 1990s 
The main legal source for shareholder protection in Switzerland is the Stock 
Corporation Law, which is part of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO). The 
‘traditional’  corporate  governance  regime,  that  is,  the  one  governing  Swiss 
corporations throughout the 20
th century, was based on the Stock Corporation 
Law of 1936. A major reform of this legal framework was initiated in the mid-
1960s, and led to a new Stock Corporation Law in 1991. In 1995, the first 
federal  Stock  Exchange  and  Securities  Trading  Act  (SESTA)  was  adopted, 
which contains several provisions touching on MSP. Finally, a code of best 
practices,  the  Swiss  Code  of  Best  Practices  in  Corporate  Governance,  was 
adopted  by  the  main  business  association  –  Economiesuisse  –  in  2002,  in 
parallel  with  a  transparency  directive  elaborated  by  the  SWX  Swiss  Stock 
Exchange (Economiesuisse 2002). Both are binding for listed companies. 
 
As in Switzerland, in Sweden the joint stock corporation was by far the most 
common form of business enterprise, being used both by large multinational 
companies and by very small companies. Therefore, rules concerning corporate 
governance and MSP can be found in Sweden mainly in the Stock Corporation 
Law  (Aktiebolagslag,  ABL).  The  legal  framework  that  shaped  Swedish 
corporate governance during the post-war era was defined by the ABL of 1944 
and the new ABL  of 1975. The  most recent reform of the ABL took place 
between 1990 and 2005.   7 
Several  specific  laws  concerning  accounting  rules  and  the  trading  with 
securities  exist  as  well,  which  in  some  cases  affect  corporate  governance. 
Finally, a code of best practice was adopted by the Swedish Code Group in 
2004 (SOU 2004: 130). 
 
Since La Porta et al.’s (1998) article on ‘law and finance’, the cross-national 
comparison of levels of legal minority shareholder protection (MSP) has largely 
been based on their anti-director rights index (ADRI). However, this index has 
been criticised on various grounds (see notably Spamann 2006, Braendle 2006, 
Lele & Siems 2007, Schnyder 2008). Several limitations of the ADRI have been 
underlined,  notably  its  insensitivity  towards  the  existence  of  functional 
equivalents  to  typically  US  instruments  of  shareholder  protection.  The 
assessment of the level of MSP in this paper is therefore based on a different 
shareholder  rights  index  developed  by  the  Corporate  Governance  Research 
Programme at the Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, UK 
(see Armour et al. 2007, Lele & Siems 2007), which comprises 10 variables. It 
has the advantage of still being fairly concise, while making meaningful cross-
country comparisons of a relatively large number of cases possible. 
 
The variables of this SPI are chosen and defined in a way which aims to remedy 
several shortcomings of the LLSV ADRI. The differences concern notably the 
sources of MSP: Armour et al. (2007) include not only positive law, but also 
rules stemming from self-regulation, such as corporate governance and takeover 
codes, where they are binding for (listed) companies. The SPI also differs from 
the ADRI in that it is not based on binary variables, but allows for intermediary 
scores between 0 and 1 where appropriate. Moreover, the SPI is, unlike the 
ADRI, sensitive to ‘default rules’ in the sense of rules which apply in certain 
circumstances depending on the involved actors’ choices. Such laws, although 
not  strictly  binding,  are  not  necessarily  coded  0.  The  index  also  explicitly 
acknowledges the importance of coding for functionally equivalent instruments 
in different countries. Finally, the SPI constructed as a longitudinal measure 
measuring  the  legal  MSP  of  a  given  country  for  each  year  (see  for  details 
Armour et al. 2007: 8ff; Lele & Siems 2007). Table 1 provides the definitions 
for the ten variables included in the SPI. 
   8 




1. Powers of 
the general 
meeting for de 
facto changes 
If the sale of more than 50 % of the company’s assets requires 
approval of the general meeting it equals 1; if the sale of more 





Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less of the capital can 
put an item on the agenda; equals 0.75 if there is a hurdle of more 
than 1 % but not more than 3%; equals 0.5 if there is a hurdle of 
more than 3 % but not more than 5%; equals 0.25 if there is a 
hurdle  of  more  than  5%  but  not  more  than  10  %;  equals  0 
otherwise. 
3.  Anticipation 
of  shareholder 
decision 
facilitated 
Equals 1 if (1) postal voting is possible or (2) proxy solicitation 
with  two-way  voting  proxy  form  has  to  be  provided  by  the 
company (i.e. the directors or managers); equals 0.5 if (1) postal 
voting  is  possible  if  provided  in  the  articles  or  allowed  by  the 
directors, or (2) the company has to provide a two-way proxy form 






Equals 1 if there is a prohibition of multiple voting rights; equals 
2/3 if only companies which already have multiple voting rights 
can keep them; equals 1/3 if state approval is necessary; equals 0 
otherwise. 
5.  Independent 
board members 
Equals  1  if  at  least  half  of  the  board  members  must  be 
independent;  equals  0.5  if  25  %  of  them  must  be  independent; 




Equals 0 if good reason is required for the dismissal of directors; 
equals 0.25 if directors can always be dismissed but are always 
compensated  for  dismissal  without  good  reason;4  equals  0.5  if 
directors are not always compensated for dismissal without good 
reason but they could have concluded a non-fixed-term contract 
with the company;5 equals 0.75 if in cases of dismissal without 
good  reason  directors  are  only  compensated  if  compensation  is 
specifically contractually agreed; equals 1 if there are no special 
requirements for dismissal and no compensation has to be paid. 
Note: If there is a statutory limit on the amount of compensation, 






Equals  0  if  this  is  typically  excluded  (e.g.,  because  of  strict 
subsidiarity requirement, hurdle which is at least 20 %); equals 0.5 
if  there  are  some  restrictions  (e.g.,  certain  percentage  of  share 
capital;6 demand requirement); equals 1 if private enforcement of 
directors’ duties is readily possible. 
8.  Shareholder 
action  against 
resolutions  of 
the  general 
meeting 
Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim against a resolution 
by the general meeting; equals 0.5 if there is a threshold of 10 % 
voting rights; equals 0 if this kind of shareholder action does not 
exist.   9 
9.  Mandatory 
bid 
Equals  1  if  there  is  a  mandatory  public  bid  for  the  entirety  of 
shares in case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0.5 
if the mandatory bid is triggered at a higher percentage (such as 40 
or 50 %); further, it equals 0.5 if there is a mandatory bid but the 
bidder is only required to buy part of the shares; equals 0 if there is 
no mandatory bid at all. 
10.  Disclosure 
of  major  share 
ownership 
Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the companies 
capital have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5 % of the 
capital;  equals  0.5  if  this  concerns  10  %;  equals  0.25  if  this 
concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise 
Source: Siems 2007  
 
Figure 1 reports the evolution of Swiss and Swedish company law concerning 
the protection of minority shareholders’ rights between 1980 and 2006. The 
figure clearly shows that the overall trend in legal MSP in the two countries is 
similar to the evolution Armour et al. (2007) and Lele and Siems (2007) observe 
for the countries in their sample, that is to say, towards increasing MSP. Several 
important differences between the two countries have to be stressed however. 
Thus,  Switzerland  had,  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  under  analysis,  a 
considerably lower level of legal MSP than Sweden. The Swiss law of 1980 
scored 2.75 on the 10 points SPI scale, whereas Sweden scored 3.5 in the same 
year. 
 
Also, the Swiss legal framework began to change much earlier than the Swedish 
one. The score increased with the Stock Corporation Law reform of 1992, to 4.5 
due to important improvements in the field of proxy voting and the disclosure of 
large stakes, while the Swedish law changed only very moderately between the 
adoption of the 1975 Stock Corporation Law and 1990. The only change during 
this period was the entry into force of law 1987:464 (the so-called ‘Leo Law’), 
which  prevented  parent  companies  from  selling  off  stakes  in  a  subsidiary 
company to related persons without a 90% AGM approval (+0.25 on the SPI). 
The SPI for Switzerland further increased with the entry into force in 1998 of 
the Stock Exchange and Securities Trading Act (SESTA), which introduced a 
mandatory bid rule. In 2002, finally, with the introduction of the Swiss Code of 
Best  Practice  (SCBP),  a  voluntary  code,  which  is  quasi-binding  for  listed 
companies, the score further increased (+0.5) due to a rule demanding that the 
majority of board members be independent. 
 
During the 1990s, Swedish law, on the other hand, improved the position of 
minority shareholders only in 1993 through the adoption of a disclosure rules 
for stakes above 10%, through the implementation of the EC directive on the 
information  to  be  published  when  a  major  holding  in  a  listed  company  is 
acquired or disposed of (88/627/EEC), and in 1999 with the adoption by Stock   10 
Exchange Committee of the Swedish Economy (Näringslivets Börskommitté, 
NBK) of a mandatory bid rule (which was lowered to 30% of the shares only in 
2003) (+0.5). Other than that, no change affecting the SPI took place during the 
1990s. Only the new ABL of 2005, which entered into force on January 1, 2006, 
led to a significant increase in the SPI due to better MSP concerning the selling 
of companies’ assets (during a merger), proxy voting, and the election of board 
members. 
 
In sum, during the 1990s and the early 2000, the Swiss law changed to a larger 
extent than the Swedish one and legal MSP was higher in Switzerland than in 
Sweden for several years until the entry into force of the new Swedish ABL in 
2006. The difference becomes even clearer when we look at other instruments 
of insider-control, which are not completely covered by the SPI. While the long-
term  evolution  still  points  into  the  same  direction,  these  differences  in  the 
trajectories of both countries are significant and appear even more important in 
light of the political theory of corporate governance which I have presented 
above. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the Shareholder Protection Index in Switzerland and 

























Source: My own calculations 
 
In sum, there can be no doubt that the Swiss corporate governance system was, 
up until the 1990s at least extremely insider-friendly, – and that consequently 
legal MSP was low (see David et al. forthcoming, Schnyder 2008, Djankov et 
al. 2006, Monks & Minow 1995). This is clearly confirmed by the SPI. For 
Sweden, opinions diverge to a greater extent on how to characterise the system. 
In fact, some authors consider Sweden to be a case of comparatively high levels   11 
of MSP by continental European standards (see Agnblad et al. 2001, LLSV 
1998). This classification relies, however, in part on the fact that accounting 
rules were traditionally rather strict in Sweden and that transparency was high. 
As early as 1944, the ABL included provisions on the disclosure of certain basic 
figures (turnover notably), the consolidation of accounts, and the disclosure of 
affiliations (Kollatz 1962). In comparison, in Switzerland, no such rules existed 
until 1991. Another example concerns hidden reserves: the Swedish ABL of 
1948  allowed  their  creation,  but  an  amendment  of  1950  obliged  firms  to 
disclose undervaluation of assets to a certain extent. Thus, the insurance values 
of buildings and machines had to be indicated (Kollatz 1962: 93-95). The Swiss 
law, on the other hand, still allows today the creation of hidden reserves for 
non-listed  companies.  Hence,  while  the  ‘principle  of  prudence’,  which  by 
definition leads to an underestimation of profits, was applied in Sweden as well, 
accounting standards were considerably higher than in Switzerland. 
 
Yet,  despite  a  traditionally  –  for  insider-orientated  systems  –  comparatively 
high level of legal MSP in Sweden, two factors make it clear that Sweden has to 
be  consider  as  a  case  of  low  shareholder  protection:  firstly,  the  SPI  clearly 
shows that the level of MSP in Sweden was below the level of Anglo-Saxon 
countries  (the  US  score  6.25  and  the  UK  6.5  on  the  SPI  in  1995,  whereas 
Sweden scored 3.75 in that same year).7 Secondly, and more importantly, voting 
right distortions were not prevented by the relatively high level of legal MSP, 
but were in fact much stronger in Sweden than in any other European country 
(see section 6.2.2. below for details). Voting right distortions constitute one of 
the  most  efficient  mechanisms  of  insider  control  (Bebchuk  et  al.  2000)  and 
deprive external shareholders from their most fundamental right, that is, the 
right to exercise a control over the company corresponding to the financial risk 
that they carry. Therefore – while granting a relatively helpful insight into the 
company’s financial situation due to high standards of transparency – Swedish 
company law was contrary to minority shareholders’ interests concerning one of 
the most crucial aspects of corporate control.8 The traditional Swedish model 
can thus by no means be seen as protecting minority shareholders significantly 
better than other continental European countries. Also, a variety of limitations 
to the transferability of shares – including the possibility of prohibiting foreign 
investors from acquiring stock in Swedish companies – also existed (see further 
below). 
 
Consequently, the argument that Sweden did not experience a similar reform of 
its legal framework as Switzerland is due to its higher ‘starting level’ of MSP at 
the outset does not hold. In fact, concerning the most fundamental aspect of 
corporate  governance,  the  Swedish  legal  system  restricted  shareholder  rights   12 
even  more  than  other  systems  and  can  therefore  be  expected  to  have 
experienced  similar  pressures  to  Switzerland.  In  other  words,  the  different 
starting levels of MSP between Switzerland and Sweden do not provide a clear 
explanatory  variable  for  their  different  trajectories.  Both  countries  clearly 
belong  to  the  ‘insider-orientated’  type  of  corporate  governance  systems  in 
which shareholders’ interests are subordinated to that of insiders. There may 
indeed  have  been  differences  in  the  degree  to  which  minority  shareholders’ 
interests  are  protected,  overall,  but  MSP  was  a  secondary  concern  in  both 
systems. 
 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  SPI  aims  primarily  at  making  meaningful 
longitudinal  cross-country  comparisons  of  legal  MSP  by  defining  a  set  of 
variables  which  are  considered  to  be  central  to  the  protection  of  minority 
shareholders. Armour et al. (2007: 12) state that the choice of the variables was 
influenced, among other things, by the importance these instruments had in the 
different jurisdictions for which the SPI was first developed. The instruments 
that are measured by these variables were hence not necessarily important in 
each  one  of  these  countries.  The  SPI  can  only  provide  a  partial  picture. 
Therefore,  in  analysing  the  politics  of  corporate  governance  reform  in 
Switzerland and Sweden, it is essential to add in several other country-specific 
dimensions of shareholder rights, which are not necessarily captured by the SPI, 
but  which,  as  we  shall  see,  were  perceived  by  the  relevant  actors  in  both 
countries as being central to the question of MSP. The advantage of case studies 
and  ‘small  number  comparisons’  is  precisely  to  be  able  to  provide  in-depth 
analyses of a limited number of cases without having to limit the analysis to a 
small number of indicators for each case. A further point is that while the SPI 
captures, given its definition, the rules that apply to listed companies, the rules 
that  apply  to  non-listed  companies  should  also  be  discussed,  as  they  were 
relevant to the political debates on corporate governance in the two countries in 
the period we are concerned with. 
 
Having said that, two issues deserve particular attention when discussing the 
question of minority shareholder protection in Switzerland and Sweden: firstly, 
the question of voting right distortions, and secondly, instruments that allowed 
corporate insiders to shape the capital structure of the firm and to restrict the 
transferability of shares and/or the exercise of rights linked to these shares. In 
both countries, such instruments were the central pillar of the traditional insider-
domination over firms.   13 
 
Voting Rights, Capital Structure and Vinkulierung in Switzerland 
The traditional Swiss corporate governance regime rested on two main pillars: 
first,  the  existence  of  a  large  degree  of  financial  autonomy  on  the  part  of 
corporate  insiders  due  to  the  possibility  of  concealing  large  parts  of  profits 
through the creation of hidden reserves; and second, the so-called Vinkulierung 
procedure, which allowed corporate insiders to refuse buyers of registered stock 
their inscription in the stock ledger. While – for reasons of space – I will not 
discuss the issue of accounting rules in this paper, the issue of Vinkulierung is 
of central importance for assessing changes in the Swiss corporate governance 
regime. Indeed, many aspects of the regulation of corporate governance have 
undergone very significant changes during the 1990s. This concerns notably the 
level  of  transparency  in  accounting,  the  functioning  of  the  board  and  the 
definition  of  the  responsibilities  of  directors.  Yet,  the  related  questions  of 
capital structure, voting rights, and the possibility of corporate insiders rejecting 
buyers of registered shares, provide a reasonable ‘proxy’ for power relations 
between different stakeholders and illustrate well the debates and changes that 
took  place  in  other  fields  as  well.  As  noted  above,  the  questions  of  capital 
structure and voting rights are even more significant when it comes to analysing 
changing preferences of political and economic actors concerning the question 
of insider- vs. outsider-orientated corporate governance, as these issues directly 
affect power relations between insiders and outside investors. Other aspects, 
such as transparency, have a much more ambiguous effect on the distribution of 
power within the firm. Höpner (2003) considers that increasing transparency is 
more than just ‘symbolic policy’ and has an important impact on the operational 
management of the firm, as it gives rise to shareholder claims for an increasing 
part of the value added, which are hard for managers to resist. This is certainly 
true, but it should be noted that improved transparency does still not directly 
affect  corporate  control  and  it  may  well  be  that  increasing  pressures  from 
shareholders following increasing transparency are often successfully resisted 
by the ‘controllers’. Changes to the means of influencing power relations during 
the  AGM,  such  as  voting  right  distortions,  on  the  other  hand,  are  an 
unambiguous sign of changing power relations and preferences. Limiting the 
discussion to the issue of the capital structure is also justified by the fact that in 
Switzerland this issue had become – by the mid-1980s – the most controversial 
issue debated in the federal parliament in relation to the Stock Corporation Law 
reform  (see  for  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  other  aspects  of  the  reform 
Schnyder 2008). 
 
The Swiss Stock Corporation Law of 1936 allowed firms to limit the voting 
rights of shareholders who owned more than one share (art. 692. al.2 aCO) and   14 
the  issuing  of  'super-voting  shares'  (Stimmrechtsaktien)  was  explicitly 
acknowledged  (art.  693  aCO).  The  Swiss  type  of  ‘super-voting  shares’  is 
different from multiple voting shares in the sense that both ‘normal’9 stock and 
super-voting stock carried one vote. However, the face values of shares from 
different categories were different (art. 693 al.2 aCO). Shares from the category 
with lower face value gave hence right to more votes for the same amount of 
capital than from the category with higher face value. The famous slogan ‘one 
share – one vote’ was hence literally respected in Switzerland. This is of course 
not what shareholder activists have in mind today when they demand respect for 
this principle. The proportionality between voting rights and face value of the 
investment was often not respected. This type of super-voting shares is usually 
referred to as ‘indirect super-voting stock’. 
 
The provisions of the law concerning voting right distortions did not change 
much with the adoption of the new Stock Corporation Law in 1991. Thus, art. 
692 CO still stipulates the principle of voting rights being proportional to the 
face value of shares, but admits also the possibility of voting caps (art. 692 al.2 
CO) and of issuing shares with lower face value but the same voting right (art. 
693 al.1 CO). Art. 693 al.2 CO, however, introduces a new provision, which 
limits the distortion of voting rights to a ratio of 1 to 10. It is therefore not for 
that a super-voting share to carry more than ten times as many votes as an 
ordinary  share.  Respect  for  the  ‘one  share  –  one  vote’  principle  was  by  no 
means  guaranteed  with  this  new  rule,  but  voting  right  distortions  were 
somewhat restricted by comparison with the previous law. 
 
In  practice,  voting  right  distortions  –  although  fairly  common  –  played  a 
secondary role in Switzerland. This is illustrated by the fact that during the 
reform of the law of 1936 there was literally no debate about voting rights in 
Switzerland  and  that  the  limitation  of  1:10  was  accepted  without  much 
opposition in both chambers of the parliament (Official Bulletin (OB) of the 
National Council (NC) 1985: 1659ff; OB of the Council of States (CoS) 1988: 
450ff). As I will show below, this contrasts very much with the Swedish case, 
where the dual class share system was regularly subject to public debate. 
 
The limited importance of voting right distortions in Switzerland was mainly 
due to the existence of a more efficient instrument of insider control, that is, the 
so  called  Vinkulierung.10  Vinkulierung  designates  the  limitation  of  the 
transferability  of  registered  shares  for  reasons  mentioned  in  the  articles  of 
incorporation or in the law. Concretely, the articles of incorporation could give 
management11 the option to refuse the inscription of buyers of registered shares 
in the stock ledger for reasons specified in the articles of incorporation (art. 686   15 
al.1 aCO). The articles could also specify that the management could refuse to 
inscribe buyers of registered stock without giving a reason (art. 686 al.2 aCO). 
This instrument was mainly used by Swiss companies to protect themselves 
from hostile takeovers notably by foreign competitors and more generally to 
limit the influence of foreign investors on Swiss companies (see Lüpold 2004). 
The effect of a refusal of inscription was that the buyer was not considered to be 
a shareholder (art. 685 al.4 aCO) and did not obtain any of the shareholders’ 
rights (that is, neither voting nor cash-flow rights) (for more details: Kaufmann 
and Kunz 1991, and Kläy 1997). 
 
Concerning the Vinkulierung regime, however, fundamental changes were made 
with the reform of 1991. First of all a distinction was introduced between listed 
registered shares and non-listed registered shares, with stricter rules concerning 
restriction of the transferability of shares applying to the former. Under the new 
regulation for listed registered shares (art. 685d-685f CO), Vinkulierung may 
not constitute a limitation to the transferability of shares anymore (that is, all 
rights are transferred to the buyer with the purchase), but ‘merely’ a limitation 
on  the  exercise  of  voting  rights  (Kläy  1997:  139).  For  non-listed  registered 
shares (685b-685c CO), however, the new law introduces the ‘theory of unity’, 
which states that the rights appending to the share cannot be separated, in other 
words,  the  financial  rights  (right  to  receive  a  dividend  and  parts  of  the 
liquidation proceedings mainly) cannot be transferred to the buyer as long as the 
associational  rights  (voting  right,  right  to  participate  in  the  AGM)  are  not 
transferred.12 This implies that all rights remain with the seller if the company 
does not accept the new shareholder (art. 685c al.1 CO; Kläy 1997: 127). 
 
More importantly, however, the reasons a company may have for refusing to 
register a buyer of shares have been limited in a very important way. For listed 
registered shares, the only legitimate reason for refusal is a limitation in the 
percentage of the number of registered shares for which a shareholder can be 
registered  and  thereby  exercise  her  voting  rights  (art.  685d  al.1  CO).  This 
considerably  restricts  the  scope  for  refusals  of  new  shareholders,  since 
discrimination against certain types of shareholders (for example foreigners) is 
not possible any more. The change is particularly striking if one considers that 
the law of 1936 allowed any reason for refusal and permitted the company to 
refuse shareholders even without mentioning a reason. 
 
However, the transitional provisions of the new Stock Corporation Law state at 
art. 4 that the company can – separately from what is stated in art. 685d al.1 – 
refuse ‘[…] persons, in as far and as long as their acceptance would prevent the 
company from providing proof of the composition of the circle of shareholders   16 
as demanded by federal law.’ (art. 4 transitory provisions, my translation). The 
debates which took place in the parliament clearly show that this provision was 
aimed at maintaining the possibility of excluding foreign investors from Swiss 
companies – the traditional aim of Vinkulierung – without stipulating explicitly 
in the law that nationality could be a reason for refusal (see e.g. OB of the 
Council of States (CoS) 1988: 487 and 490). Indeed, federal laws exist which 
require companies to prove that they are in the hands of a majority of Swiss 
citizens. In addition to the Banking Act and laws concerning sensitive sectors 
such as nuclear power plants, the main law which the legislator had in mind 
here was the so-called ‘Lex Koller’, which establishes quotas for the acquisition 
of  real  estate  in  Switzerland  by  foreigners.  A  Swiss  company  which  is 
controlled  by  foreign  investors  would  not  be  allowed  to  acquire  real  estate 
above this quota.13 Consequently, as long as the Lex Koller is in force, foreign 
investors can still be refused the inscription in the stock ledger.14 
 
The reasons for refusal are more generously defined for non-listed registered 
shares.  In  this  case,  the  company  can  refuse  to  inscribe  shareholders  for 
‘important reasons’, which are mentioned in the articles of incorporation (art. 
685b al.1 CO). Such reasons can be provisions justified by a ‘social’ goal, or the 
goal of the economic independence of the company. Moreover, the company 
can reject shareholders who refuse to state that they are buying the shares on 
their own account (this is intended to constitute a protection against ‘trustees’ 
that buy shares for competitors or other, unwanted investors) (art. 685b al.3 
CO). Finally, the company can refuse a shareholder without giving a reason if 
they propose to buy back the shares in question at their real price (art. 685b al.1 
CO). 
 
This new regulation concerning Vinkulierung, which clearly bears the mark of 
consensual  policy-making  and  compromising  (see  below  chapter  5.1),  may 
appear to an external observer to be highly restrictive of shareholder rights. 
However, compared to the law of 1936 and to previous practice, the regulation 
for  listed  shares  can  be  considered  to  be  a  very  large  step  towards  better 
protection of shareholders as it affects the very heart of the traditional insider-
orientated system, in that it effectively deprives insiders of their most important 
control instrument. 
 
Overall,  the  1991  reform  constituted  a  considerable  –  although  not  an 
unambiguous – step towards increasing the shareholder orientation of the Swiss 
corporate  governance  system.  The  ambiguous  character  of  the  changes  is 
expressed  by  the  fact  that  different  leading  experts  on  Swiss  company  law 
reached quite different conclusions concerning the interpretation of the extent of   17 
these changes. Thus, Forstmoser et al. (1996) pointed out that several ‘sacred 
cows’ were not slaughtered (for example, a majority of the board of directors of 
Swiss companies still had to be Swiss citizens and to reside in Switzerland (art. 
708 CO)). Other observers, however, stress that already in 1991, solutions were 
found for problems that in other countries were  only to become part of the 
corporate  governance  debate  of  the  1990s  (Böckli  2002).  Overall,  the 
assessment was that the reform of the stock corporation law had considerably 
improved legal MSP. Kunz (2001: 246) considered that  
‘[t]he  parliament  adopted  […],  concerning  minority  protection,  a 
patchwork  of  compromises.  This  patchwork  of  compromises, 
however,  takes  the  interests  of  shareholders  much  more  fully  into 
account than the cantonal Stock Corporation Laws of the 19th century 
as well as the two first Stock Corporation Laws at the federal level 
[i.e. the ones of 1881 and 1936], without putting into question the 
operability of the company.’ (my translation) 
This observation corroborates my earlier analysis based on the SPI. 
 
The  trend  towards  increasing  MSP  continued  with  the  Stock  Exchange  and 
Securities Trading Act which was adopted in 1995 and entered into force on 
January 1, 1998. As far as the SPI is concerned, this law matters because it 
regulated  corporate  takeovers  for  the  first  time  and  introduced,  most 
importantly, a mandatory bid rule at the 30% level (art. 32 al. 1 SESTA). This 
rule implied that any shareholder who holds a stake of more than 30% of the 
company's equity is obliged to make a public bid for the remaining shares.
15 
Moreover,  the  newly  created  SWX,  which  was  mandated  by  the  SESTA  to 
establish listing requirements, introduced the ‘true and fair’ view principle to 
the  listing  rules  of  1996,  which  considered  a  very  important  increase  in 
transparency levels for listed companies. 
 
It should also be noted that several other reforms to the Company Law – which 
cannot be discussed in detail in this work for reasons of space – have been 
undertaken since the end of the 1990s which all confirm the direction of change 
of the Swiss model, in other words, shareholders’ interests increasingly take 
centre stage. These other reforms include a Merger Act that was adopted in 
2003,  and  an  Auditors  Oversight  Act  (AOA),  which  aims  at  efficiently 
supervising the competences and work of auditors and was adopted in 2005. 
Also, a new proposal for reform of the Stock Corporation Law, which envisages 
several far-reaching changes – notably the abolishing of proxy voting by banks 
and the organs of the company – was submitted to the parliament in December 
2006 and will be examined in parliament sometime in 2008. The argument that 
the legal changes that took place in Switzerland during the 1990s (and since)   18 
signify  a  structural  break  with  the  traditional  system  –  even  although  some 
features of the traditional model still persist – seems unquestionable. 
 
Voting Right Distortions and Limitations on Share Transfers in Sweden 
The ABL of 1975 states in chapter 3 1§ that all shares are to have the same 
rights.  Yet,  the  articles  of  incorporation  can  stipulate  that  different  share 
categories with different voting rights can be created. The only limitation is that 
no share may carry more than ten times as many votes as those in the other 
categories. This rule, which had been introduced in the 1944 ABL, was however 
combined with a ‘grandfather clause’ allowing companies that were established 
before 1944 and had issued shares with more than ten times as many votes than 
others to continue to issue such shares. As a result, at the beginning of the 21
st 
century, several of the largest companies still had differentials of 1:1000 and 
continued to issue such shares. As an example, Ericsson issued in May 2002 B-
shares which carried just 1/1000
th votes compared to the A-shares (Ahlqvist 
2004: 4-44). Differential voting rights were an all the more efficient instrument 
of insider control as the ABL of 1975 contained the possibility of ‘directed 
issues’, which in essence allowed the company to cancel the pre-emption rights 
of certain existing shareholders (that is to say, their right to participate on an 
equal  or  proportionate  basis  in  subscribing  to  newly  issued  shares).  This 
instrument was restricted in 1987 in the sense that only a 90% majority at the 
AGM could approve such directed issues if they were made to related persons. 
 
As I will show below (section 5.2), a possible limitation or abolition of voting 
right distortions has been discussed several times during the last 30 years in 
Sweden. Yet, the investigations had each time led to the conclusion – supported 
by the different governments as well as by the industry – that no limitation was 
desirable. Therefore, up until the reform of the ABL in 2005 this instrument 
remained unchanged. 
 
Besides  voting  right  distortions  and  ‘directed  issues’,  the  Swedish  corporate 
governance system contained a variety of instruments that allowed the company 
to  restrict  the  transferability  of  shares  and  to  exclude,  above  all,  foreign 
investors. The most important of these instruments were probably the existence 
of  ‘bound’  shares  which  were  subject  to  a  ‘foreigner  reservation’ 
(utlänningsförbehåll), and the redemption clause (hembudsförbehåll)16. 
 
The so-called ‘foreigner reservation’ was first introduced in the ABL of 1910 
and  prescribed  that  only  Swedish  companies  which  were  not  controlled  by 
foreigners or by foreign-controlled Swedish companies could acquire real estate   19 
in  Sweden  without  governmental  approval.  In  order  to  prove  their 
‘Swedishness’, Swedish companies were allowed to introduce an anti-foreigner 
clause,  which  since  1934  had  been  formulated  in  a  way  that  foreign 
shareholders could not hold more than 40% of a company's’ shares and not 
more than 20% of the total voting rights. A company could freely decide to 
make all shares subject to such a clause or to separate the equity capital into 
shares subject to a ‘reservation’ – in which case the shares were said to be 
‘bound’ – and shares without such restrictions (‘free shares’). 
 
This  rule  remained  in  force  throughout  the  20
th  century.  In  1982,  it  was 
integrated  into  the  new  law  on  foreign  acquisition  of  Swedish  companies 
(företagsförvärvslag 1982:617), which also introduced a general clause obliging 
foreign investors to ask governmental approval for acquisitions leading to the 
purchaser  exceeding  the  10%,  20%,  40%  and  50%  thresholds  in  respect  of 
either  equity  or  voting  rights (Skog  1994:  119).  The  government  suggested, 
however, in proposal 1991/92:71, to repeal this law (see PM 18) and – as of 
January 1, 1993 – Swedish companies were no longer obliged to issue ‘bound 
shares’ even when acquiring real estate in Sweden. 
 
While ‘bound shares’ were abolished – in the light of Sweden’s joining the EU 
in  1995  –instruments  for  restricting  the  transfer  of  shares  were  further 
developed in the new law of 2005. The most important of these ‘reservations’ to 
the transfer of shares was the ‘redemption reservation’ (hembudsförbehåll). This 
instrument was defined in ABL 1975 chap. 3 3§ as an exemption to the general 
rule of the free transferability of shares (ABL 1975 chap. 3 2§). It provided that 
the  articles  of  incorporation  may  contain  a  clause  according  to  which  a 
shareholder  or  other  person  has  a  right  to  redeem  shares  when  they  are 
transferred  to  a new  owner.  An  investor  who  buys  shares  subject  to such  a 
reservation has to inform the company and the company then informs those who 
have the redemption right (‘lösningsrätt’). The individuals in question have then 
two months to make an offer. During the redemption period, neither the seller 
nor the buyer can exercise voting rights. This clause could – theoretically – also 
be  used  against  foreigners,  as  the  articles  may  postulate  that  the  'hembuds' 
clause applies when shares are sold to a foreigner. In view of Sweden’s joining 
the EU, the official report SOU 1992:13 proposed, however, to introduce a new 
clause in ABL 1975 3 chap. §3, which would have excluded nationality from 
being a valid reason for the application of a hembud obligation. Yet, the new 
rules concerning the hembudsförbehåll (ABL 2005 4:27-36) do not contain any 
such restrictions concerning the reasons for a ‘hembud’. 
   20 
Furthermore, the adoption of the new ABL in 2005 introduced two new forms 
of reservations to the transfer of shares were into Swedish law: the ‘right of first 
refusal’ reservation (förköpsförbehåll, ABL 2005 ch. 4 18-26§§), which obliges 
existing shareholders to offer shares they wish to sell to a person designated in 
the  articles  as  having  a  pre-emptive  right  on  certain  shares  (the  hembud 
reservation  by  contrast  is  exercised  after  the  selling  of  the  shares  to  a  new 
owner, not before Svensson & Danelius 2005: 54); and, in addition, the ‘consent 
reservation’ (samtyckesförbehåll), makes the transfer of shares conditional on 
the board’s consent (ABL 2005 ch. 4 9-17§§). 
 
As I will show below, the fact that bound shares were abolished (due to their 
incompatibility with EC law), but not functionally equivalent instruments of 
insider control, is very telling. It shows that increases in MSP in Sweden during 
the 1990s were mostly linked to adaptations of the Swedish company law to EU 
directives.  Other  than  that,  the  Swedish  reforms  in  the  field  of  corporate 
governance  up  until  2005  were  very  precisely  calibrated;  in  particular,  the 
central CMS (voting right distortions and stock pyramids) were not touched by 
any reform and domestic pressures for change were very weak. 
 
This led the European Corporate Governance Service to the observation that the 
new  ABL  of  2005  contained  few  provisions  which  affected  corporate 
governance, and was less directly aimed at improving the position of minority 
shareholders  within  the  company  than  was  the  case  in  other  countries  (see 
ECGS 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, some of the more important changes in the corporate governance 
field at this time include the introduction of the principle that terms of office for 
directors should only last until the next AGM, unless the byelaws explicitly 
provide  otherwise.  The  raising  of  new  capital  on  financial  markets  and  the 
issuing  of  new  securities  were  made  more  flexible  through  new  provisions 
concerning  convertible  bonds  and  incentive  warrants  (teckningsoptioner).  In 
addition,  kapitalandelslån,  loans  whose  repayment  depended  on  the 
performance of the company, and stock repurchases, were legalised.17 
 
To sum up this part: the analysis of legal MSP in Switzerland and Sweden 
shows that changes took place earlier in Switzerland than in Sweden, and were 
more clearly directed towards an increasing protection of minority shareholders. 
While the SPI indicates a common long-term trend, the discussion of the most 
central minority control structures – Vinkulierung in Switzerland and dual class 
shares in Sweden – indicates that recent reforms have improved the position of 
outside investors much more considerably in Switzerland than in Sweden.   21 
 
The  next  section  analysis  the  political  contexts  in  which  these  different 
trajectories  of  change  took  place,  so  as  directly  to  test  Roe’s  ‘partisan’ 
hypothesis. 
 
4. Political Variables: the Polity and Party Strength 
As  mentioned  above,  the  differences  between  Switzerland  and  Sweden 
concerning the polity and the strength of different political forces in the two 
countries are very significant. The Swiss polity was characterised during long 
periods of time by an extremely consensual set-up containing numerous veto 
points (bi-cameral parliament, federalism, popular referendum, and so on) (see 
Lijphart 1999).18 In addition, power relations in the political arena were stable 
and  changes  in  power  relations  in  the  federal  parliament  did  not  affect  the 
composition  of  the  coalition  government.  The  Christian-Democratic  Party 
(CVP), the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPS) each 
had two representatives in the government, and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
had one member. The centre-right parties thereby held a very clear majority of 5 
out of 7 seats in the governmental college. This informal rule concerning the 
distribution of the seats in the Federal Council – the so-called ‘magic formula’ – 
was strictly respected between 1959 and 2003. Therefore, the composition of 
the Federal Government did not change following general elections even during 
the 1990s, when the populist right-wing SVP grew to become, by the end of the 
20
th century, the largest party, while both the other centre-right parties (CVP 
and FDP) lost considerable numbers of voters. Overall, however, despite the 
power shift within the ‘bourgeois block’, power relations between left and right 
did not significantly change as the centre-left parties (mainly the SPS and the 
Greens) never had significantly more then 30% of the seats in parliament during 
the  post-war  era  (figures  from  Armingeon  et  al  2005).  The  Swiss  Social 
Democratic Party was thus never in control of the political decision-making 
process – either alone, or in alliance with other centre-left parties. Thus the role 
played  by  the  social  democratic  party  cannot  explain  the  phenomena  of 
concentrated ownership and a low level of MSP before 1990. Also, evidence for 
decreasing  social  democratic  power  –  which  could  explain  the  increases  in 
levels of MSP after 1990 – is weak. Even though unionisation rates decreased 
considerably during the period under scrutiny19, at the political level, the left did 
not lose its – limited – influence on the political process. In the parliament, the 
proportion of seats occupied by Social Democrats remained on average fairly 
stable during this period. If anything, the Social Democrats gained influence 
during  the  critical  period  of  the  1990s.20  However,  these  fluctuations  in  the 
number of votes did not have any major impact on social democratic influence   22 
over the political process. The proportional election mechanism for the lower 
house prevented important changes in power relations despite changes in the 
party  strength.  Thus,  the  ‘bourgeois  block’  in  parliament  remained  clearly 
dominant  and  the  Social  Democrats  a  structural  minority  within  the 
governmental college (see below, figure 3). 
 
The corporate governance reforms of the 1990s therefore took place in a context 
of a highly consensual political system with stable centre-right domination over 
the executive and legislative powers. Thus the question becomes: why were 
there such considerable changes in legal MSP despite the stability of political 
power relations? 
 
Sweden,  while  usually  considered  to  be  a  consensual  democracy  as  well,  is 
closer to being a majoritarian system than Switzerland is in several respects (see 
Lijphart 1999). Sweden is less federalist and has a unicameral parliament, the 
Riksdag. The outcome of the general elections does determine the composition 
of the government. As in a majoritarian democracy, the winners of the general 
elections appoint the government. 
 
Despite  these  ‘majoritarian’  characteristics,  Swedish  politics  were,  in  actual 
fact, characterised by a remarkable stability of political power relations due to 
the  social-democratic  SAP’s  (Sveriges  socialdemokratiska  arbetarparti) 
dominant position for most of the 20
th century. The SAP had rarely obtained 
less then 50% of the votes in general elections since 1932. The average of seats 
obtained  by  centre-left  and  left-wing  parties  in  the  parliamentary  elections 
during the period from 1960 to 2004 was 65.0% (as compared to 27.0% in 
Switzerland for the lower chamber; see figure 2).   23 
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Source: Armingeon et al. 2005; 
 
Notes: The figures report the percentage of seats occupied by ‘left’ political parties in the 
national parliament. For Switzerland the figures refer only to seats in the lower house. 
‘Left’ includes in Sweden: Social Democratic Workers Party, Communist/Left Party, Green 
Party; in Switzerland: Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Greens, Green Alliance, 
and Progressive Organisations of Switzerland (POCH). 
 
As a result, Sweden was governed between 1932 and 2006 – with the exception 
of the years 1976-1981 and 1991-1994 – by a government dominated by the 
social democratic SAP. In spite of the fact that, especially after the introduction 
of the proportional election mode in 1974, Swedish governments were often 
minority governments, the Social Democrats governed – after the end of the last 
coalition government with the agrarian party Bondeförbundet
21 in 1957 – most 
of the time through a single-party government which was passively supported 
by the communists of the Left Party
22 and in more recent years by the Greens 
(Miljöpartiet, mp) (see Högfeldt 2005: 522). In Switzerland, on the other hand, 
the first member of the SP in the Federal Government was elected only in 1943, 
and only in 1959 did the left obtain a second seat in the Federal Government. 
 
At first glance, Sweden, with its politically strong left, which went together with 
a  marked  insider  orientation  of  corporate  governance  and  concentrated 
corporate control, seems hence to confirm Roe’s (2003) partisan hypothesis, in 
other words the strength of the left led owners to hold on to their stakes in order   24 
to oppose the additional claims on company resources voiced by the labour 
movement. 
Yet, in Sweden, changes in governmental power could and did occasionally 
happen (see figure 3). Thus, the first bourgeois-dominated government came to 
power in October 1976 after 40 years of SAP dominance, the SAP regained 
power in October 1982, but lost it again in 1991 to the centre-right coalition of 
the ‘moderate’ Bildt government. In 1994, the SAP won the new elections, but 
had to govern from the late 1990s onwards – due to a considerable loss of votes 
(45.4% of the votes in 1994 elections and 36.5% in 1998) – in coalition with 
other left parties. In 2006, finally, a new bourgeois coalition – the Alliance for 
Sweden  –  won  the  elections  and  formed  the  Reinfeldt  government.  Clearly, 
Swedish  politics  are  still,  after  1970,  dominated  by  the  social  democrats. 
However, this domination is no longer hegemonic and changes in governmental 
power do happen. Therefore, in Sweden, contrary to Switzerland, party politics 
could have played a role in corporate governance reform during the 1980s and 
1990s, as changing governments were able to change the direction of policies 
concerning corporate governance. 
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Source: Armingeon et al. 2005; 
 
Note: Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index): 1 = hegemony of right-wing parties (number of 
cabinet seats occupied by members of a left party (gov_left) = 0), 2 = dominance of right-
wing parties (gov_left<33.3), 3 = stand-off between left and right (33.3<gov_left<66.6), 4 = 
dominance of social-democratic and other left parties (gov_left>66.6), 5 = hegemony of left 
parties (gov_left=100). 
   25 
Yet, as I will now show, despite the differences in the political system and the – 
in part consequential – differences in the politics of the two countries, party 
politics did not play any determining role in corporate governance reform in 
either case. In Switzerland changes in corporate governance took place despite 
stable power relations. In Sweden, changes in governmental power did not lead 
to  any  corresponding  changes  in  corporate  governance  policy.  Therefore,  in 
Switzerland  the  dominant  centre-right  actors’  preferences  concerning  the 
direction of corporate governance reforms must have changed at some point, 
while in Sweden no difference between the centre-left’s and the centre-rights’ 
preferences in this matter existed. 
In  the  next  section,  I  turn  to  analyse  the  political  debates  over  corporate 
governance reform during the 1980s and 1990s in the two countries in order to 
identify different actors’ preferences empirically. 
 
5.  The  Politics  of  Corporate  Governance  Reforms  in  Switzerland  and 
Sweden 
5.1. Switzerland 
As mentioned above (see section 3), two major reforms have changed the rules 
of Swiss corporate governance during the 1980s and 1990s: the reform of the 
Stock Corporation Law, which lasted from 1965 to 1991, and the elaboration of 
the SESTA between 1989 and 1995. 
 
The issue of the reform of the Stock Corporation Law of 1936 was extremely 
controversial throughout its 26 year-long history. When the federal government 
initiate a reform discussion in 1965, no significant political force showed much 
interest in supporting reform, which from the outset aimed at improving the 
position of ‘minorities’ within the firm (see Schnyder et al. 2005a, 2005b). The 
first criticisms of the ‘traditional’ corporate governance system  were  mainly 
academic in nature and attacked the legal precepts on which this system was 
based (in particular Gautschi 1966, but also Bär 1959 and 1966, Jolidon 1968). 
The reason why a reform process was initiated despite the lack of any serious 
political support lies in the particular context of the 1960s. In 1964, a banking 
scandal hit Switzerland, which in conjunction with a bear market during the first 
half  of  the  decade,  led  different  economic  actors  –  notably  the  banks  –  to 
support reform of the existing corporate governance regime in order to restore 
confidence in the Swiss financial system. Yet, this initial support for reform 
waned quickly as the stock market recovered and the most urgent problems 
were  addressed  by  the  SBA  in  a  circular  demanding  that  listed  companies 
increase  the  transparency  of  their  annual  accounts  (see  David  et  al.   26 
forthcoming).  Most  economic  actors  and  their  representatives  in  the 
associational and political spheres resolutely disavowed any need for reform, 
above all in order to avoid the ‘politicisation’ of issues that were left, under the 
old law of 1936, to self-regulation. 
 
During this phase, the centre-right parties and their constituencies attempted to 
limit the public regulation of corporate governance to the absolute minimum 
necessary, and to defend as far as possible the status quo. The social democrats 
and the trade unions, on the other hand, had, at that time, one single political 
priority,  which  was  the  introduction  in  Switzerland  of  a  co-determination 
system based on the German model. All their efforts went in this direction, as is 
illustrated, for instance, by the fact that the only subject discussed in the Swiss 
Union  of  Trade  Unions’  (Schweizerischer  Gewerkschaftsbund,  SGB)  written 
opinion during the consultation procedure
23 on the first draft law of 1973 was 
the question of co-determination (Swiss Federal Archives (BAR), E4110 (B); 
1992/175; vol.9). Between 1965 and the mid-1970s, support for a far-reaching 
shareholder-orientated reform came almost exclusively from legal experts and 
public officials, who had, owing to their expertise, a considerable influence on 
the definition of the terms of the debate during the pre-parliamentary phase (see 
for details Schnyder 2008). 
 
A first significant change in the politics of reform took place in 1976, when the 
social-democratic popular initiative
24 concerning the introduction of a German-
style co-determination system was rejected by a very large majority of Swiss 
voters. The failure of the left's demand for co-determination led them to join the 
reformers  who  were  pushing  for  increasing  transparency  and  minority 
shareholder protection in the Stock Corporation Law. In the absence of any 
possibility for employees to influence firm-level decision-making from within, 
the  ‘second  best  solution’  for  the  left  became  increasing  the  possibility  of 
control from ‘without’ through increasing transparency and control rights over 
the insiders. 
 
Paraphrasing  Höpner  (2003),  one  can  say  that  the  rejection  of  the  co-
determination initiative led to the emergence of the ‘Swiss party paradox’, that 
is, the fact that the Social Democrats became the main political force pushing 
for shareholder-orientated corporate governance reforms, while the bourgeois 
centre-right parties opposed such a liberalisation. In fact, this attitude of the 
Swiss centre-left clearly contradicts Roe’s (2003) prediction, which claims that 
social  democrats  would  not  favour  such  a  ‘second  best’  solution,  as  the 
empowerment of shareholders would have  ambiguous effects on labour (see 
above section 1). This apparently paradoxical situation – paradoxical because an   27 
increased  shareholder-orientation  is  generally  associated  with  increasing 
distribution of value added to shareholders, down-sizing of the work force, and 
increasing job insecurity – is explained in the Swiss case by the convergence of 
outside shareholders’ and employees’ interests in increasing transparency and 
outside control over management in order to reduce agency costs (see below 
section 6.1 for details concerning the reasons for left support of pro-shareholder 
reform). 
 
The  reform  proposal  was  transferred  from  the  federal  administration  to  the 
lower chamber of the federal parliament – the National Council (NC) – in 1981, 
after fully 16 years of pre-parliamentary deliberations in two different expert 
committees.  The  pre-parliamentary  phase  was  very  conflict-laden  and  at 
different  points  the  reform  was  in  danger  of  being  abandoned  due  to  the 
irreconcilable positions of the pro- and anti-reform forces (see Schnyder et al. 
2005b). Yet, the governmental proposal still contained a fairly liberal – that is, 
pro-shareholder  –  tendency,  the  result  of  legal  experts  disproportionate 
influence on the definition of the terms of the reform during its early stages. 
This  can  be  seen  in  the  governmental  explanation  of  the  reform  and  its 
insistence  on  the  need  to  improve  the  position  of  the  minority  shareholder 
within  the  firm.  The  following  passage  taken  from  the  Official  Journal 
(Bundesblatt, BB), which accompanied the draft law when it was handed from 
the government to the parliament, expresses this point of view:  
‘The  protection  of  shareholders  [in  Switzerland]  is  parlous:  the 
shareholder submits to the power of the majority and puts up with 
leaving the management of the capital he invested in the hands of 
someone else. Most of the time, restrictions on the transferability of 
the shares […] prevent him from selling his shares if he wants to 
avoid this […] threat. The protection that he is offered by the law is 
deficient: due to a lack of sufficient information, the shareholder is 
not well informed about the real situation of his company, so that it is 
difficult for him to […] protect and defend himself.’ (BB 1983 vol. II, 
no.27: 779; my translation). 
In the lower house, which debated the reform proposal between 1982 and 1985, 
only  a  very  limited  number  of  liberally-minded  members  of  the  bourgeois 
parties  supported  the  government’s  and  the  Social  Democrats’  efforts  to 
improve the protection of minorities and to limit the power of mangers. At that 
stage, the Swiss ‘transparency coalition’ (see for the concept of ‘transparency 
coalition’ Cioffi & Höpner 2006) was largely composed – besides legal experts 
and civil servants – of Social Democrats. This ‘coalition’ pushed mainly for 
improvements in the level of transparency in accounting, notably by limiting – 
or even prohibiting – hidden reserves and for a limitation of the management   28 
and board’s far-reaching powers. Lillian Uchtenhagen – an influential socialist 
MP  –  expressed  explicitly  the  somewhat  paradoxical  situation  in  which  the 
social democrats sided with ‘capital’ in order to oppose the power of mangers: 
‘The evolution of the last decades has shifted the power within the 
joint stock corporation from the shareholders to the management. The 
goals of the intended reforms are not least explained by this evolution. 
The question was never the control or the containment of the power of 
capital  providers,  who  were  previously  called  ‘capitalists’.  On  the 
contrary,  the  aim  was  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  shareholders  – 
especially  the  minority  shareholders  –  from  over-powerful 
management.  The  attempt  to  create  transparency  concerning  the 
financial situation and the results of the company, too, aimed to limit 
somewhat  the  nowadays  almost  unlimited  power  of  management, 
which exists in many companies even towards the boards of directors 
– in theory the supreme management body.’ (OB CN 1985: 1791; my 
translation) 
The vast majority of bourgeois MPs, however, fiercely opposed any attempt to 
liberalise  the  corporate  governance  system,  pointing  to  the  importance  of 
management’s independence from market forces for the success of a business 
enterprise. The minimalist character of the law of 1936 was considered to be 
one of the factors explaining the economic success story of Switzerland during 
the 20
th century. This view had been expressed by the representatives of the 
business all the way through the elaboration of the draft laws, and justified their 
preference  for  the  status  quo  (see,  for  example,  minutes  of  the  Tschopp 
Committee 2
nd meeting, September 1968: 10-11). During the first half of the 
1980s,  virtually  all  economic  actors  –  whether  they  were  close  to  the  SME 
sector,  to the  large  MNCs,  the  banks,  and  even  some  representatives  of the 
accounting profession – were very critical of the governmental proposal and 
above  all  rejected  transparency  and  disclosure  requirements,  as  well  as  the 
restriction of the Vinkulierung procedure, as too far-reaching
25 Unsurprisingly, 
the strongest opposition came from the SME sector. Just before the debates in 
the  lower  house,  the  most  important  business  association  in  this  sector,  the 
Swiss Trade Association (Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband) sent, on August 
26, 1983, a letter to several MPs, whom they thought sympathetic to their cause, 
in order to ask them to defend the interests of the small companies during the 
parliamentary debates.
26 In this letter, the USAM complained in particular about 
the  importance  that  was  given  to  minority  shareholder  protection  in  the 
governmental draft law:  
‘The  minority  needs  without  doubt  protection.  However,  the 
enterprise  and  the  main  shareholders,  the  management  and  the   29 
employees  too  need  protection  from  the  minority!  Therefore,  no 
minority  protection  rules,  which  not  only  paralyse  the  stock 
corporation,  but  can  even  destroy  it,  should  be  adopted.  Much 
importance is attributed in this Stock Corporation Law reform to the 
theme  of  ‘minority  protection’.  One  gets  the  impression  that  the 
shareholders  –  especially  the  minority  shareholders  –  are  martyrs; 
people  who  subscribe  for  or  acquired  shares  completely 
disinterestedly and unselfishly, who give their money altruistically to 
the economy. Anyone who knows the practice just a little bit knows 
that  this  is  not  the  case.  This  kind  of  ill-conceived  minority 
protection,  as  is  illustrated  by  the  [reform  proposals  for]  the 
Vinkulierung, the special control etc., has as its sole aim to promote 
vexatious  litigation  and  the  subjugation  of  the  enterprise.’  (Letter 
from August 26, 1983: 5, my translation) 
This  passage  very  clearly  shows  the  opposition  between  two  contradictory 
views of the firm and of shareholders which have shaped the Swiss corporate 
governance  reform  debate  throughout  the  20
th  century  (see  Schnyder  et  al. 
2005a, Lüpold & Schnyder 2008). 
 
While the SME sector defended the most conservative point of view, even large 
companies were very much opposed to the direction of the reform. This can be 
illustrated by the fact that MPs like the Christian Democrat Paul Eisenring, one 
of the most fervent opponents of the reform and one of the representatives of the 
CVP in the preparatory committee of the NC, held seats on the board of several 
of the largest Swiss companies, including BBC (which was later to merge with 
the Swedish company Asea AB to become ABB Ltd.), Motor-Columbus (an 
investment company in the Energy sector close to the UBS), Jacobs-Suchard, 
and Südelektra (which was later to become Xstrata). 
 
The centre-right actors close to both the SME sector and large companies, along 
with  their  representatives  in  parliament,  constituted  an  insurmountable 
‘bourgeois block’ – or ‘conservative coalition of insiders’ – controlling more 
than 70% of the seats in the lower chamber of parliament (see figure 2 above) 
against  which  the  emerging  ‘transparency  coalition’  had  no  possibility  of 
defending the governmental reform proposal. As a result, it came as no surprise 
that  the  draft  law  adopted  by  the  NC  in  1985  undid  most  of  the  –  already 
moderate – reforms that the governmental proposal had suggested and which 
aimed at tipping the power balance within the company somewhat in favour of 
the shareholders. The proposal of the National Council was, according to certain 
observers, even more insider-friendly than the law of 1936. Kaspar Villiger, an   30 
influential  Radical  Democratic  MP  who  was  later  to  become  Minister  of 
Finance, explains the attitude of the majority thus:  
‘Even  if  we  consider  that  the  main  emphasis  should  be  shifted  in 
favour of the shareholder, the survival of the enterprise still has to 
have absolute priority.’ (OB NC 1985: 1661, my translation) 
A number of observers – even from the centre-right – were critical of the work 
on the reform that the NC had done between 1982 and 1985. This was for 
instance the case with many national newspapers. The very influential Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung – close to the FDP – and the head of its economic department 
Hansjörg Abt were very critical of the work of the National Council. Other 
examples include Der Bund from the city of Bern and the Basler Zeitung, which 
ran  on  October  5,  1985  an  article  with  the  headline  ‘Aktionäre  bleiben  die 
Dummen’ (‘shareholders remain the losers’).
27 
 
Actors close to the SME sector, on the other hand, were delighted with the 
result  of  the  negotiations  within  the  NC.  Several  newspapers  of  trade 
organisations  and  notably  the  Schweizerische  Gewerbe-Zeitung  published  an 
article  on  November  21,  1985  whose  title  read  ‘Aktienrechtsrevision  –  die 
Vernunft  hat  gesiegt’  (‘Stock  Corporation  Law  Reform  –  Reason  has 
Triumphed’). 
 
The  period  from  1982  to  1985  therefore  saw  the  conservative  coalition  of 
insiders successfully block rising pressures for corporate governance reform in 
the political arena stemming from a (weak) transparency coalition of the centre-
left,  trade  unions,  civil  servants,  liberal  lawyers,  and  some  isolated  liberal 
members of the bourgeois parties. 
 
Yet, a very considerable and unexpected change in the direction of the reform 
took place when the reform proposal was transferred in 1985 from the lower 
chamber of parliament to the upper chamber, the Council of States (CoS). From 
the  late  1980s  onwards  an  increasing  number  of  formerly  conservative 
bourgeois MPs started to support a certain degree of pro-shareholder reform, 
which led the – even more clearly conservative-dominated – Council of States
28 
to adopt in 1988 a reform proposal which was much more orientated towards 
the interests of shareholders then the version adopted by the NC in 1985. This 
change  surprised  most  commentators,  who  had  expected  the  CoS  to  further 
reduce the extent of the reform. The difference in the approaches of the two 
chambers was made clear from the outset by the chairman of the CoS, Carlo 
Schmid  –  a  conservative  member  of  the  Christian  Democratic  Party  –  who 
presented the preparatory committee’s proposal in the Plenum of the CoS in 
1988 in the following words:   31 
‘The  old  saying,  according  to  which  the  shareholder  is  stupid  and 
impertinent,  stupid  because  he  gives  away  capital  and  impertinent 
because he wants even a dividend for it, should not even remotely be 
the guiding principle of our reform. The fact that [the preparatory 
committee of the CoS] has come back to the Governmental slant is 
not least of all linked to the fact that we wanted to lay the stress more 
on the protection of the shareholder than the National Council, which 
had attached more value to the operability of the enterprise.’ (OB CE 
1988: 455, emphasis added, my translation) 
Given that the same centre-right parties dominated the CoS and the NC, this 
passage  shows  that  a  fundamental  change  in  centre-right  actors’  preferences 
started  to  take  place  during  the  second  half  of  the  1980s,  which  cannot  be 
explained  by  changing  political  power  relations.  This  becomes  even  clearer 
when we consider that most of the changes to the reform proposal proposed by 
the CoS in 1988 were ultimately accepted by the NC and were in some cases 
even further developed towards shareholder interests (see Schnyder 2008 for 
details). 
 
The change in centre-right actors’ preferences led at the end of the 1980s to the 
emergence of a genuine cross-class transparency coalition, uniting actors close 
to  the  large,  internationalised  companies  and  centre-left  actors.  An  example 
from the legal debates over a provision, which would have obliged companies 
to disclose details any participation in other companies over 5% of the equity, 
illustrates this new constellation of forces. The SVP MP Christoph Blocher had 
submitted a proposal containing such an obligation to the plenum of the NC in 
1990 (which is interesting in itself as Blocher was one of the addressees of the 
SGB letter referred to above and one of the most conservative MPs during the 
first half of the 1980s; see footnote 54 below for a possible explanation). The 
Social Democrat Lilian Uchtenhagen intervened in order to ask her fellow party 
members to back Blocher: 
‘I demanded the floor mainly in order to tell those, who think that 
whenever Mr. Blocher is favourable to something, they have to be 
against, that Mr. Blocher represents concerning the Stock Corporation 
Law  economic  interests  –  this  is  legitimate  –  but  he  does  it  very 
independently,  contrary  to  many  other  business  representatives.  In 
this matter, he will often say correct things; it is therefore worthwhile 
listening to what he says.’ (OB CN 1990: 1363, my translation). 
The  changing  preferences  of  the  centre-right  MPs  and  the  consequential 
strengthening  of  the  transparency  coalition  were  the  single  most  important   32 
factor explaining the increase in legal MSP, as I have observed in section 3 
(above). 
 
The reasons of the changing centre-right preferences are multiple and complex 
and will be discussed in more detail below (section 6). Suffice here to say that 
the changes can be attributed to changes in Swiss companies’ practices towards 
an increasing shareholder orientation, which stopped politicians close to these 
companies opposing the reform. More precisely, banks and large – and mostly 
listed companies – had already changed their practices in important ways during 
the late 1980s. Smaller companies, on the other hand, did not necessarily follow 
the same path. The change in the preferences of the large companies and the 
resistance  of  SMEs  to  such  changes  led  to  an  increasing  heterogeneity  of 
corporate governance practice within the Swiss system (see for this concept 
Deeg & Jackson 2006). As a result of this increasing heterogeneity, tensions 
within the business elite started to increase as centre-right MPs close to the 
SME  sector  continued  to  oppose  the  reform,  while  many  MPs  close  to  the 
MNCs  and  banks  started  to  abandon  their  resistance.  This  tension  can  be 
illustrated by the following passage taken from the parliamentary debates in the 
Council  of  States  in  1988.  In  the  field  of  Vinkulierung,  the  preparatory 
committee of the CoS had proposed to the plenum to retain the nationality of 
investors as a reason for rejection of a shareholder. Yet, the majority of the 
clearly  centre-right  dominated  Council  did  not  support  the  Preparatory 
Committee’s solution any longer. The most conservative senators such as the 
Radical  Democrat  Peter  Hefti  were  surprised  by  this  loss  of  support  for 
Vinkulierung from their fellow party members: 
‘Especially those circles who are now up in arms against the solution 
proposed  by  the  preparatory  committee  [i.e.  maintaining  the  anti-
foreigner clause], stressed at the time very much how important it was 
that the Swiss character of an enterprise could be preserved, in other 
words, that it was possible to keep foreigners at bay. I do not really 
understand how this volte-face came about.’ (OB CoS 1988: 485) 
While Hefti was not close to the SME sector alone, but rather a member of the 
board of Zurich Insurance, one of the largest Swiss insurers, this still illustrates 
the increasing cleavage within the formerly cohesive centre-right coalition. This 
increasing cleavage considerably weakened the anti-reform coalition and made 
change possible. Yet, given the existence of numerous veto points in the Swiss 
political  process  (bicameralism,  popular  referendum,  etc.)  and  given  the 
political  and  organisational  resources  of  the  SME  sector  and  its  economic 
power, the conservative coalition remained influential even during the 1990s 
and prevented any radical change (such as abolishing Vinkulierung altogether). 
In other words, the strength of the SME sector – in a very consensual polity –   33 
constituted a conservative bias in the reform process, which explains why the 
reform was more limited than could have been expected from the considerable 
political support for pro-shareholder reforms during the 1990s. 
 
In  order  to  overcome  the  increasing  volatility  of  majorities  within  the 
parliament and the SME opposition to reform, a mechanism was used, which 
Thelen  (2003)  has  labelled  ‘institutional  layering’.  The  new  regulation  of 
Vinkulierung gives a good example for this: the parliament decided at the end of 
the  1980s  to  make  two  separate  regulations  for  Vinkulierung  depending  on 
whether shares were listed on the stock exchange or not. As I have shown above 
(see section 3), the rules for listed shares were much stricter than the latter. 
Through this ‘layering’ of new (more liberal) rules over the old ones – which 
remain applicable to certain companies (that is, non-listed ones) – the legislator 
managed  to  achieve  a  politically  viable  and  internationally  acceptable 
equilibrium  between  continuity  and  change.  Deeg  and  Jackson  (2006:  14) 
observe  that  ‘[i]nstitutional  layering  […]  may  allow  differential  adoption  of 
“old”  and  “new”  business  practices  according  to  sectoral  and  firm-specific 
characteristics’. This was indeed the case in Switzerland.
29 
 
When we look at the elaboration of the first federal stock exchange law between 
1988 and 1995, the profound changes in Swiss corporate governance and in 
business  actors’  preferences  become  even  clearer.  The  two  central  issues 
touching  the  question  of  MSP  in  the  SESTA  were  the  regulation  of  hostile 
takeovers and transparency standards for listed firms, which were defined in the 
listing requirements adopted by the newly created Swiss Exchange, SWX. The 
SESTA introduced for the first time in Switzerland legal rules for takeovers 
including a mandatory bid rule (the AGM could decide to ‘opt out’ however). 
Concerning the second dimension – transparency – the SWX was mandated to 
elaborate a new set of listing requirements. These listing requirements made de 
facto compulsory the ‘true and fair view’ standard for listed firms. This was a 
very significant increase in transparency compared to the level of transparency 
imposed  by  the  Stock  Corporation  Law  even  after  1992.  One  legal  expert 
commented on this evolution in the following words: 
‘If one thinks of the very cramped and almost passionate debates that 
have taken place in this field for the last twenty or thirty years, it is 
incredible to observe the facility with which this problem could be 
solved so quickly through the adoption of listing requirements, with 
almost no opposition from the listed companies.’ (Hirsch 1995: 230; 
my translation). 
One important factor to explain this astonishing observation is of course that the 
SESTA concerned only listed companies and that the most conservative actors,   34 
that is the private SMEs, were not concerned with these rules. Yet, as I have 
shown  above,  some  years  earlier,  even  the  largest  companies  were  firmly 
opposed to stricter rules concerning accounting. The increase in MSP in these 
new regulations is therefore very remarkable. 
Conclusion on Switzerland 
To  sum  up,  the  analysis  of  the  decision-making  process  highlights  two 
fundamental  changes  in  the  configuration  of  political  coalitions:  after  the 
rejection  of  the  popular  initiative  on  co-determination  in  1976,  the  labour 
movement more or less abandoned its struggle for co-determination and started 
to  support  what  it  had  seen  as  second  best  solutions  –  the  improvement  of 
external control over firms through increasing transparency – and in so doing 
joined forces with legal experts and public officials
30. This second phase of the 
reform  process  saw  the  emergence  of  an  important  endogenous  source  for 
corporate governance change – left political pressure – and was marked by a 
coalition  of  members  of  the  social  democratic  party  and  some  liberal  legal 
experts who were struggling to increase minority protection and transparency in 
the Stock Corporation Law. 
 
The conservative coalition of insiders during this phase was still very cohesive 
and  opposed  to  any  attempt  at  change.  Given  the  weakness  of  the  left  in 
Switzerland,  the  conservative  actors  very  largely  managed  to  impose  their 
preferences  on  the  pro-reform  actors,  leading  to  amendments  in  the 
governmental  reform  proposal  which  turned  the  draft  law  into  a  very 
conservative,  insider-orientated  legislation,  which  offered  virtually  no 
protection for minority shareholders. 
 
Yet, centre-left support for pro-shareholder reform was still an important factor 
for the reform process as it kept questions linked to MSP on the political agenda 
throughout the 1980s. Reasoning counterfactually, one could say that had the 
left not supported such a reform, the reform process would without doubt have 
been abandoned at the end of the 1970s or concluded in the early 1980s with a 
very conservative law. The left's support for the reform was therefore essential 
for the changes of the early 1990s. However, given the political weakness of the 
left in the Swiss parliament, centre-left support was not enough to push through 
a pro-shareholder reform. 
 
From  1985  onwards,  the  power  relations  within  the  parliament  started  to 
change, as a cross-class pro-reform coalition, including an increasing number of 
centre-right  MPs  close  to  the  business  elite,  emerged.  This  change  led  to  a 
profound  reorientation  of  the  reform  during  the  last  phase  of  the  decision-
making  process  (1986-1991).  The  law  that  was  finally  adopted  in  1991   35 
protected shareholders considerably better than the law of 1936 or the proposal 
of  the  National  Council  of  1985.  Moreover,  the  elaboration  of  the  Stock 
Exchanges and Securities Trading Act in 1995 and the adoption of Listing Rules 
by the new Stock Exchange, SWX, show that the actors’ preferences continued 
to evolve during the 1990s, making possible a change which clearly departed 
from the traditional paradigm of insider-orientated corporate governance. 
 
The conservative coalition – since the early 1990s mainly composed of SMEs – 
remained, however, influential and managed – especially due to the consensual 
decision-making  process  –  to  push  the  transparency  coalition  to  make 
compromises,  which  took  mostly  the  form  of  flexible,  enabling,  and  vague 
rather than constraining rules. This allowed the SMEs to stick to their somewhat 
insider-orientated  practices  while  forcing  listed  companies  could  adapt  to 
international standards. 
 
The  Swiss  case  therefore  shows  that  it  was  not  changes  in  partisan  power 
relations, but changing preferences of centre-right politicians, that best explain 
the changes we observe in the legal framework of corporate governance. Before 
turning to explaining these remarkable changes in more detail, I analyse, in the 
next  section,  the  Swedish  reform  process,  in  order  to  compare  the  Swedish 
coalition configuration to the Swiss case. 
5.2 Sweden 
Since the adoption of a new Stock Corporation Law in Sweden in 1975, some 
reform work has been going on almost without interruption. Several official 
investigations into different problems related to the Stock Corporation Law and 
to MSP took place during the 1980s notably concerning the question of voting 
rights (SOU 1986:23 by the ‘Voting Right Committee’ (Röstvärdeskommittén); 
SOU 1988:38 and 1990:1 by the Ägarutredning). Most of these investigations 
did not result, however, in concrete legal action. Only in 1990 was a major 
reform  process  initiated,  leading  to  several  successive  changes  to  the  legal 
framework of corporate governance during the 1990s. More precisely, in the 
light of Swedish accession to the EU in 1995, the social-democratic government 
of  PM  Ingvar  Carlsson  established  in  1990  the  Aktiebolagskommitté  (Stock 
Corporation  Committee,  committee  no.  Ju  1990:08).  The  AB  Committee 
published  its  reform  proposals  in  intermediary  reports  in  1992,  1995,  1997, 
1999  and  2000  –  before  submitting  the  final  report  in  2001.
31  These 
intermediary reports led to regular changes in the ABL of 1975 throughout the 
1990s  until  it  was  finally  replaced  by  the  new  ABL  of  2005  based  on  the 
Persson government’s proposal 2004/05:85 of March 10, 2005.
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By Swedish standards, this was a very long legislative process. In contrast to 
Switzerland, however, this lengthy process was not caused by political conflicts 
and  opposition  to  the  reform,  but  rather  to  the  continuing  evolution  of  the 
European company law directives, which led to the extension of the reform 
mandate and the inclusion of new issues (see Jan Ertsborn’s (fp) intervention in 
the parliamentary debate on the ABL on June 13, 2005).
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The  AB  Committee’s  mandate  was,  in  the  first  place,  to  examine  the 
compatibility of the Swedish ABL with the European Company Law Directives 
in view of Sweden’s entering the EU in 1995. The first part of this task led to 
two  official  reports  (SOU  1992:13  and  SOU  1992:83).  SOU  1992:83 
‘Aktiebolagslagen och EG’, which adapted Swedish law to the First, Second 
Third  and  Twelfth  Company  Law  Directives,  was  debated  in  parliament  in 
1992, and the new rules entered into force on January 1, 1993. 
 
The second part of the committee’s task was to examine questions concerning 
the  company’s  capital  and  instruments  of  finance,  its  organisation  and  the 
protection of minority shareholders (see governmental directive dir. 1990:46). 
The most important changes related to these reports concerned the abolition of 
‘bound shares’ (prop 1992/93:68), discussed above, and the division of stock 
corporations  into  two  categories,  public  ABs  and  private  ABs  (prop 
1993/94:196). 
 
While EU legislation required a certain adaptation of Swedish law, it is striking 
to see that these changes did not give rise to any significant political debate. The 
abolition  of  ‘bound  shares’  was  arguably  a  considerable  change  to  the 
traditional Swedish corporate governance system. The anti-foreigner clause was 
still  widespread  in  corporate  articles  of  association  in  the  beginning  of  the 
1990s. The AB Committee found that in 1991, 80% of all Swedish companies 
had an anti-foreigner clause in their articles, which was twice as many as the 
number that the AB Committee which prepared the ABL of 1944 had identified 
in 1941 (see PM 18, p.17). Among listed companies, 89% (188 out of 212 listed 
companies)  used  such  a  ‘reservation’.  The  abolition  of  this  clause  in  1993 
therefore constituted a considerable interference with corporate practice. Yet, 
neither the existence of nor the removal in 1993 of these anti-foreign measures 
gave rise to much debate (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2003: 79). This contrasts 
starkly with the Swiss case, where the question of the anti-foreigner clause had 
become,  at  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  most  controversial  issue  of  the  stock 
corporation  law  reform  of  1991  and  gave  rise  to  lengthy debates  and  many 
conflicts. 
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The ‘civilising force’ of the EU largely explains why this reform generated little 
controversial debates, as these legal provisions were clearly incompatible with 
the  principle  of  the  equality  of  treatment  of  EU  nationals  and  had  to  be 
abolished given Sweden’s entry into the EEA on 1 July 1994 and into the EU in 
1995.  EU  legislation  has  pushed  the  Swedish  legislator  to  undertake  some 
reform steps despite a virtual absence of domestic pressure for such reforms.
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Beyond the adaptation of Swedish law to EU legislation, it is striking to see that 
in all the reports published by the AB Committee, the issue of MSP was – 
despite the initial mandate of the AB Committee – only very marginally touched 
on. Agnblad et al. (2001: 251) also consider that ‘[e]xpropriation of minorities 
[is] remarkably absent as an issue in the public debate’. This contrasts strongly 
with the Swiss case where the protection of minority shareholders was the main 
issue throughout the reform process. This does not mean that Sweden was not 
affected  by  the  international  debates  about  an  increasingly  shareholder-
orientated view of the firm (see for instance very explicitly in SOU 2001:1, 
p.26).  In  fact,  in  one  sense,  the  Swedish  debate  was  clearly  shareholder-
orientated as well. Thus in its official report on The Organisation of the Stock 
Corporation of 1995 (SOU 1995:44), the AB Committee stressed that owner 
interests were at the centre of the reform proposal: 
‘The  Companies  Act  must  guarantee  owners  the  ultimate  right  of 
decision  in  their  companies  and  allow  for  changes  in  ownership 
structures. The Companies Act should also provide owners with the 
opportunity  to  uphold  their  interests  vis-à-vis  the  companies’ 
management’ (SOU 1995:44 p.19; my translation) 
At first glance, this sounds very much like the pro-shareholder rhetoric that was 
popular  during  the  1990s  among  economic  actors  and  politicians  in  many 
countries including Switzerland. Yet, the same report made it also very clear 
that by ‘owners’ the AB Committee did not principally mean external minority 
shareholders.  Rather,  the  AB  Committee  had  ‘active  ownership’  by  large 
shareholders in mind. In fact, the Committee stressed the ‘importance of an 
active  ownership  role’  (SOU  1995:44,  p.19;  my  translation)  and  that 
‘[s]hareholders  who  take  responsibility  for  the  corporate  and  business 
development are […] an important element in a prosperous market economy’ 
(SOU 1995:44 p.154; my translation). 
 
The idea of ‘active ownership’ was the closest that the Swedish legislator got to 
a ‘shareholder value debate’. Yet, this concept is far from being equivalent to 
the Anglo-American idea of shareholder primacy. On the contrary, in several 
respects the Swedish variation of the ‘shareholder theme’ is at odds with the 
debates  about  Anglo-American  corporate  governance  that  were  going  on   38 
elsewhere. Firstly, the Swedish idea focused on large shareholders as they were 
considered  to  be  the  ones  who  can  realistically  be  expected  to  have  a  real 
influence on the management of the company. Secondly, the idea of ‘taking 
responsibility’ for the company – or even the economy as a whole – is very 
much contrary to the shareholder primacy idea, which states precisely that the 
shareholder  does  not  have  any  responsibility  for  the  company  in  which  she 
invests (see for a discussion of different concepts of the stock corporation and 
of the rights and responsibilities of shareholders Lüpold & Schnyder 2008 and 
contributions in Biondi et al. 2007). 
 
This perception of the role of the owners was widely shared among different 
political forces in Sweden during the 1990s. As the moderate MP Stig Rindborg 
put it during the debates in parliament on SOU 1995:44: 
‘One  of  the  starting  points  of  this  revision  was  that  the  stock 
corporation law should promote an active owner function in the firm. 
The law has been considered under different governments, but there 
was a large consensus in the investigation that ownership has a great 
importance.  We  have  witnessed,  during  the  last  few  decades,  how 
increasing  possibilities  of  influence  from  the  owners’  side  have 
created  the  conditions  for  successful  companies.  […]  Owners  who 
take responsibility for the company’s and the economy’s development 
are therefore an important element in a functioning market economy’ 
(Minutes  of  the  Riksdag  1997/98:114;  intervention  no.  200:  my 
translation) 
The idea of active ownership by large shareholders is perfectly in line with the 
Swedish tradition of actively favouring the concentration of share ownership 
and hence the existence of large institutional blockholders, which manage the 
firm largely without interference from the (social-democratic) state (box 1).  
 
Indeed, the crucial role that owner families – most importantly the Wallenbergs 
– had played for the Swedish economy since the 19
th century favoured a largely 
positive  view  of  large  owners’  involvement  in  industrial  companies.  This 
explains why the ‘active ownership’ idea enjoyed such a large support among 
Swedish politicians (see Carlsson 2007). 
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Box 1 
Private Property, Concentrated Ownership and the Wage-Earner Funds 
One of the puzzling facts of the Swedish case throughout the 20
th century is that 
the Social Democrats – despite their political power – never attempted up until 
the  1970s  to  socialise  private  enterprise.  On  the  contrary,  they  consciously 
favoured the concentration of private property in the hands of a very limited 
number of owners (Högfeldt 2005, Henrekson & Jakobsson 2001). This strategy 
is explained by the idea of Ernst Wigforss – from the 1910s till the end of the 
1940s  the  SPA’s  leading  ideologue  –of  creating,  in  the  long  run,  ‘social 
companies without owners’, that is, very large companies which were owned 
and governed by all stakeholders, not by the ‘capitalists’. This ideal state was 
considered to be best achieved through the intermediary goal of favouring the 
concentration of ownership of very large companies in the hands of large – 
preferably  institutional  –  owners  rather  than  dispersed  ownership  among 
countless small shareholders (Högfeldt 2005). 
This idea was linked to Joseph Schumpeter’s and John K. Galbraith’s theories 
concerning the evolution of capitalist societies and the increasing concentration 
of industrial production, which had had a major influence on the ideologues of 
Swedish Social Democracy (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2001; Högfeldt 2005). In 
particular, Galbraith’s books from 1952 and 1967 (Galbraith 1952; 1967) were 
received with much interest by the Swedish Social Democrats and one Swedish 
prime minister even invited Galbraith to a conference in Stockholm (Högfeldt 
2005: 540, note 11). 
For the ‘capitalists’ and the bourgeois parties, on the other hand, this approach 
had – in the short- or medium run – considerable advantages as well: given the 
very strong position of trade unions and the SAP in the political arena, the fact 
that  SAP  did  not  aim  at  abolishing  private  ownership  was  a  considerable 
achievement in itself. 
The SAP’s restraint also made possible the so-called ‘historical compromise’, 
which  implied  that  the  Social  Democrats  accepted  (concentrated)  private 
ownership, whereas the ‘capitalists’ (‘[…] a relatively small number of owners 
or owner groups – that is, an identifiable industrial elite […]’, Henrekson & 
Jakobsson 2006: 9; my translation) accepted in return the development of an 
extensive welfare state (Korpi 1982,). In respect of corporate governance, this 
compromise explains why the SPA and the unions were reluctant to interfere 
with the management of the companies (Högfeldt 2005). 
Tax incentives were the central instrument of the SAP in the shaping of the 
ownership structure of Swedish firms. Substantial taxes on shareholdings by 
individuals  and  on  profits  that  were  extracted  from  the  company  favoured   40 
ownership by large, institutional shareholders rather than by private individuals, 
and this led to ever larger companies due to the reinvestment of large parts of 
the profit stream. This policy also explains the extremely powerful position that 
the  traditional  Closed-End  Investment  Funds  (CEIF)  of  major  families  and 
banks  held  in  the  Swedish  system,  while  individual  ownership  declined 
throughout the post-war era (Högfeldt 2005) 
In the 1970s, however, a strategic reorientation of the left concerning private 
ownership took place. The LO – with the timid support of the SAP leadership – 
adopted in 1976 a programme that aimed to put the idea of ‘capitalism without 
capitalists’  (Johansson  &  Magnusson  1998)  into  practice.  This  was  to  be 
achieved  through  a  (gradual)  socialisation  of  private  companies  through  the 
establishment of wage-earner  funds that would, little by little, take over the 
ownership  of  companies.  More  precisely,  companies  with  more  than  50 
employees would have been obliged to issue each year new shares to the wage-
earner  funds  corresponding  to  a  value  of  20  per  cent  of  their  earnings 
(Henrekson  &  Jakobsson  2003:  85).  Over  the  years,  the  wage-earner  funds 
would thereby acquire a majority stake and exercise voting rights collectively 
through  employers’  and  other  stakeholders’  representatives  (Högfeldt  2005: 
546). In the history of the Swedish labour movement, this was the trade unions’ 
and SAP’s only deviation from the principle of redistributing ‘incomes but not 
property rights’ (Högfeldt 2005). However, due to the first electoral defeat of 
the socialists that same year after 44 years in power, the programme was not 
immediately implemented. A considerably watered-down version of the wage 
earner  funds  was  finally  implemented  in  1984,  when  the  SAP  was  back  in 
power, but this version of the funds was ‘[…] cosmetic at best’ (Blyth 2002: 
214). In fact, when the SAP was back in power in 1982, the Social Democrats’ 
‘ownership policy’ had fundamentally changed, and they adopted an economic 
programme  which  implied  ‘[…]  far-reaching  deregulation  of  the  banking 
system, dismantling of capital flow controls, privatisation of state-owned firms 
and policies that promoted market competitiveness, and reactivation of equity 
markets  that  were  liberalized  with  unrestricted  foreign  ownership  of  shares’ 
(Högfeldt 2005: 546-547). One of the most important reforms in that respect 
was a comprehensive (Reaganite) tax reform, which constituted a turning away 
from the left’s strategy of heavily disadvantaging individual ownership and the 
distribution of benefits (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2003: 81, Reiter 2003). The 
wage-earner funds were finally abolished by the new centre-right government 
which came to power in 1992 (Högfeldt 2005).   41 
Following  the  financial  market  liberalisation  of  the  late  1980s  (see  below 
section  6.2.2),  new  types  of  owners  (notably  (foreign)  mutual  funds  and 
insurance companies) emerged, which were expected to take a similar role in 
the companies as the traditional institutional investors. In fact, the new investors 
were repeatedly accused in the Swedish press of not taking responsibility for 
their investments and of not adopting an active role in the company (Reiter 
2003: 116). The aim of the improvement of shareholders’ position within the 
firm was hence not so much to protect them from agency- and expropriation 
costs, but to give them the means to exercise actively their ownership rights. 
Thus,  the  Law  Committee  (Lagutskottet,  LU)  of  the  Swedish  parliament 
explicitly stated in its report on the governmental proposal for a new ABL (prop 
2004/05:85): 
‘[…] it appears, according to the committee’s opinion, important to 
revise the Swedish stock corporation law rules in a way, which gives 
the Swedish as well as the foreign institutions effective opportunities 
to  participate  in  the  Swedish  companies’  management’  (Bet 
2004/05:LU23; my translation) 
This was to be achieved through measures such as the abolition of the rule 
which  limited  the  maximum  voting  rights  that  can  be  exercised  by  one 
shareholder to 20% of the total number of votes present during the AGM (SOU 
1995:44). The AB Committee argued that voting caps  
‘[…]  impair  rather  than  enhance  an  active  ownership  role  and 
increase  the  risk  of  isolating  the  company’s  management  from 
monitoring by the owners’ (SOU 1995:44; p.20, my translation). 
Some  MPs  wanted  even  to  go  further  concerning  the  ‘responsibilisation’  of 
shareholders  by  introducing  personal  liability  for  large  shareholders  for  the 
company’s activities. According to the author of motion 1997/98:L21 – Yvonne 
Ruwaida (Greens) – for instance, this would have created incentives for large 
shareholders  to  exercise  pressure  on  the  board  to  take  their  responsibilities 
seriously.
35 The parliament’s Law Committee, however, taking the view that 
personal  liability  for  certain  types  of  shareholders  was  contrary  to  the 
fundamental idea of the joint stock corporation, rejected this motion. 
 
The concept of ’active ownership'’ marked the debates concerning the reform of 
all major instruments of insider control in Sweden. The single most important of 
these instruments was without doubt the system of differential class shares, as 
part of which companies were allowed to issue A- and B-shares with differential 
voting rights. This system of voting right distortions has repeatedly come under 
attack from different sides.   42 
On  the  one  hand,  starting  in  the  mid-1970s,  the  liberal  Folkpartiet  (fp) 
attempted several times to abolish voting right differentials (Reiter 2003: 111). 
At the end of the 1980s, a group of fp MPs led by Hadar Cars submitted a 
motion to the Riksdag, which demanded the prohibition of dual class shares for 
listed companies’ new issues (motion 1989/90:L214). The MPs justified their 
claim by the argument that ‘similar risk on the stock market should give rise to 
similar rights to influence [...]’ (see Betänkande 1990/91:LU2). Thus a part of 
the  Swedish  centre-right  did  promote  the  liberalisation  of  the  corporate 
governance  system.  Yet,  the  fp  constitutes  only  a  minority  in  the  Swedish 
‘centre-right block’ (holding on average 9% of the seats in parliament during 
the period 1980 to 2000: Armingeon et al. 2005), which is clearly dominated by 
the  liberal-conservative  Moderata  samlingspartiet  (or  moderaterna,  the 
Moderates). Following the fp’s motion – and a similar one coming from the 
Greens (miljöpartiet, mp) – the parliament dealt with the question in autumn 
1989,  but  rejected  both  motions,  referring  to  the  ongoing  work  of  different 
governmental committees in this area (Betänkande 1989/90:LU3).
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The system of differential voting rights came also under pressure following the 
so-called ‘Fermenta scandal’.
37 The scandal revealed apparent several failures in 
the  Swedish  ABL  concerning  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders.  In 
particular it led the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) to establish in 1987 a 
committee of experts in order to investigate the affair. The report of August 
1988 (Fermenta – fakta och erfarenheter) concluded among other things that 
there  were  various  reasons  for  abolishing  voting  right  distortions  in  listed 
companies.  However,  like  the  governmental  committees,  the  Ferment 
committee  did  not  make  any  concrete  proposal  to  prohibit  voting  right 
differentials,  but  proposed  instead  to  limit  the  voting  rights  of  large 
shareholders. This recommendation, however, did not give rise to any concrete 
results. 
 
On the other hand, the SAP and the trade unions also had a genuine interest in 
abolishing voting right distortions. Since the introduction of the wage-earner 
funds (löntagarefonder) in the early 1980s (see box 1), the LO’s attempt to 
increase employees’ influence in companies through share ownership had been 
frustrated by the fact that they gained control only over B-shares with minimal 
voting rights. Thus at one point, the left – and in particular the trade unions – 
were favourable to the abolition of dual class shares in order to increase the 
power of the wage-earner funds (see explicitly in SOU 1981:78, pp.99-105). 
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As  a  result,  several  governmental  committees  investigated  voting  right 
distortions  as  early  as  the  1980s,  but  none  of  them  actually  proposed  their 
abrogation.  Thus,  the  Voting  Rights  Committee  (Röstvärdeskommittén) 
concluded in SOU 1986:23 that, due to a lack of evidence on the consequences 
of an abrogation, they would not put forward any definitive response to the 
issue. Similarly, in SOU 1988:38, the ‘Owner investigation’ (Ägarutredningen), 
although observing a considerable increase in voting right distortions between 
1978 and 1988, considered that the existing rules should be maintained. 
 
This view was shared by the different SAP governments during the 1980s –they 
did not undertake any concrete step to remove voting right differentials – and 
the trade unions’ interest in attacking this system vanished in 1992 when the 
Bildt government abolished the wage-earner funds. At the end of the 1990s, Per 
Lindh of the SIF trade union explicitly stated that voting right differentials were 
favourable to employees as they facilitated the company’s long-term orientation 
(quoted in Ahlqvist 2004: 4-61). With trade union pressure gone, the social-
democratic  Persson  government  had  even  fewer  incentives  to  question  this 
system. At the end of the 1990s, the LU quoted the government as follows: 
‘[T]he  government  states  that  the  custom  of  having  shares  with 
differential voting rights has a long tradition in Swedish law and that 
this  system  has  great  advantages’  (Betänkande  1997/98:LU26;  my 
translation). 
Reiter (2003: 104) explains the centre-left’s reluctance to change this system by 
reference to its importance not only for the corporate insiders, but also – more 
generally – for the economic system as a whole. Voting right distortions were 
central to the concentration of corporate control and had  
‘[…]  enabled  bank-related  investment  companies  to  emerge  as 
dominant economic actors during the postwar period. [Providing] the 
state with a partner in economic policy making, for example in the 
area of industrial policy. […] For [this reason], the Swedish (Social 
Democratic) government explicitly omitted the issue of voting rights 
from its deregulation and liberalisation programme in the 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s’. 
More  precisely,  the  abolition  of  voting  right  distortions  was  rejected  by 
reference to the argument of ‘active ownership’. The AB Committee concluded 
in SOU 1995:44 that 
‘Differentiated voting rights facilitate a strong ownership role, even in 
very large companies. The Committee therefore dismisses the notion 
of restrictions or further limitations on the right to issue shares with 
different voting rights’ (SOU 1995:44, p.20, my translation)   44 
In short, voting right distortions – the main pillar of insider-control in Sweden – 
enjoyed very large support from the right to the left of the political spectrum, 
and was not seriously threatened by any legal measure up until the early 2000s. 
 
Other examples of this very timid approach from the Swedish government and 
legislator  towards  MSP  can  be  mentioned.  Significantly,  when  problems  of 
minority protection were mentioned at all during the reform process, the AB 
Committee  referred  to  the  ‘horizontal’  rather  than  the  ‘vertical’  corporate 
governance  problem  (cf.  Roe  2005),  that  is,  the  need  to  protect  minority 
shareholders  from  other  shareholders  rather  than  from  managers  and/or 
directors. In fact, the AB Committee acknowledged that the aim of the reform – 
strengthening the role of large owners – led to an increasing risk of abuse by the 
majority,  which  made  a  certain  increase  in  MSP  necessary  as  well  (SOU 
1995:44, p.21). The measures that were proposed to achieve this were new rules 
concerning the organisation of the AGM: the announcement of the AGM should 
be made earlier and important issues had to be contained in the notice so that 
minority shareholders could prepare properly. Obviously, this constituted a very 
marginal  increase  in  MSP.  The  AB  Committee  made  it  clear  that  minority 
shareholders should not be able to obstruct decisions that a large majority was 
in favour of (SOU 1995:44, p.20).
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The  government  defended  the  same  point  of  view,  rejecting  even  moderate 
claims  for  improving  the  accessibility  of  existing  instruments  of  minority 
protections. The Swedish law of 1975 contained three different instruments that 
were  explicitly  designed  for  the  protection  of  minority  groups.  These 
instruments concern chap. 9 6§ ABL 1975, which stipulates that 10% of the 
capital can call an extraordinary AGM; chapter 12, 3§: which states that the 
same proportion of shareholders can demand the distribution of half of what 
remains of net profit after certain deductions; and chapter 15 5§, which gives 
them the right to file a law suit for damages against the company. Claims for 
lowering the threshold for the use of these instruments from 10% of the capital 
to 5% had been voiced notably by the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) and the 
Swedish Shareholder Association (Sveriges Aktiesparares Riksförbund) in the 
aftermath  of  the  ‘Fermenta  scandal’
  and  were  taken  up  during  the  reform 
process by MPs from the liberal folkpartiet (motion 1997/98:L16). The Persson 
Government, however, in the governmental proposal 1997/98:99 on the ‘Stock 
Corporation’s Capital’ rejected these claims. 
 
The  main  argument  against  increasing  MSP  was  every  time  that  it  would 
hamper  the  ’active  ownership  role’  of  large  blockholders.  This  can  also  be 
illustrated by the debate about a mandatory bid rule. In SOU 1997:22 on ‘the   45 
Stock Corporation’s Capital’ the AB Committee rejected the idea of introducing 
a  mandatory  bid  rule  in  the  ABL  on  the  grounds  that  this  would  make  the 
building up of a strong owner position in a company difficult and was hence 




Most  significantly,  however,  the  AB  Committee  explicitly  stated  in  SOU 
1997:22  (p.28)  that  ‘shifts  in  control’  over  firms  were  considered  to  be 
potentially  detrimental  to  the  company.  As  a  result,  the  AB  Committee 
proposed to strengthen the existing instruments for restricting the transferability 
of  shares.  Thus,  besides  the  traditional  hembudsförbehåll  (redemption 
reservation),  which  obliges  buyers  of  shares  that  are  submitted  to  such  a 
’reservation’  to  offer  the  shares  to  the  company,  the  AB  Committee  also 
proposed  to  introduce  –  for  private  companies
40  –  a  ‘right  of  first  refusal’ 
(förköpsförbehåll), which would allow them to buy the shares from an existing 
shareholder  before  they  were  sold  to  a  new  investor.  Moreover,  the  AB 
Committee also proposed to give ‘coupon companies’ the power to introduce a 
‘consent  reservation’  (samtyckesförbehåll),  which  would  have  subjected  the 
selling of certain shares to the need to get the prior approval of the company 
(SOU  1997:22,  p.  29).
41  These  proposals  were  accepted  by  the  parliament 
without any significant opposition or debate. The strengthening of instruments 
limiting  the  transferability  of  shares,  which  are  comparable  to  the  Swiss 
Vinkulierung, accordingly shows that up until the early 21
st century there was 
only a very limited willingness in Sweden to limit the traditional instruments of 
insider control. The strengthening of these instruments is even mentioned as a 
major achievement of the reform process (SOU 2001:1, p.26). 
 
When the governmental proposal was finally adopted (prop. 2004/05:85), it was 
‘based  on  an  agreement  between  the  social  democratic  government,  the  left 
party and the Greens’ (Bet 2004/05:LU23). Yet, like the changes introduced 
during  the  1990s  following  the  various  intermediary  reports,  the  reform 
proposal 2004/05:85 was accepted by the oppositional centre-right MPs in a 
climate  of  consensus;  and  this  despite  the  fact  that  the  parties  were  already 
preparing for the general elections of 2006. 
 
The  only  critical  voices  concerning  the  draft  law  during  the  consultation 
procedure (remiss) in 2004 were those of the Swedish Shareholder Association, 
which criticised the intended weakening of the ‘Leo law’, that it to say, the 
proposal that the sale of shares in a subsidiary company would no longer require 
AGM approval (Dagens Nyheter online edition, March 21, 2004).
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The Allians för Sverige (Alliance for Sweden) – an electoral coalition uniting all 
major bourgeois parties (Moderaterna, Folkpartiet, the Christian-conservative 
Kristdemokraterna  and  the  centerpartiet)  –  presented  only  19  proposals  for 
modifications.  Bertil  Kjellberg  –  entrepreneur  and  moderate  MP  –,  who 
presented  the  centre-right’s  ‘reservations’,  further  qualified  the  extent  of 
divergence from the government’s position: 
‘The  proposal  for  the  Stock  Corporation  Law  is  in  large  parts 
acceptable. The modifications that we demand are in many respects 
not linked to political divergences, but more to questions of the legal 
method which is preferred.’ (Minutes of the Riksdag; June 13, 2005, 
my translation) 
All  other  bourgeois  MPs  who  intervened  during  the  debate  supported  the 
governmental proposal in large parts as well (see also the interventions of Jan 
Ertsborn (fp) and Yvonne Andersson, Christian-democrats (kd)). 
 
Due  to  this  large  consensus and  to  the  social-democratic  control  over  the  – 
unicameral  –  parliament,  all  formal  ‘reservations’  of  the  bourgeois  Alliance 
were rejected and the law was adopted without major changes on June 15, 2005. 
However, as mentioned above, while the reform was quite comprehensive, it 
was  not  very  profound  in  the  sense  that  it  did  not  fundamentally  put  into 
question  the  traditional  instruments  of  insider  domination  and  the  power 
relations  between  different  stakeholder  groups,  which  of  course  reduced  the 
probability for conflicts greatly. Thus, the most central instruments of insider-
domination – dual class shares, limitations to the transferability of shares, and 
pyramids – were not touched by the reform, leaving the insider-orientation of 
Swedish company law intact. 
 
Conclusion on Sweden 
To  sum  up,  the  analysis  of  the  political  process  of  the  Swedish  corporate 
governance reform in this section shows very different political power relations, 
coalition configurations, and preferences of central actors than in Switzerland. 
Clearly,  there  was  no  transparency  coalition  between  the  centre-left  and  the 
liberal right in Sweden comparable to what I have shown for Switzerland above 
and to what other authors have shown for other countries (Cioffi & Höpner 
2006, Gourevitch & Shinn 2005). The Swedish centre-left did not defend a pro-
minority shareholder stance during theses reforms. Rather the smaller bourgeois 
parties – folkpartiet and centerpartiet – were from time to time the advocates of 
small shareholders, but only to a very limited extent. In fact, the consensus 
about the direction of the reform among left and right parties was very broad.   47 
The increase in MSP that did take place was hence not the result of domestic 
pressures but mainly of EU legislation. 
 
The  Swedish  Social  Democrats  therefore  behaved  as  Mark  Roe’s  (2003) 
political theory would predict. They preferred low levels of MSP and insider-
domination over market control. They were not opposed, however, to the parties 
of  the  centre  right  on  corporate  governance  issues.  Rather,  we  find  strong 
evidence for the existence of a strong corporatist coalition between the left and 
the centre-right, which opposed shareholder-orientated reform. 
 
Given the very extensive changes that Sweden has experienced concerning the 
welfare state, labour market and the financial system since the 1980s, it is very 
striking  to  see  how  resistant  corporate  governance  was  to  change,  and  in 
particular how little influence neoliberal ideas (shareholder value and primacy, 
value-based  management  etc)  had  on  the  reform  of  corporate  governance
43. 
Pontusson (1997:69) explains the contradiction between parts of the Swedish 
model  moving  towards  the  ‘German  model’  and  parts  moving  towards  an 
Anglo-Saxon  one,  by  a  compromise  between  political  forces  close  to  the 
business elite pushing for market solutions, and forces close to labour (the LO, 
not  the  SAP)  fighting  to  preserve  the  traditional  Swedish  model.  Clearly, 
however, corporate governance does not fit this explanation: there was a broad 
consensus on the maintenance of the ‘old system’ and the business elite did not 
show any sign of favouring liberalisation. 
 
The comparison of the Swiss and the Swedish cases show that Roe’s (2003) 
partisan  explanation  of  corporate  governance  systems  is  too  simplistic.  The 
same collective actors can defend very different preferences from one country 
to  the  other  and  over  time.  In  order  to  understand  how  reform  occurs  in 
corporate  governance  systems,  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  look  at  the 
determinants of the different actors’ preferences. The next section attempts to 
do precisely this. 
 
6. Discussion: The Determinants of Preferences 
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  explain  the  divergent  political  dynamics  of 
corporate governance change in Switzerland and Sweden by explaining what 
the different actors’ preferences were and how they changed – or did not change 
–  over  time.  More  precisely,  the  questions  that  I  will  try  to  answer  in  this 
section are: firstly, why did the Swiss left support pro-shareholder reform, while 
the Swedish left opposed it? Or in other words, why did a transparency coalition 
emerge in Switzerland, but not in Sweden? And secondly, why did the Swiss   48 
business elite adhere during the 1990s to a shareholder-orientated approach to 
corporate governance and start, as a result, to abandon its opposition to change, 
while no such change took place among the Swedish business elite? 
6.1 Corporatism vs. Transparency: Explaining the Preferences of the Left 
As I have shown above, one central factor explaining pro-shareholder reforms 
in Switzerland was the continuous centre-left support for such reforms, which 
constituted between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s the main domestic pro-
reform force and managed to keep the issue on the agenda despite strong centre-
right  opposition.  Conversely,  the  absence  of  left  support  for  reform  was  a 
crucial factor explaining the absence of pro-shareholder reform in Sweden. In 
fact,  reasoning  counterfactually,  one  could  make  the  hypothesis  that  SAP 
support for pro-shareholder corporate governance reform would have been at 
different points in time – at least arithmetically – a sufficient condition for such 
reforms to take place. It therefore becomes important to explain the preferences 
of the left.  
 
In order to answer this question, it is useful to look at Cioffi and Höpner’s 
(2006)  analysis,  which  constitutes  the  most  elaborate  analysis  of  the 
‘transparency coalition’ phenomenon to date. They identify the emergence of a 
‘transparency coalition’ concerning corporate governance reforms of the 1990s 
in  Germany,  Italy, France,  and  to  a  lesser  extent, the  US. They  explain  the 
seemingly paradoxical centre-left support for pro-shareholder reforms in these 
three cases by different ‘push factors’ (Cioffi & Höpner 2006: 487-488): firstly, 
during the 1990s, in a time of sluggish growth and high unemployment, the 
centre-left was in need for an economic reform agenda which would allow it to 
maintain its electoral competitiveness by seducing middle-class centrist but also 
left-wing  and  working-class  voters.  Second,  centre-left  parties  started 
increasingly  to  ally  with  new  financial  institutions  against  their  traditional 
opponents, that is, centre-right parties and their constituency, managers. Third, 
increasing  shareholdings  among  the  general  public  and  the  importance  of 
equities  in  underpinning  pension  arrangements  created  a  situation  in  which 
centre-left, anti-elite and pro-welfare preferences could be reconciled with pro-
market and pro-shareholder stances. As a result: 
‘The  centre-left  saw  corporate  governance  reform  as  a  way  of 
promoting  economic  restructuring,  dynamism,  and  fairness  without 
increasing managerial autonomy and power at employees’ expense. 
Corporate governance reform also provided the centre-left with a way 
to attack the opaque and strategically important relationships between 
conservative politicians and corporate managers, while appealing to   49 
the resentment of their left-wing constituents towards these incestuous 
elites.’ (Cioffi & Höpner 2006: 488) 
Besides these reasons linked for the most part to electoral strategies, there were 
other more specific reasons for Social Democrats and – in particular – trade 
unions to support pro-market reforms (Cioffi & Höpner 2006: 477-478). Firstly, 
increasing transparency and management accountability implied increasing the 
power of the supervisory board, which was desirable for employees in systems 
where  board-level  codetermination  existed.  Secondly,  in  common  with 
shareholders,  labour  has  an  interest  in limiting  agency  costs  stemming  from 
excessive  managerial  pay  and  value-destroying  strategies  such  as  empire 
building.  Thirdly,  employees  were  themselves  becoming  shareholders  to  an 
increasing  extent,  both  directly  through  savings  and  indirectly  through  their 
interests  in  pension  funds.  Thus  their  preferences  and  those  of  shareholders 
were becoming increasingly blurred. 
 
These  explanations for centre-left support for pro-shareholder policies can – 
apart from the co-determination variable – be applied to the Swiss case as well. 
Concerning co-determination, I showed above that in the Swiss case, it was not 
the presence of co-determination, but rather its absence that gave rise to centre-
left support for such policies. Yet, these explanations would lead us to expect 
centre-left support for corporate governance reforms in Sweden as well. After 
all,  Sweden  has  board  level  co-determination,  Swedish  employees  have  an 
interest in limiting managerial agency costs and have increasing parts of their 
savings  invested  in  shares,  either  directly  as  private  household  savings  or 
indirectly  through  their  pension  funds  (see  for  figures  Gourevitch  &  Shinn 
2005). The puzzle therefore lies in the fact that Swedish centre-left parties did 
not  support  reform,  given  all  the  reasons  singled  out  by  Cioffi  and  Höpner 
(2006) are applicable to the Swedish case.
44 
 
A  tentative  answer  can  be  seen  in  the  possibility  that  supervisory  board  or 
strong  works  council  representation  may  –  contrary  to  Cioffi  and  Höpner’s 
(2006)  argument  –  push  labour  to  oppose  rather  than  favour  increases  in 
transparency  and  external  control.  Of  course,  increasing  board  power  is 
favourable to workers who are represented on the board. However, in Sweden 
employee representation is strictly minoritarian. Hence, increasing supervisory 
board power can be perceived to benefit the majority of the board more than the 
labour  minority.  The  increasing  influence  that  transparency  and  stronger 
supervisory board control over managers confer to genuine outsiders – such as 
shareholders – can be perceived by employees to outweigh the benefits that 
these  changes  confer  on  labour.
45  In  other  words,  workers  who  are  given 
instruments which allow them to monitor and influence the management of the   50 
company from within can be expected to oppose changes which would lead to 
increasing external control over the firms. This is all the more the case as Cioffi 
and  Höpner  (2006:  477-478)  identify  the  main  reason  why  increasing  MSP 
should  favour  co-determination  as  the  reduction  of  information  asymmetries 
between the labour representatives on the board and the management. Because 
transparency levels were traditionally considerably higher in Sweden than in 
Germany,  the  Swedish  labour  movement’s  incentives  to  support  pro-
shareholder reforms were particularly low. 
 
The  degree  of  information  asymmetries  between  managers  and  other 
stakeholders  expresses  a  more  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  relationship 
between  labour  and  employers  in  Sweden,  that  is,  their  cooperative  and 
‘equilibrated’ nature. Certainly, Switzerland has a very developed culture of 
corporatist negotiating as well. However, contrary to Sweden, Switzerland is a 
case of ‘corporatism without labour’, where a very strong and well-organised 
employer side faces a deeply divided trade union movement. Swiss trade unions 
were historically split along sectoral, religious, and linguistic lines and hence 
much more heterogeneous and weaker than the Swedish unions (Kriesi 1998). 
This  led  to  a  situation  in  which  trade  unions  could  not  negotiate  with 
employers’  associations  on  equal  terms,  and  did  not  have  enough  political 
power to compensate at the level of the welfare state for their organisational 
weakness.  The  corporatist  arrangements  that  emerged  in  Switzerland  were 
therefore much less favourable to labour than in Sweden. 
 
This  can  be  illustrated  by  the  question  of  co-determination.  The  political 
weakness  of  the  Swiss  left  meant  that  no  political  force  guaranteed  that 
companies  would  respect  workers  interests  within  the  firm,  or  at  least  that 
workers  would  be  compensated  by  a  developed  welfare  state  in  case  of 
hardship. Labour’s direct influence on corporate control was much more vital to 
trade unions in Switzerland than in Sweden, where labour could count on the 
SAP’s political protection. This explains why the left in Switzerland was much 
more  active  in  promoting  corporate  governance  reform  –  first  through  their 
claim to introduce a co-determination system akin to the German system, and 
later  through  market-orientated  reforms  that  were  intended  to  increase 
transparency and control over insiders. The weakness of Swiss labour also led 
to  their  using,  at  times,  highly  conflictual  strategies.  Thus  the  Swiss  trade 
unions’ attempt to introduce a German-style codetermination system was  an 
extremely  conflict-laden  process  which  culminated  in  a  very  aggressive 
campaign in the run up to the popular vote on the introduction of such a system. 
During  the  campaign,  employers’  associations  accused  the  left  to  attempt  a 
‘bolshevisation’ of the Swiss economy (see David et al. forthcoming). Due to   51 
the limited support of the left among Swiss voters, the centre-right opposition to 
co-determination could not be overcome. 
 
In Sweden, in contrast, co-determination was instead the result of long-term 
cooperation, and can be interpreted as a reward for restraint in wage demands 
during  the  post  war  years.  Thus  codetermination  did  not  generate  much 
opposition  by  employers  (see  for  this  interpretation  Högfeldt  2005).
46  This 
interpretation is supported by a look at political power relations: in Sweden, 
very tellingly, codetermination arrangements – while elaborated in 1976 under 
the SAP government under pressure of the LO – were implemented in 1977, 
when the Fälldin Government, the first centre-right government since 1932, had 
just come to power. The centre-right government did nothing to abolish the co-
determination  act  or  other  laws  adopted  by  the  SAP government  during  the 
early 1970s which aimed at the ‘democratization of working life’ (see Blyth 
2002: 202ff). Högfeldt (2005: 552) notes, concerning the differences between 
codetermination  in  Germany  and  Sweden,  that  ‘[u]nlike  in  Germany,  co-
determination was not designed to appease aggressive unions and to fight social 
and political instability.’ 
 
In  short,  the  extensive  social-democratic  control  over  the  public  sector  in 
Sweden allowed labour to establish a highly developed welfare-state, influence 
the allocation of resources at the macro-level, and set up other policies aiming at 
the redistribution of wealth in favour of employees (all this can be seen as part 
of  the  ‘historical  compromise’).  This  had  as  a  consequence  that  employee 
participation at the level of the company was dispensable, and more generally 
that corporate governance could be largely left to managers and capitalists. 
 
It did not make sense for Swedish labour representatives to ‘[...] attack opaque 
and strategically important relationships between conservative politicians and 
corporate  managers,  while  appealing  to  the  resentment  of  their  left-wing 
constituents towards these incestuous elites […]’ (Cioffi & Höpner 2006: 488), 
given that they were, in some way, part of these ‘incestuous elites’, or at least 
bound to them through strong and equilibrated corporatist arrangements. On the 
contrary, the same ‘pull factors’ which Cioffi and Höpner (2006: 487) identify 
as major elements which prevent centre-right politicians in Germany, Italy, and 
France  from  supporting  pro-market  reform  apply  to  Swedish  labour 
representatives:  
‘[T]he  established  post-war  political  economic  institutions  and 
corporate governance regimes were largely, and in the French and 
Italian cases almost entirely, the creation of the right and they were 
designed  to  benefit  conservative  parties,  politicians,  and  their   52 
supporters. This led to close and mutually reinforcing business-party 
relationships between managerial and party elites that persisted over 
decades and became extremely valuable politically and financially for 
managers and politicians alike.’ (Cioffi & Höpner 2006: 487) 
Given  that  the  political  economic  institutions  in  Sweden  –  but  not  in 
Switzerland – were created in cooperation between labour and employers in the 
shadow of labour-dominated governments, it comes as no surprise that the left 
did not favour the dismantling of these institutions. This is all the more the case 
given that from the 1970s onwards, the Swedish left did not content itself with 
leaving corporate governance relations at the firm level to the employers any 
more.  While  the  strong  corporatist  compromise  that  prevailed  between  the 
1930s and 1960s consisted mainly in leaving the management of firms to the 
‘capitalists’, at the end of the 1960s, the trade unions – and notably the LO – 
started  to  question  this  distribution  of  roles.  The  reason  for  this  changing 
strategy was that the LO had increasing difficulties in obtaining what it wanted 
in bilateral negotiations with the employers’ association SAF. Thus, in 1968, the 
LO  failed  to  obtain  in  bilateral  negotiations  with  the  SAF  greater  worker 
decision making at the plant level. A year later, an extensive strike in the mining 
industry in the Kiruna area over pay increases and over working conditions put 
further pressure on the LO to improve working conditions. As no self-regulatory 
solution could be found with the SAF, the LO turned to the SAP government 
and  pushed  it  to  adopt,  during  the  early  1970s,  a  series  of  laws  aiming  to 
‘democratize working life’ (Blyth 2002: 203). Both the co-determination act 
and the wage-earner funds were part of this programme. Furthermore, in 1973 
the Working Hours Law (Arbetstidslagen) and a year later the Job Security Law 
(Lagen  om  anställningsskydd;  LAS)  were  adopted  by  the  SPA-dominated 
parliament. The Working Hours Law limited the working week to 40 hours; the 
LAS introduced far-reaching dismissal protection and the ‘last in – first out’ 
(LIFO) principle, which had been advocated by the LO. Also, legal reasons for 
dismissal were limited to ‘gross misconduct’ and redundancies (Högfeldt 2005: 
26). Due to the political power of labour in Sweden, the legislative path was in 
the  short-run  more  efficient  for  the  left,  rather  than  negotiating  with  the 
employer side; however these developments led to a deterioration in traditional 
corporatist  relations  with  the  SAF  and  permanently  upset  relations  with  the 
employers (Blyth 2002). 
 
This ‘legislative turn’ of the labour movement has far-reaching consequences 
for the question of corporate governance reform.  Due to the increased legal 
action during the 1970s in favour of labour, the left became even more than 
before the architect of the Swedish corporate governance system. The Swedish 
centre-left’s incentives to attack this system were thereby even further reduced.   53 
 
This change also pushed the employers to become increasingly politically active 
as well, and led to the ‘remobilisation of Swedish business’ as a political actor 
(Blyth 2002: 209ff). As a result, relationships between labour and employers 
became increasingly conflictual and would progressively lead during the 1980s 
and 1990s to the often-anticipated end of the Swedish model. As the LO had put 
into question the principle of self-regulation and negotiation between employers 
and employees, the SAF started to reject traditional corporatist arrangements as 
well. Already in 1977, following the adoption of the co-determination act, the 
SAF declared the death of the Saltsjöbadavtal, that is, the agreement between 
trade unions and employers, which had constituted the basis for self-regulation 
of  labour  relations  in  Sweden  since  1938.  During  the  1980s,  this  evolution 
continued as the SAF started to adopt a neoliberal reform program putting into 
question  the  LO’s  control  over  labour-market  policy,  rejecting  corporatist 
institutions like the consultation (remiss) on new laws (Blyth 2002: 227) and 
announcing in 1991 that it would abandon the tripartite boards of state agencies 
(Pontusson 1997). In Sweden, pro-market reforms were a political weapon for 
the right rather than for the left. 
 
Interestingly, however, the neoliberal turn of the Swedish employers and the 
increasing  opposition  between  employers  and  labour  never  extended  to  the 
question  of  corporate  governance.  Concerning  this  issue,  the  ‘corporatist 
compromise’  was  remarkably  stable.  By  leaving  the  most  fundamental 
mechanisms on which the Swedish system is based – dual class shares, cross-
shareholdings, pyramids, and co-determination – intact, even the reform of the 




In  Switzerland  on  the  other  hand,  the  weak  labour  movement  was  largely 
excluded  from  the  formulation  of  the  corporate  governance  system,  which 
explains  why  the  left  thought  it  had  nothing  to  lose  in  siding  with  outside 
investors in order to increase external control over corporate insiders. 
 
In  short,  social  democratic  power  does  seem  to  matter  for  the  shaping  of 
corporate governance systems. A comparison between Sweden and Switzerland 
suggests that where labour is strong, it might have enough influence on the 
shaping of the ‘corporate compromise’ to have reason to defend the system in 
place  against  reforms.  Where  labour  is  weak,  however,  an  alliance  with 
‘shareholders’  against  ‘managers’  may  be  a  politically  interesting  option  in 
order to change a system that was seen as being constructed against worker 
interests in the first place. In that sense, Roe’s (2003) prediction concerning   54 
centre-left preferences seems to hold in certain circumstances, but not in all. 
This is now a well-established finding (see Cioffi & Höpner 2006, Gourevitch 
&  Shinn  2005).  Yet,  my  study  shows  that  the  part  of  employees’  pension 
savings, which is invested in corporate stock, is not a sufficient explanation for 
the emergence of a transparency coalition, and neither is the existence or indeed 
the absence of board-level co-determination. The emergence of such a coalition 
–the  comparison  suggests  –  depends  also  on  the  type  of  relations  that  exist 
between labour and employers. Relations between labour and employers are the 
critical variable. Thus in Sweden it was the corporatist coalition between labour 
and  managers/blockholders,  which  was  remarkably  strong  and  long-lasting, 
which helps to explain why social democrats opposed shareholder-orientated 
reforms. 
 
Yet, I have also shown that left support for reform was not a sufficient condition 
for change to happen in Switzerland. This was due to the political weakness of 
centre-left parties in the Swiss federal parliament. In fact, only a considerable 
shift in centre-right actors’ preferences  allows us to understand why change 
happened in Switzerland during the early 1990s. This is the objective of the next 
section. 
6.2 The National Business System and the Preferences of the Business Elite 
In the following sections, I argue that three factors were particularly important 
to  explain  the  changing  preferences  of  centre-right  parties  in  Switzerland. 
Firstly,  the  changing  strategies  and  preferences  of  banks;  secondly,  the 
emergence of corporate raiders; and thirdly, changing corporate practices. I then 
show  that  these  factors  also  explain  why  the  Swedish  centre-right  parties’ 
preferences did not change. 
 
6.2.1 Switzerland 
The Role of Banks in Switzerland 
The  large  banks  were  the  first  important  business  actors  in  Switzerland  to 
change their preferences during the late 1980s. This change was in part the 
result of a strategic adaptation to new opportunity structures at the international 
level (new possibilities due to liberalised financial markets) but also to new 
constraints at the domestic and international level. More precisely, since the 
early  1980s,  competition  for  savings  with  insurance  companies  increased 
considerably.  Since  the  early  1980s,  Swiss  insurance  companies  were  in  a 
difficult situation due to the saturation of the domestic market for accident and 
property insurance as well as increasing deregulation and foreign competition 
(Ravara  1999).  This  pushed  them  to  look  for  growth  opportunities  in  other   55 
sectors. As a result, they started to offer new services such as investment funds 
and mortgage credits. Due to tax advantages and a lower level of capital reserve 
requirements,  insurance  companies  found  themselves  able  to  provide  these 
services at lower costs than banks (Ravara 1999). The intrusion of insurance 
companies  in  the  hunting  grounds  of  banks  led  to  a  fierce  competition  for 
clients between the two sectors. The banks reacted to this increasing domestic 
competition,  as  well  as  to  increasing  international  competition  due  to  the 
liberalisation  of  financial  markets,  by  developing  highly  profitable  business 
opportunities such as investment banking, wealth management, and by pursuing 
‘bancassurance’ strategies, that is, selling bank and insurance services through 
the same distribution channels. 
 
This strategic change can be illustrated by the changing distribution of bank 
income (see figure 4). As bank income stemmed increasingly from financial-
market related activities (investment banking, asset management), the existence 
of  developed  and  well  functioning  capital  markets  became  increasingly 
important for them. This change explains why – during the late 1980s – the 
banks  gradually  stopped  supporting  traditional  insider-orientated  corporate 
governance practices and instruments. 
 























Interest income (%) Commissions and fees (%) Trading income (%)
 
Source: Swiss National Bank (annual reports) 
 
One very telling example of the changing attitude of banks concerns their role 
in the refusal by Swiss companies to inscribe shareholders on their registers.   56 
The banks had agreed in 1961 to sign a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ with non-
financial companies about the use of Vinkulierung. In this agreement the banks 
committed themselves to sell registered shares only to investors who fulfilled 
the company’s requirements for registration in the stock ledger (especially the 
nationality  requirement).  Concretely,  this  meant  that  banks  had  to  inform 
themselves about the registration criteria for each listed company, which was 
done with the help of the so-called ‘blue folder’ in which the Swiss Bankers 
Association (SBA) kept a record of the current registration criteria for the firms 
that  were  party  to  the  agreement  (for  more  details  on  the  GA  of  1961  see 
Lüpold 2004). Obviously, for the banks, this agreement did not produce many 
immediate advantages, as it restrained their leeway in trading registered shares. 
The  fact  that  the  banks  did  respect  it  for  nearly  30  years  is  a  very  telling 
example  of  the  functioning  of  the  cooperative,  insider-orientated  Swiss 
corporate governance regime. In the agreement of 1961 the banks justified their 
position as follows: 
‘For obvious reasons, the banks are in the first place interested in the 
free  circulation  of  securities.  [Therefore,  the]  banks  hope  that  the 
industrial  companies  will  henceforth  abstain  from  limiting  the 
transferability  of  registered  shares  through  their  articles  of 
incorporation [...]. Our executive committee [...] considers [however] 
that it is, in spite of what precedes, the duty of the Swiss banks is to 
support the industry in its efforts [to exclude foreign investors] when 
it is in the superior national interest. […]’ (GA of 1961; quoted in 
David et al. forthcoming: 217-218; my translation; emphasis added) 
The GA of 1961 contributed in important ways to making Swiss companies 
largely invulnerable to takeover attempts from abroad and constituted hence a 
central  piece  in  the  puzzle  of  Swiss  insider-orientated  corporate  governance 
system. It illustrates the strong cohesion and cooperative manner of interaction 
among the Swiss business elite across sectors, which is also reflected in the 
cohesion of the ‘bourgeois block’ in parliament during the first phase of the 
Stock Corporation Law reform up until 1985. 
 
The immediate reason for the adoption of the GA of 1961 was a ruling by the 
Swiss Supreme Court – the Federal Tribunal – of 1957 (ATF 83 II 297 ff), 
which  established  the  so-called  doctrine  of  the  ‘dissociation  of  rights’.  The 
‘dissociation of shareholder rights’ designated the fact that associational rights 
linked to the share (that is the voting right, right to participate in the AGM and 
so on) and the cash-flow rights (the right to receive a dividend, the right to a 
share in assets on liquidation, and so on) could be transferred separately from 
each other. Concretely, the Federal Tribunal established that in the case of the 
refusal of a buyer of registered shares, the voting right remained with the seller   57 
of the shares as long as the new shareholder was not registered in the stock 
ledger. The cash-flow rights, however, were transferred to the buyer as soon as 
he bought the shares even if the company refused his registration (see for a 
detailed discussion Kläy 1997). This doctrine of the dissociation of shareholder 
rights  implied  a  weakening  of  the  Vinkulierung  as  a  defensive  mechanism 
against  unwanted  shareholders.  After  this  decision,  a  company  could  not 
prohibit an investor from becoming a shareholder, but ‘only’ prevent her from 
exercising  the  voting  rights.  The  GA  of  1961  allowed  companies  largely  to 
counter  balance  the  effect  of  the  Federal  Tribunal’s  ruling  by  filtering  out 
unwanted shareholders before they had the chance to acquire registered stock. 
 
The most problematic aspect of the judicial construct of the ‘dissociation of 
rights’ was that the seller of the shares – who did not carry any financial risk 
any more – could exercise the voting right. The seller remained registered on 
the stock-ledger as long as the company did not accept the buyer; the seller was 
therefore called a Buchaktionär (‘stock-ledger shareholder’). This doctrine had 
been criticised for a long time by legal experts as well as by economic actors. 
The  Federal  Council  announced  in  a  statement  of  1983  concerning  stock 
corporation law reform that the elimination of this singular legal construct was 
one of the goals of the reform (BB 1983 II 844). At the time, the most important 
economic and political actors supported this objective. The business actors did 
so hoping that the elimination of the dissociation would give the Vinkulierung 
its original form again, in other words they hoped that all rights – not just the 
voting right – could be restricted with the use of Vinkulierung. Yet, up until the 
mid-1980s, even the banks were favourable to this objective, as is indicated in 
the  SBA’s  annual  report  of  1985/86,  which  enumerates  the  elimination  of 
dissociation as a priority for its reform objectives (Annual report SBA 1985/86: 
132). One year later, however, the SBA rejected this reform objective, stating in 
its annual report 1986/87 that the abolition of dissociation would make stock 
market transactions with registered stock submitted to Vinkulierung impossible. 
As banks started to give more attention to their immediate material interests 
(including the functioning of capital markets), they were not as ready any more 
to defend Swiss companies’ wish to be isolated from market pressures in the 
name  of  the  ‘superior  national  interest’.  This  change  in  preferences  created 
considerable tensions within the Swiss business elite and – at the level of the 
parliament – within the ‘bourgeois block’. Starting from 1986, the preferences 
of  actors  close  to  the  banks  were  opposed  to  the  preferences  of  industrial 
companies,  which  created  strong  dissensions  between  the  SBA  and  the  two 
main business associations, the Vorort and SwissHoldings. One senator called 
this  opposition  a  ‘combat  of  the  titans’  (Minutes  PC-CoS  1988:  483).  The 
disagreement between the banks and the rest of the Swiss economy weakened   58 
considerably  the  conservative  coalition  of  insiders,  and  the  banks  started  to 
support some reform postulates of the pro-reform coalition. The impact of this 
volte-face  on  the  power  relations  between  the  two  coalitions  can  hardly  be 
overestimated. As the banks started to support the transparency coalition, the 
power of the pro-reform coalition in parliament increased considerably. 
 
However, as I will show in the remainder of this section, other – non-financial – 
companies  were  soon  to  follow  a  similar  change  in  preferences  concerning 
corporate  governance.  One  crucial  reason  for  this  was  the  emergence  of 
corporate raiders and the threat of hostile takeovers during the late 1980s, which 
is the subject of the next sub-section. 
Corporate Raiders, Takeovers and their Impact on the Swiss Business System 
The first Swiss corporate raiders appeared – apart from one isolated case at the 
end of the 1970s – during the mid-1980s. Most of these raiders aimed to take 
control  of  a  company  or  at  least  to  acquire  enough  influence  to  impose  a 
shareholder-value enhancing policy, notably by dissolving the large amounts of 
hidden reserves that Swiss companies were famous for.
48 Most of the time, the 
raiders also demanded changes to the corporate governance structure of the firm 
– such as the reduction of the board size, and the abolishing of Vinkulierung – in 
order to empower the shareholder meeting vis-à-vis the management. Where 
such  strategies  were  successful,  they  obviously  had  a  direct  impact  on  the 
corporate  governance  structures  of  Swiss  firms.  Some  of  the  raiders  –  most 
notably  Martin  Ebner  and  Tito  Tettamanti  –  also  actively  promoted  a 
shareholder  culture  in  Switzerland  through  publicity  campaigns  encouraging 
people  to  invest  their  savings  in  equity.  They  thereby  contributed  to  a 
considerable extent to the changing saving behaviour of Swiss households and 
to the very pronounced increase in private household savings that were invested 
in equity (see e.g. Volkart & Cocca 2001). 
 
The most influential raider in Switzerland was Martin Ebner and his investment 
company BZ Bank, which had a tremendous influence on the Swiss economy 
especially during the 1990s.
49 Ebner’s strategy of acquiring large enough stakes 
in the largest Swiss companies to impose shareholder-value orientated strategies 
triggered  a  wide  public  debate  over  issues  related  to  shareholder  value  and 
corporate governance in Switzerland and thereby contributed to the changing 
preferences of the Swiss business elite referred to above. Loderer and Zgraggen 
(1998: 29) consider that  
‘Until recently Switzerland's economy was dominated by cartels with 
closely  overlapping  boards  of  directors.  Hostile  takeovers  were 
essentially unheard of, and criticism of management by shareholders   59 
was  highly  unusual  and  thoroughly  unappreciated.  Martin  Ebner’s 
activities  have  had  the  merit  of  stimulating  public  debate  about 
shareholders'  right  and  shareholder  activism.  Also,  they  have 
contributed to making shareholder value a politically correct goal for 
firms  to  pursue  and  made  it  more  acceptable  for  shareholders  to 
criticize management.’ 
It therefore comes as no surprise that Ebner was greeted by the Anglo-Saxon 
finance press like a saviour who would finally shake up the establishment and 
break down the notorious Swiss ‘fortress of the Alps’. Thus the Financial Times 
run a very positive article about Ebner on December 13, 1985 with the headline 
‘Readiness to break the mould of conformity’ (quoted in Becher 1996: 66). 
 
A very important element in the raiders’ contribution to the destabilisation of 
the traditional corporate governance system was their use of – for Switzerland – 
unusual  investment  and  financing  practices  and  the  introduction  of  radical 
innovations concerning financial instruments. These innovations then pushed 
other – more established – actors such as the major banks to learn from the 
raiders  and  use  similar  strategies  and  instruments  themselves,  which  greatly 
favoured  the  rapid  spread  of  Anglo-Saxon  style  investment  practices  in 
Switzerland.  The  best  example  for  such  an  innovative  practice  is  the 
introduction in Switzerland of Stillhalteroptionen (covered warrants) by Martin 
Ebner’s  BZ  Bank  in  October  1986  (Becher  1996:  78).  The  Stillhalteroption 
consisted in the practice of the BZ Bank depositing shares of a given Swiss 
company in a blocked deposit and issuing options which gave the owner the 
right to purchase the share of the company in question at a particular date at a 
fixed price. When Ebner issued his first Stillhalteroptionen in October 1986, the 
large banks – who were planning to launch a standardized market for share-
options only in 1988 – were stunned, but they reacted immediately. Only a 
couple of days after Ebner had issued the Stillhalteroptionen on Ciba-Geigy 
shares, the SBS issued a Stillhalteroption on the registered shares of Zurich 
Insurance  and  Vontobel  followed  a  little  later  with  a  warrant  on  registered 
shares of Sandoz AG (Becher 1996: 79). 
 
The most important effect of the emergence of corporate raiders, however, was 
the fact that they created an unprecedented hostile takeover threat for Swiss 
firms and demands for an increasing shareholder-orientation. Their unorthodox 
strategies forced listed companies to react, which led to profound change in 
corporate practices. The case of Ebner vs. UBS (see box 2) is a particularly 
telling  example  of  the  impact  that  the  raiders  had  on  the  largest  Swiss 
companies. The impact of the takeover battle between BK Vision and the UBS 
–  although  just  one  case  among  many  others  –  on  the  Swiss  corporate   60 
governance system was particularly great because it was widely discussed even 
abroad. Thus, the Financial Times considered this episode to constitute the end 
of an era:  
‘[The case] is about more than UBS; it also marks the beginning of 
the  end  for  continental  Europe’s  discreet  and  private  approach  to 
corporate governance. Capital market liberalisation and privatisation 
have created a new shareholder culture bent on accountability. And 
Mr. Ebner, a former share analyst, has confronted the bank with it.’ 
(FT November 21, 1994, quoted in Burkhalter 2001: 190; emphasis 
added) 
The UBS case was by no means an isolated incident. Since the late 1980s, most 
of the very largest Swiss companies have come under attack at one point or 
another by one of the raiders, forcing them most of the time, to change their 
strategies  and  corporate  governance  practices  considerably.  Ebner  alone 
acquired considerable stakes in ABB, Roche, Rieter, Intershop, and Algroup 
(Becher 1996). Moreover other raiders including Tettamanti, Braginsky, and 
Müller-Möhl attacked other traditional companies such as Ascom, Sulzer, and 




The  UBS  case  also  illustrates  the  relative  inefficiency  of  existing  takeover 
protections and notably the Vinkulierung. If a raider bought enough registered 
shares – even if they were not allowed to vote these shares – the raider could 
block important voting rights, which in turn could allow him to acquire the 
majority of voting rights by buying the freely transferable bearer shares. Thus 
Vinkulierung,  even  though  it  had  allowed  the  management  to  avoid  the 
acquisition of a controlling stake by the raider, had detrimental effects on the 
development of the company without ultimately offering efficient protection. 
For  example,  UBS  was  vulnerable  despite  a  complex  capital  structure,  the 
existing of voting caps, and super-voting shares. Its management therefore had 
to  use  other  –  very  radical  and  costly  –  instruments  in  order  to  protect  its 
independence, including the replacement of the different share categories by a 
unitary  share  category  (Einheitsaktie).
51  When  even  these  moves  failed,  the 
incumbent  management  finally  had  to  change  corporate  practices  in  the 
direction of the raiders’ demands. The emergence of corporate raiders led to a 
change in the preferences of managers not merely in those instances where they 
were convinced by the new practices, but because they constituted ways in 
which the incumbent management could avoid takeovers and could, thus, keep 
their jobs. 
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Box 2 
BZ Bank vs. UBS (1991 – 1997) 
The most important example of Ebner’s activity was his attack on the largest 
Swiss bank, the old UBS. The altercation between Ebner and UBS lasted from 
1991 until 1997 and had far-reaching consequence for the Swiss economy and 
the  corporate  governance  system  as  a  whole.  Ebner  had  begun  to  buy  UBS 
shares through the intermediary of his investment company BK Vision as early 
as 1991. In 1991 he held 1.4% of the bearer shares and 4.4% of the registered 
shares  of  UBS  (Loderer  &  Zgraggen  1998).  In  parallel,  Ebner  demanded  a 
strategic reorientation of UBS in order to increase shareholder value. Thus he 
demanded the imposition of a return on equity (RoE) of 15 to 20%, a reduction 
of costs through layoffs (SHZ, January 23, 1992), as well as a reduction of the 
size of the board of directors (from 24 to 9 members) (Burkhalter 2001: 182). 
Besides these textbook shareholder value claims, Ebner also attacked directly 
the top management of the UBS. He demanded the resignation of the chairman 
of the board Nikolaus Senn and of the CEO Robert Studer, two of the most 
influential  members  of  the  Swiss  business  elite.  The  UBS  rejected  all  these 
demands, which led Ebner to further increase his stake. Ebner’s perseverance 
and his considerable financial resources created a permanent threat for the UBS 
management. In the run-up to the 1996 AGM, Rainer E. Gut – chairman of the 
UBS’s main domestic competitor Credit Suisse – contacted Nikolaus Senn in 
order to suggest a merger between the two banks in order to fend off Ebner’s 
attack.  According  to  the  newspaper  Tages  Anzeiger  of  April  9,  1996,  Gut 
explicitly  threatened  to  vote  the  shares  controlled  by  the  CS  in  favour  of 
Ebner’s propositions during the AGM, were the UBS to refuse the merger offer 
(Lüchinger & Nolmans 2003: 182). This breach of the culture of cooperation by 
a powerful banker was termed in the press as sign of a ‘Verrohung der Sitten’ 
(‘brutalisation of manners’) and an irresponsible destabilisation of the largest 
Swiss banks (Sedlmaier 2003: 195). UBS refused the offer and Ebner continued 
to increase his participation and filed several law suits against UBS notably 
following the introduction in 1994 of the unitary share, which aimed mainly at 
diluting Ebner’s stake in registered shares (Loderer and Zgraggen 1998). In the 
autumn of 1997 Ebner held 25% of the equity capital. Together with CS he 
controlled 40% of UBS. 
 
In order to find a way out of this situation, the UBS management contacted the 
third large Swiss bank, SBC, and started negotiations on a possible merger. In 
December  1997,  the  two  banks  announced  the  conclusion  of  a  merger 
agreement. Following this announcement the litigation with Ebner was settled 
by an out-of-court settlement. Despite the fact that Ebner did not manage to take 
the control of UBS, he was still the winner of the six-year confrontation. The   62 
NZZ considered the merger to be a capitulation of the management of the old 
UBS since ‘the new UBS meets in all respects the BK Vision’s expectations’ 
(NZZ January 24, 1998 quoted in Burkhalter 2001: 188). Besides the fact that 
the share price after the announcement of the merger exceeded by far the level 
prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  unitary  share,  the  new  bank  very  soon 
implemented  most  of  Ebner’s  proposals.  Thus,  a  productivity  goal  was 
introduced requiring a RoE of at least 15% and the layoff of 13,000 out of the 
56,000 employees was announced (7,000 of them were in Switzerland). 
 
In this context, it is important to note that the corporate raiders emerged during 
the 1980s without any change in the legal corporate governance framework. 
This shows that the absence of hostile takeovers prior to the 1980s is – contrary 
to  what  most  incumbent  managers  and  observers  believed  –  not  so  much 
explained by the defensive mechanisms as such, but much more by the fact that 
investors used to ‘play by the rules’. In fact, no legal change was necessary in 
order to make the emergence of corporate raiding possible; it was enough that 
certain actors dared break the unwritten laws of the business elite. This also 
points toward the importance that normative and cognitive aspects played in the 
reform of Swiss corporate governance. 
 
The activities of the corporate raiders were very much linked to their status of 
outsiders to the Swiss business elite. Due to the fact that they did not consider 
themselves to be bound by the informal norms and rules of the Swiss business 
elite,  corporate  raiders  could  seize  opportunities,  which  were  not  open  to 
established actors. Tito Tettamanti explicitly expresses this point in an interview 
in  September  2005.  He  commented  thus  on  the  events  around  his  takeover 
attempt on the traditional loom producer and machinery company Sulzer during 
the late 1980s: 
‘My strength was that I […] did not have any debts and did not want 
to  belong  to  the  Establishment,  which  gave  me  a  certain  jester’s 
licence’. (My translation)
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Given that these kinds of investment strategies were fundamentally contrary to 
the informal ethical codes of the Swiss business elite based on cooperation, it 
comes  as  no  surprise  that  they  were  –  at  first  –  resolutely  rejected  by  the 
establishment. Hansjörg Abt, editor at the NZZ, described the reactions to the 
very first truly hostile takeover in Switzerland – the acquisition of the shoe 
producer Bally by the young financier Werner K. Rey in 1977 – as follows: 
‘Helvetia’s first raider was borne; walls of Vinkulierung – which were 
considered  to  be  earthquake-proof  –  crumbled,  an  outcry  went 
through the country. The “NZZ” used three-column-wide, bold block   63 
letters, which were actually reserved for the outbreak of the Third 
World War!’ (The Accountant no. 12/95: 1022, my translation) 
The same reaction occurred when the phenomenon of hostile takeovers became 
more wide-spread during the 1980s (see Becher 1996, Sedlmaier 2003).  
A first reaction of the establishment to the new threat was to elaborate – under 
the leadership of the Association of Swiss Stock Exchanges (ASSE) – a first set 
of takeover rules in the form of a takeover code, which entered into force on 
September 1
st, 1989 and addressed the most important problems. In order to 
ensure respect for the code, the ASSE established a ‘Regulatory Committee’ 
composed  of  representatives  of  the  issuing  companies  and  legal  experts. 
Officially,  the  code  aimed  at  establishing  rules,  which  guaranteed  that  a 
takeover took place in a fair and transparent way without either attempting to 
favour or hamper hostile takeovers. However, the defensive mechanisms that 
the target companies could use were only mildly constrained by the code (the 
manipulation of the share price by the management was prohibited), whereas 
the bidder’s leeway was considerably curtailed (Dufour & Hertig 1990). The 
code  can  therefore  be  seen  as  an  attempt  by  the  establishment  to  limit  the 
chances of success of hostile takeovers (Peter 1990: 161). This interpretation is 
supported  by  the  fact  that  after  the  adoption  of  the  code,  hostile  takeover 
attempts almost stopped completely in Switzerland for sometime.
53 However 
there  was  litigation  in  several  instances  and  the  decisions  of  the  newly 
established  ‘Regulatory  Committee’  were  put  into  question,  which  led  the 
Government finally to include the issue of takeovers in the new proposal for the 
SESTA (BB 1989 I: 1289 ff.). 
 
Paradoxically, however, takeover attempts increasingly generated criticism not 
of the ‘raiders’ but much more of the traditional defence mechanisms and of the 
behaviour  of  the  corporate  insiders  during  takeover  battles.  Journalists  and 
commentators  criticized  incumbent  managers  for  the  arbitrary  way  in  which 
they treated the shareholders in a range of widely publicised takeover battles. 
One  case  –  that  of  the  canned  food  producer  Hero  –  led  the  Zurich  Stock 
Exchange  to  closely  examine  all  strongly  bound  registered  shares  that  were 
listed in Zurich and to consider delisting them (Basler Zeitung, February 20, 
1987; FA E4110 (B); 1992/175; vol.58). Moreover, given the clear limitations 
of  the  traditional  defensive  mechanisms,  some  actors  started  to  demand  a 
reorientation of the companies’ behaviour. Such claims came in a first phase 
mainly  from  the  left.  Thus,  the  social  democratic  Councillor  of  States  Carl 
Miville stated in September 1988: 
‘I believe that certain companies should realise that the fostering of 
the capital market, of the share price, and of the shareholders is as   64 
efficient  a  takeover  defence  as  the  erection  of  barricades  through 
extensive Vinkulierung.’ (OB CoS 1988: 485; my translation) 
At the end of the 1980s this view began to become increasingly accepted even 
among  actors  close  to  the  business  elite,  who  started  to  realise  that 
‘Vinkulierung ist das Problem für dessen Lösung sie sich hält’ (‘Vinkulierung 
is the problem, not the solution it is supposed to be’) (Editorial of the Swiss 
Review of Commercial Law 1988: 87). Similarly, the existence of complex 
capital  structures  was  also  increasingly  questioned.  Thus  the  private  banker 
Julius Bär (1991: 6) wrote in a study on equity ownership in Switzerland: 
‘Depending  on  the  constellation  of  the  ownership  structure,  the 
excessive  use  of  voting  shares  and  non  voting  participation 
certificates  can  be  counterproductive  and  downright  provoke 
takeovers because the raider will [be able to] focus with relatively 
little capital spending on the voting shares’. 
The new practices introduced by the ‘raiders’ increasingly gained acceptance 
among the business elite, while the traditional instruments of insider control lost 
support. Some established economic actors even went as far as allying with 
‘raiders’  in  certain  takeovers.  Thus,  in 1996,  the very  traditional  Winterthur 
Insurance company joined forces with Ebner in order to take over another Swiss 
company, the Intershop Group. Thus in this case, the ‘pariah’ Ebner had support 
from the very core of the Swiss business elite. Winterthur had very eminent 
representatives of the Swiss business and political elite on its board. Peter Spälti 
– between 1983 and 1991 a conservative FDP MP – who was at the time of the 
Intershop  takeover  CEO  and  Chairman  of  Winterthur,  had  opposed  only  a 
couple of years earlier Ebner’s attack on UBS (NZZ April 10, 1996). The fact 
that such a company allied itself with the raider Ebner points to a considerable 
change in the establishment’s preferences. This shows that during the 1990s 
Ebner’s methods were no longer considered by all members of the business elite 
to be anything reprehensible. This constituted a crucial step on the way towards 
a new – shareholder-orientated – corporate governance system. 
 
The increasing acceptance of aggressive investment strategies had an important 
impact on the political reform processes as it led centre-right MPs to change 
their preferences concerning central issues of corporate governance. Thus, the 
conservative  MP  Ulrich  Gadient  (UDC)  nuanced  the  negative  image  of 
corporate raiders by invoking the laws of the free market
54: 
‘We have to decide what we want: special rules for Switzerland? A 
free  market  economy?  As  an  article  in  Finanz  und  Wirtschaft  has 
demonstrated, the acquirer is, from the viewpoint of the free market   65 
economy, not a priori worse than the existing shareholders.’ (OB CE 
1988: 457; my translation) 
In short, the fact that certain actors started to consider it to be legitimate – or did 
not  care  anymore  that  it  was  not  –  to  buy  shares  against  the  will  of  the 
company’s management, take the control, and change the company’s strategy, 
destabilised  the  traditional  corporate  governance  system  in  different  ways. 
Firstly, in several cases raiders obtained enough influence in order to impose 
directly shareholder-orientated strategies and corporate governance practices on 
the targeted companies. Secondly, their activities showed that the traditional 
instruments  of  insider  control  proved  efficient  only  as  long  as  most  actors 
played  according  to  the  rules  of  the  game.  This  –  in  combination  with  the 
permanent takeover threat – led to an increasing questioning of the traditional 
system by the business elite and the use of alternative, more market-conforming 
defence strategies – for example, increasing transparency rather than restricting 
the transfer of shares – in order to counter the new threat. Worse, little by little 
less marginal actors – such as managers of ‘respectable’ firms and MPs close to 
the business elite – started to support to some extent the new practices. This 
directly affected the reproduction of the traditional institutional setting, above 
all because these central actors had a direct influence on the formulation of legal 
rules through their seats in the non professional parliament. Thirdly, the new 
investors  introduced  highly  profitable  investment  strategies  and  instruments, 
from which traditional financial companies – and notably the major Swiss banks 
– were eager to learn. This led to radical innovations in the financial system, 
which  had  a  considerable  impact  on  the  functioning  of  the  Swiss  economy. 
Finally, the raiders’ publicity campaigns led to a more general diffusion of a 
certain  ‘equity  culture’  whose  most  important  consequence  was  the  ever 
increasing  part  of  private  savings  that  was  invested  in  equities  rather  than 
traditional  savings  vehicles  such  as  savings  accounts,  thereby  providing  the 
equity markets with considerable liquidity. 
 
By the beginning of the 21
st century hostile takeovers of Swiss firms – even by 
foreign  investors  –  had  become  a  common  phenomenon,  which  sometimes 
provoked some admonitory voices – especially in the tabloid press and from the 
incumbent managers of the attacked firms – but did not arouse any fundamental 
objection. Clearly, Swiss companies and the Swiss business elite had become 
more inclined to accept the new rules of the market economy than some ten to 
fifteen years previously. This process influenced the political debates over legal 
reforms. The next section explores in more detail this change by analysing how 
exactly the corporate strategies of Swiss companies changed during the 1980s 
and 1990s.   66 
Corporate Practices and Managerial Preferences 
The pressure created by the corporate raiders was a crucial factor triggering 
change in the Swiss business system starting at the end of the 1980s. However, 
as I will show in this section, changes in corporate governance practices during 
the 1990s were very extensive and all of them cannot be attributed to the impact 
of the raiders alone. 
 
One crucial element of the changes in corporate practices during the 1980s and 
1990s was that Vinkulierung and especially the exclusion of foreign investors – 
the  central  pillar  of  insider  domination  in  Switzerland  comparable  to  the 
Swedish  voting  right  distortions  –  increasingly  came  under  pressure.  The 
clearest case in this respect is Nestlé, which decided, in 1988, to abolish its anti-
foreigner clause for inscription in the stock ledger. This was mainly the result of 
the strong reactions in the English press following Nestlé’s takeover of the UK 
company Rowntree. The English press attacked Nestlé’s behaviour, pointing out 
the contradiction between its very aggressive expansion strategy abroad while 
being completely shielded from takeovers at home. Fearing retaliatory measures 
from international markets and competitors, Nestlé was pushed to liberalise its 
Vinkulierung regime (Loderer & Jacobs 1995: 320-322). 
 
The case of Nestlé is significant because it can be expected that the practices of 
this  prestigious  first  mover  had  a  signalling  impact  on  other  companies. 
According to Culpepper (2005) changes in central actors’ beliefs – and hence 
preferences and practices – are central to making institutional change happen. 
Institutions ‘change only when the central strategic actors within the system are 
persuaded, collectively, that their old cognitive maps are wrong and that they 
need to devise new ones’ (Culpepper 2005: 176). Nestlé's changing corporate 
governance  practices  certainly  had  the  potential  to  spur  the  spread  of  such 
practices  among  Swiss  firms.  Nestlé  opened  its  registered  share  capital  to 
foreign  investors  in  1988,  introduced  international  accounting  standards  in 
1989, had established an investor relations department by 1990, and decided to 
introduce the unitary share class in 1993. These very important reforms in one 
of  the  largest  and  most  successful  Swiss  company’s  corporate  governance 
practices  can  be  expected  to  have  contributed  to  the  generalisation  of  such 
practices during the 1990s. Although the reasons why companies like Nestlé 
adopted new practices are not limited to ideational aspects, but can be linked to 
very concrete material interests (as Nestlé’s fear for international reprisals after 
the Rowntree takeover), new practices introduced by a prestigious first-mover 
may lead other companies to being convinced that this example is the lead to 
follow,  thereby  producing  a  ‘joint  belief  shift’  (‘JBS’)  (Culpepper  2005). 
Following  such  a  ‘JBS’,  new  practices  spread  quickly  as  part  of  a  ‘trend’   67 
without  questioning  of  their  costs  and  benefits  or  even  their  sense  or 
senselessness. 
 
This can be illustrated by the simplification of complex capital structures, which 
went often together with the liberalisation of Vinkulierung, reported in figure 5. 
The figure clearly shows a dramatic increase in the number of companies that 
have  a  unitary  share  structure  and  at  the  same  time  the  equally  dramatic 
abolition  of  non-voting  participation  certificates  (PC).  By  2001,  70%  of  the 
listed companies in Switzerland had introduced the unitary share class (Kunz 
2002: 30). 61.3% of the companies which had introduced – by November 2000 
– a unitary share abolished at the same time the possibility of Vinkulierung 
(Burkhalter  2001),  exposing  themselves  to  a  much  large  extent  to  financial 
market pressures than in the past. 
 











1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Listed firms with PC Listed firms with unitary shares
 
Source: Kunz 2002 
 
Note:  The  sample  includes  all  operating  public  companies  under  Swiss  law  that  were 
included in the Aktienführer Schweiz and had one or several share classes quoted in the main 
segment of the Zurich Stock Exchange (up to 1995) or the Swiss Electronic Exchange (from 
1998, including Virt-x in 2001) (Kunz 2002: 31). This sample represents over 99% of the 
market capitalisation and trading volume of Swiss public companies. 
   68 
The simplification of the capital structure, while exposing insiders to increasing 
market pressures, allowed them to become  more  attractive for investors and 
hence  to  increase  their  market  capitalisation  (Helbling  1996:  216-217).  In 
addition to  
increasing the valuation of the company – and hence a reduction of capital costs 
– the simplification of the capital structure also has a signalling effect, showing 
investors that the company respects the laws of the financial market, which also 
indicates the new position of the shareholder within the company (Burkhalter 
2001: 244, Kunz 1998: 73, Boemle 2003: 909). 
 
The abolition of multiple share categories is but one – albeit a very important 
one – of several areas in which corporate governance practices of Swiss firms 
have changed fundamentally. Another one is the question of transparency in 
accounting.  The  first  Swiss  companies  to  apply  international  accounting 
standards (IAS) were Ares-Serono, BBC, and Tecan, which all introduced IAS 
rules in 1988; Nestlé followed in 1989, Saurer, Roche, Landis&Gyr in 1990. 
Accounting  standards  ‘improved’  rapidly  from  that  point  on.
55  By  the  mid-
1990s,  Switzerland  was  the  mainland  European  country  with  the  highest 
proportion  of  companies  applying  international  accounting  standards 
(Dumontier  and  Raffournier  1998:  216).  Thus,  in  1995,  nine  German  and 
twenty-four  French  companies  applied  IAS  rules  (Dick  &  Zarlowski  2002), 
whereas we count seventy-eight Swiss companies applying these rules (KPMG 
2001). 
 
The  reasons  for  these  changes  are  multiple.  Pressures  stemming  from 
internationalisation and liberalisation of international markets, mediated through 
domestic actors such as the corporate raiders and ‘norm entrepreneurs’ such as 
the accounting profession, are a central element of this evolution. Through a 
variety of mechanisms, this led large, mostly listed companies to change their 
practices.  These  mechanisms  are  a  mixture  of  strategic  adaptation  to  new 
opportunity/constraint structures (access to foreign markets, competitiveness), 
elements  of  direct  ‘external  inducement’  (Ikenberry  1990)  notably  through 
international  regulatory  pressure  (for  example,  the  indirect  political  and 
regulatory pressure by EC/EU legislation on Swiss firms) and ‘direct coercion’ 
(for  example  through  corporate  raiders,  but  also  the  listing  requirements  of 
foreign stock exchanges and most notably of the LSE). 
 
Besides these external factors, endogenous factors contributed to the increasing 
shareholder orientation of Swiss firms. One of the most important factors in this 
respect is the increasing convergence of the preferences of the Swiss managerial 
elite and of outside investors.
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The  two  main  reasons  for  this  ‘convergence  of  interests’  are  a  change  in 
managers’ educational profile, leading to changes in norms and values, and an 
altered pecuniary incentive structure.
57 Concerning the former, a considerable 
change in the educational profile of Swiss managers can be observed during the 
1980s and 1990s: by 2000, Anglo-Saxon style MBAs had become the education 
par excellence for top managers, whereas degrees in law had become much 
rarer  and  degrees  in  engineering  were  stagnating  (Davoine  2005;  Dyllick  & 
Torgler 2006). This ‘new school’ of Swiss managers – who often went through 
Anglo-Saxon  business  schools  and  were  sometimes  trained  in  American 
consulting firms such as McKinsey – has imposed a new management culture 
on  many  Swiss  companies.  The  new  school  of  Swiss  mangers  defended 
fundamentally different norms and values than the traditional managerial elite. 
Under  the  old  insider-orientated  paradigm,  managers  (often  engineers)  with 
profound  knowledge  of  a  given  company  and  its  production  processes  were 
considered  to  know  best  what  was  good  for  the  firm.  Outside  shareholders, 
financial analysts, and other actors defending minority interests, on the other 
hand, were considered to be dangerous Querulanten (vexatious litigants) and 
financial analysts were considered to be ‘rabble’ (explicitly so in minutes of the 
preparatory committee of the NC, May 1985, p.515). During the 1990s, this 
changed  as  consultants,  financial  analysts,  and  those  holding  MBA  degrees 
from  US  universities  or  business  schools  acquired  a  position  of  undisputed 
authority  concerning  the  management  of  firms.  Again,  this  also  shows  that 
ideational changes (acceptance of new values and norms) played an important 
role in the changing behaviour of Swiss companies, in addition to the role of 
strategic  behaviour  (managers  taking  advantage  of  new  opportunities)  and 
coercion (raiders’ imposing new practices on companies),. 
 
Moreover,  as  Höpner  (2003a)  has  argued  for  the  German  case,  managers 
became increasingly supportive of value-based management methods (VBM) as 
these methods went together with performance-related pay schemes, which led 
to a very significant increase in managerial compensation. This was clearly the 
case in Switzerland too. The rise of performance-related compensation schemes 
led even mangers of the ‘old school’ to support shareholder-related policies. 
This  new  orientation  towards  financial  goals  and  personal  wealth  has  been 
publicly criticised in the press by several – interestingly enough often retired – 
‘old-school’  managers  as  greedy  unethical  behaviour,  illustrating  the  break 
between two different management ‘cultures’ (see for instance WOZ April 22, 
2004; Blick May 9, 2007). 
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The spread of the shareholder value idea and related management techniques in 
Switzerland was favoured by the context of the 1990s. Learning from other 
(foreign) companies based on evidence of their performance (most importantly 
the success of the US economy during the 1990s, which contrasted with the 
recession in Switzerland) led to the belief that pursuing the maximization of 
shareholder value was the most appropriate – or the only sensible – goal likely 
to  guarantee  the  success  of  the  company  in  a  difficult  environment.  The 
traditional  ‘stakeholder  approach’  –  most  often  referred  to  as  the  ‘multi-
referentiality of the firm’ – was considered, in this environment, as a strategy to 
reduce  managerial  accountability  by  making  the  measurement  of  success  or 
failure more difficult. This attitude, which was seen as necessarily leading to 
sub-standard profitability of the companies, was considered to be impossible in 
the  new  context  of  increasing  international  competition.  By  the  mid  1990s, 
’shareholder supremacy’ was accepted by very important Swiss managers, as is 
illustrated for instance by the contributions in the debate on shareholder value in 
the  columns  of  the  NZZ  (NZZ  1996)  (see  also  Forstmoser  2005,  Schnyder 
2008). 
 
The examples of the capital structure and of accounting rules show that the 
changes at the level of the listed companies’ practices went well beyond the 
requirements of the new Stock Corporation Law of 1991 or even the SESTA 
and the SWX listing requirements of 1996. Thus, neither the law nor the listing 
requirements  required  the  abolition  of  different  share  categories  or  the 
introduction  of  IAS  standards.  These  changes  in  corporate  practices  can 
therefore not be explained by the legal change of 1992, but are – conversely – 
the main reason why considerable legal changes became possible during the 
1990s after almost 30 years of fierce centre-right opposition to liberalisation of 
corporate  governance.  As  MNCs  (to  use  a  short  hand  for  the  largest  listed 
companies)  were  increasingly  ready  to  follow  international  or  US  corporate 
governance standards, whereas SME and non-listed firms did not change much, 
the heterogeneity of practices within the Swiss corporate governance system 
increasedly led to the emergence of ‘models within models’ (Deeg & Jackson 
2006). The increasing heterogeneity of corporate governance practices directly 
translated into the political arena through the splitting up of the business elite – 
and the centre-right parties close to them – into a pro- and an anti-reform camp 
at the end of the 1980s. The opposition of actors close to the largest companies 
towards the liberalisation of the traditional instruments of insider domination 
waned rapidly as ‘their’ companies abandoned these instruments anyway. 
 
This change in centre-right parties’ constituencies tipped the power balance in 
the  Swiss  parliament  at  the  end  of  the  1980s  and  led  to  an  increasing   71 
substitution  of  the  left-dominated  transparency  coalition  for  a  manager-  and 
investor-led  pro-shareholder  coalition.  This  evolution  ultimately  explains  the 
legal changes in the Swiss corporate governance system at the beginning of the 
1990s  since  it  weakened  the  coalition  of  the  cohesive  business  elite  – 
represented by the centre-right parties – whose opposition had  made reform 
impossible despite permanent domestic pressure for change stemming notably 
from the labour movement.  
 
Concerning the latter point, it is also interesting to note, that centre-left support 
for  pro-shareholder  reform  started  to  wane  during  the  1990s,  or  at  least,  to 
become  more  conditional.  In  fact,  as  the  pro-shareholder  approach  became 
increasingly a pro-shareholder value approach, the left remained supportive of 
those  aspects  of  the  reform,  which  touched  transparency  issues,  but  started 
increasingly  to  distance  itself  from  reform  claims,  which  skipped  power 
relations within the firm in favour of shareholders. This divergence increased 
throughout  the  1990s  and  was  spurred  on  especially by Martin  Ebner’s  and 
other raiders’ activities, as they increasingly pushed for radical restructurings of 
the targeted firms. In 1999, the chairwoman of the machinery industry trade 
union  FTMH  and  Socialist  MP  –  Christiane  Brunner  –  denounced  in  the 
editorial of a publication dedicated to the theme  of ‘Shareholder Value’ the 
‘bloodletting’ of the Swiss economy in the name of shareholder value: 
‘The industrial substance in Switzerland is to day being bled to death. 
In fact, we live in a country where one single speculator, motivated 
only by greed and using foreign capital, can decide about the future of 
companies and of thousands of jobs; and what is worse, without ever 
having  set  foot  in  a  factory.  We  suffer  from  an  economic  system 
where the most prestigious industrial companies become the plaything 
of the shareholder strategists’. (FTMH 1999: 2, my translation) 
This view contrasts with the traditional view of the left for which the ‘arch-
enemy’  were  clearly  the  directors  and  the  managers  –  in  other  words  the 
insiders – while raiders and other actors that fought against insider domination 
over the firm had been seen as allies in the workers’ struggle to increase control 
over management. Thus, one of Brunner’s fellow party members, Carl Miville, 
had stated in September 1988 during the debates in the parliament: 
‘I share largely the opinion of the executive committee and the board 
of the Federal Banking Commission [which have] “no fundamental 
objections to takeovers”. Although there may be every now and then 
an unnecessary takeover, some fresh wind does not do any harm to 
the  boards  of  directors  and  the  management  floors.  Where  large 
takeovers have taken place so far in Switzerland, it became apparent   72 
– at least up to now – that the people who were considered as pure 
financiers – in the worst case as raiders with asset-stripping in mind 
– were in fact responsible [people] with an industrial commitment. 
And where […] in the past takeovers were prevented with the means 
and methods of a company protectionism which you all know about, 
this happened probably more in the interest of a management which 
did not want to put its cards on the table, rather than for the benefit of 
the company.’ (OB CoS 1988: 485, emphasis added; my translation) 
When the shareholder activists started to use the reform demands concerning 
increased transparency, equal treatment of minorities, and the limitation of the 
power of insiders, mainly in their own, material short-term interests, the left 
changed their attitude towards these investors considerably. In this context, the 
traditional managers – who defended an industrial rather than a financial logic – 
started to appear like allies rather than enemies. Managers of the ‘old school’ 
like for instance Fritz Fahrni, former CEO of Sulzer – who was characterised by 
the FTMH as ‘[…] a solid industrialist, who focuses on the long term and who 
has restructured and made the Sulzer Group competitive’ (FTMH 1999: 12, my 
translation)  –  became  in  this  context  the  example  to  follow.  Against  these 
‘traditional managers’ pursuing industrial objectives, the left contrasted a new 
generation  of  managers  such  as  Fred  Kindle  and  Sergio  Marchionne,  who 
explicitly  followed  a  shareholder-value  orientated  strategy.  When  Kindle 
replaced  Fahrni  at  the  head  of  Sulzer  in  March  1999,  he  laid  off  2,000 
employees. 
 
The evolution of corporate governance during the 1990s shows that the left’s 
struggle  for  increasing  transparency  and  minority  shareholder  protections  – 
which were meant to serve all outsiders – had as an unintended consequence the 
empowerment  of  actors  who  would  use  these  newly  created  opportunities 
against  the  interests  of  employees.  As  a  result,  during  the  1990s,  the  Swiss 
Social Democrats started to defend preferences which were closer to what we 
would expect them to have had under the assumptions of mainstream theory’. 
Contrary to Roe’s (2003) prediction, however, this stance was not ‘natural’ for 
the Social Democrats, but the result of a long process in which they had initially 
seen other strategies and preferences as better serving their interests. 
 
6.2.2 Sweden 
In this section I discuss the different factors which explain the centre-right’s 
preferences in the Swedish case. I argue that the same factors, which allow us to 
understand why the Swiss business elite changed its preferences towards pro-  73 
shareholder reform, allow us to understand why the Swedish business elite’s did 
not. 
The Role of Banks in Sweden 
One crucial difference between Switzerland and Sweden is the fact that Sweden 
did not have a bank-centred model of corporate governance in the same sense as 
Switzerland. To be sure, Swedish banks can be considered as universal banks as 
well and the Swedish economy is dominated by two main business groups – the 
Wallenberg  sphere  and  the  Handelsbank  group  –  in  each  of  which  a  bank 
occupies a central place (see notably Collin 1998). Reiter (2003: 106) also states 
that Sweden is a predominantly bank-orientated system, ‘[…] characterised by a 
small  and  strictly  regulated  capital  market,  close  and  long-term  relations 
between  financiers  and  corporate  leaders,  and  an  extensive  concentration  of 
private sector ownership in the hands of a few powerful bank-centred business 
groups’.  Yet,  these  general  characteristics  of  the  Swedish  model  can  by  no 
means be interpreted as constituting a strictly bank-centred system. In fact, in 
the  comparative  corporate  governance  literature  it  is  common  to  use  ‘bank-
centred’ and ‘insider-orientated’ corporate governance systems as synonymous 
terms.  However,  this  broad  categorisation  neglects  the  variance  that  exists 
between  countries  within  the  group  of  insider-orientated  systems.  Sweden 
cannot be considered as a bank-based system to the same extent as Switzerland 
–  or  the  ideal-type  Germany  for  that  matter  –  for  several  reasons.  Most 
importantly, Swedish banks were closely controlled both bottom-up (by their 
owners) and top-down (by the state), reducing their leeway. 
 
Yet, Swedish banks were themselves often closely linked to an owner-family. 
The Svenska Enskilda Banken (SEB) for instance was and still is controlled by 
the Wallenberg family. Other families were also linked to one of the three major 
banks,  which  were  besides  the  SEB,  Skandinavbanken  and  Handelsbanken 
(Högfeldt 2005). The case of Handelsbanken, however, is different from the two 
other  major  banks  in  the  sense  that  this  bank  is  directly  controlled  by  its 
management rather than by owner-families (Agnblad et al. 2001).
58 The fact that 
individuals  or  families  controlled  Swedish  banks  clearly  distinguishes  them 
from Swiss banks. In the Swiss case all three major banks (UBS, CS, and SBS) 
were  widely  held  companies  without  any  shareholder  controlling  significant 
stakes over a longer period of time (see Bank Bär 1991 and 1996). 
 
The  ownership  structure  of  Swedish  banks  had  an  important  impact  on  the 
reform process: as Swedish banks were controlled by people who had interests 
not only in the financial, but also – or even predominantly – in non financial 
sectors, they did not lobby as much as Swiss bankers did for increasing attention 
to be paid to the efficient functioning of capital markets. Increasing gains in the   74 
financial sectors could in fact be offset by losses in non-financial sectors. As an 
example, individuals – such as the Wallenbergs – still valued industrial interests 
at least as much as financial interests and defended protections against market 
forces from liberalisation pressures from the EU (see below). 
 
Another  important  difference  between  the  Swedish  banks  and  Swiss  banks 
consists in the fact that Swedish banks were not only closely held, but also 
heavily restrained in their activities by governmental regulations. Already in 
1932,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Kreuger  scandal,  banks  were  prohibited  from 
directly holding corporate stock. This led to the establishment of closed-end-
investment funds (CEIF)
59 by most banks, which held corporate stock on behalf 
of  the  banks  (Högfeldt  2005).  Moreover,  as  a  result,  Swedish  banks  were 
subject to lending ceilings and had to place more than 50% of their assets in 
long-term governmental bonds or bonds from mortgage institutions. This led to 
a situation where ‘[…] banks were, in effect, transformed into repositories for 
illiquid  bonds,  crippled  in  fulfilling  their  key  function  in  screening  and 
monitoring  loans  for  consumption  and  investment’  (Englund  1999:  83). 
Moreover the Swedish central bank – the Riksbank – scrutinised bank strategies 
closely and communicated what they considered to be appropriate behaviour in 
weekly meetings with the representatives of the major banks (Englund 1999). 
Swedish banks were therefore much more constrained in their strategic choices 
and especially in the development of certain lines of business than Swiss banks. 
Swedish banks were therefore mainly instruments of corporate control for their 
owners  and  integrated  into  vast  spheres  of  influence  in  which  financial  and 
industrial interests mingled. As a result, the banking sector was not the vector 
for  a  financialisation  of  the  economy  which  it  was  in  Switzerland.  At  the 
political level, bankers did not lobby for finance-orientated policies concerning 
corporate governance, because the banking sector was largely dominated by the 
interests  of  the  business  group  as  a  whole  rather  than  constituting  an 
independent sector and hence a collective political actor in its own right. 
Corporate Raiders, Takeovers and their Impact on the Swedish Business System 
As in Switzerland, hostile takeovers started to appear in Sweden during the late 
1980s,  following  an  even  more  extensive  liberalisation  of  financial  markets, 
which made possible new financial practices including corporate raiding (Skog 
1994; Isaksson & Skog 1994). According to Berglöf (1997: 109), these reforms 
were influenced by UK regulations and were very far-reaching (see also Blyth 
2002, David and Mach 2004, Reiter 2003) 
 
The main changes concerned the reactivation of virtually non-existent financial 
markets  in  1984  and  the  progressive  abolition,  between  the  mid-1980s  and 
1993, of exchange rate controls and of the need for state approval for foreign   75 
investments  in  Swedish  companies  (Henrekson  &  Jakobsson  2006;  Högfeldt 
2005, Blyth 20020, Englund 1999). 
 
The reforms of the 1980s allowed banks and mortgage institutions to expand 
their  financial  activities  into  markets  which  were  previously  reserved  to 
insurance  and  investment  companies  (such  as  leasing,  factoring,  credit  card 
issuing).  This  created  a  context  of  increasing  competition  among  financial 
institutions,  which  pushed  them  into  riskier  markets  (Englund  1999).  The 
reforms  also  made  unorthodox  investment  strategies  –  such  as  raiding  – 
possible, and led to the emergence of corporate raiders like Anders Wall and 
Erik Penser, who specialised in buying and re-selling companies. These new 
actors brought new, aggressive investment techniques such as ‘asset stripping’ 
to Sweden (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006). 
 
Yet, a crucial difference in the raiders’ activities in Switzerland and Sweden 
concerns the fact that the most aggressive strategies were short-lived in Sweden 
due to the financial crisis of the early 1990s, which led to heavy losses for the 
raiders. In fact, in Sweden, the extent and pace of the liberalisation was such 
that it led rapidly to very pronounced real estate speculation and finally to a 
financial and monetary crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Englund 
1999). A very significant consequence of the crisis for the question of corporate 
governance reform was that the role of ‘corporate raiders’ and of new financial 
methods was perceived in a very different way in Sweden than was the case in 
Switzerland. The fact that the emergence of aggressive investment strategies 
coincided  with  liberalisation  and  were  subsequently  associated  –  rightly  or 
wrongly – with the ensuing economic crisis meant that the acceptance of these 
new behaviours by the traditional actors and the public opinion remained very 
limited. As hostile takeovers had apparently very negative effects on companies 
and the economy as a whole, as the financial crisis of the early 1990s showed, it 
was  thought  that  companies  should  be  protected  from  such  activities.  The 
association  between  real  estate  speculation  and  corporate  takeovers  was 
expressed  for  instance  in  a  letter  of  June  1,  1993  of  the  white-collar  union 
Sveriges  Industritjänsteman  Förbund  (SIF)  to  the  Minister  of  Justice  Gun 
Hellsvik  (The  letter  can  be  found  in  the  Swedish  National  Archives  at 
SE/RA/325044 vol. 3): 
 
‘The real estate speculation of the 1980s with the ensuing real estate 
and  banking  crises  are  now  well-known  facts.  A  similar  wave  of 
speculation touched also upon the buying up of industrial companies, 
which happened at excessive prices. The banks played an important 
role in this evolution in that they promoted highly leveraged loans for   76 
company acquisitions and thereby contributed to the unsound prices 
of such acquisitions. […] Today, the acquired companies and their 
employees pay a high price for this behaviour when the owners and 
the banks in all likelihood even break the Stock Corporation Law in 
their zeal to extract from the company its last money in order to save 
their own finances. [A]fter the financial crisis of the 1990s it is again 
time to revise the law so that we get in the future a better protection of 
our industry and its own capital against the attacks of ‘raiders’ and the 
collaborating banks’. (My translation) 
 
In  another  letter  of  May  9,  1995  the  SIF  reiterates  its  wish  to  increase  the 
protection of company’s equity from the ‘[…] plundering by owners who have 
economic  problems’  (SE/RA/325044  vol.3;  my  translation).  A  similar 
perception of the shareholder as a ‘thief’ was widespread in Switzerland during 
most  of  the  20
th  century  and  constituted  the  main  rationale  for  the  very 
pronounced  insider orientation  of  Swiss  firms  (see also  Lüpold  &  Schnyder 
2008; Schnyder 2008). However, in Switzerland, by the mid-1990s, the negative 
perception of shareholders had largely given way to the shareholder supremacy 
view (see above). No such evolution has taken place in Sweden. The financial 
crisis of the early 1990s certainly contributed to this. 
 
The  SIF  letter  constitutes  –  of  course  –  only  anecdotal  evidence;  however, 
examples from the new ABL of 2005 show that this view is even now accepted 
among  leading  legal  scholars,  public  officials  and  the  legislator  in  general. 
Thus,  whereas  in  most  European  countries,  including  Switzerland,  the 
distribution of benefits to shareholders has been greatly facilitated during the 
1990s,  the  provisions  of  chapter  17  of  the  new  ABL  on  ‘value  transfers’ 
(värdeöverföringar) – which include distributions of capital gains, own-capital 
reductions, and the acquisition by a company of its own shares – shows a much 
more pronounced concern with making sure that a company does not distribute 
too  much  of  its  surplus  to  shareholders  by  imposing  different  safeguards. 
Changes  aiming  at  facilitating  distribution  of  benefits  through  more  precise 
rules and procedures are counterbalanced by a strong commitment to ‘capital 
protection’,  which  is  clearly  inspired  by  a  negative  view  of  shareholders’ 
influence.  To  give  but  one  example,  the  new  ABL  of  2005  refrains  from 
abolishing  the  need  for  board  approval  for  capital  reductions  (ABL  2005, 
chapter 30 3§ 2
nd sentence). Svensson and Danelius (2005: 157) explain this fact 
as follows
60: 
‘The provision is justified by the fact that it is in general the board, 
which has the best possibilities to decide how large a distribution is 
appropriated in view of the company’s [financial] situation; and [by   77 
the fact] that the board represents the company’s long-term interests 
often  better  than  shareholders  for  whom  an  immediate  high 
distribution is sometimes the focus’ (emphasis added, my translation). 
This objective – protecting the company’s own capital from being ‘plundered’ 
by  shareholders  –  reflects  persistent  negative  attitudes  towards  minority 
shareholders  and  helps  to  explain  why  in  Sweden  minority  shareholder 
protection was considered to be of little importance. 
 
The  passage  from  the  SIF  letter  quoted  above  also  suggests  that,  as  in 
Switzerland, the banks started – despite their larger commitment to industrial 
interests – to support, to a certain extent, new investment practices, and that 
they supported corporate raiders in their attacks on Swedish companies. Yet, the 
financial  crisis  meant  that  this  change  in  bank  strategies  did  not  gain  any 
legitimacy, as it was seen as being negative for the Swedish economy and for 
the banks themselves (see the number of bank failures during the crisis of the 
1990s: Englund 1999). The transformation of corporate governance structures, 
which might have taken place due to raiders’ activities – provided the banks’ 
owners  were  really  ready  to  allow  it  to  happen  –  was  thereby  aborted  very 
quickly, eliminating one important factor for change. 
 
Yet, despite the fact that corporate raiders did not play the same transformative 
role as in Switzerland, a fundamental change in the functioning of the market of 
corporate control took still place in Sweden too. Agnblad et al. (2001) report 
that  during  the  1950s  on  average  one  acquisition  a  year  took  place  on  the 
Swedish  stock  market.  During  the  1960s  the  average increased  to  three  and 
during the 1970s to four a year. During the following decade, more precisely 
between 1980 and 1992, however, 253 offers took place of which 212 were 
successful (Agnblad et al. 2001: 247). These takeovers often involved foreign 
investors and some of the offers were clearly unsolicited. The Swedish Code 
Group (SOU 2004:130, p.14) wrote in April 2004 that ‘[t]akeover activities on 
the Swedish stock market tend to be higher than in the United Kingdom, for 
example.’ Ahlqvist (2004: 4-54) reports that 9% of all listed Swedish companies 
are targeted by a takeover every year. Increasing M&A activity has notably 
affected  the  Wallenberg  sphere  of  influence.  Thus,  the  merger  between 
Pharmacia  and  Upjohn  in  1995,  the  takeover  of  Volvo’s  car  manufacturing 
division by the US company Ford, and the merger of Astra AB and Zeneca 
Group  plc.  (both  in  1999)  signified  a  considerable  loss  of  control  for  the 
Wallenberg family over their most valuable assets (Agnblad et al. 2001). This 
leads Henrekson and Jakobsson (2003: 96) to state that by 2003: 
‘[T]here has been a dramatic shift in corporate governance […]. Until 
recently, Swedish firms operated in a corporatist environment where   78 
capital markets and shareholder value played a subordinate role. The 
change  in  ownership  […]  is  part  of  a  major  restructuring  of  the 
Swedish business sector orchestrated by the capital market by means 
of mergers and takeovers. The situation in Sweden is in many ways 
similar to that in the USA […]. The difference is that the mergers and 
takeovers in Sweden have mainly been of the cross-border type. It 
seems as if the other corporatist economies of Europe have clung to 
their established patterns of corporate governance to a much larger 
extent, the only exception being Switzerland.’ 
However, I will show in the next section that –the question of M&A activity 
aside – little systematic evidence exists to support the view that changes in 
Swedish corporate governance have taken place. 
 
The  increase  in  takeover  activity  points  to  another  significant  difference 
between Sweden and Switzerland, that is, the more active role of institutional 
investors in Sweden. I have shown elsewhere (Schnyder 2008) that institutional 
investors – excluding corporate raiders and their investment vehicles from this 
category
61 – were very passive and did not exercise up until the late 1990s any 
direct  pressures  on  Swiss  firms  to  ‘improve’  their  corporate  governance 
practices.
62 In Sweden, on the other hand, foreign institutional investors appear 
to have put pressure on Swedish companies to improve the position of outside 
investors within the firm much earlier than in Switzerland. The abolition of 
restrictions  on  foreign  investments  led  to  an  ever  increasing  proportion  of 
foreign ownership in Sweden, so much so that certain authors predicted that 
most large Swedish company’s would be owned by foreigners in the near future 
(Henrekson & Jakobsson 2000 and 2002). The increase of foreign ownership 
also involved financially-orientated institutional investors, which put stress on 
increasing  returns  on  investment.  These  new  actors  put  the  Swedish  system 
directly under pressure, pushing Swedish firms to change their practices. Reiter 
(2003: 116) notes that 
‘[…] new groups of shareholders, domestic and foreign alike, have 
also  exerted  direct  pressure  to  change  the  structures  concerning 
golden shares […]. Foreign investors have repeatedly criticised the 
Swedish system of differentiated voting rights and have called it “an 
example of Swedish ultranationalism”’. 
In  particular,  the  US  adviser  of  institutional  shareholders,  Institutional 
Shareholder Service (ISS), has continuously lobbied the Swedish government to 
abolish voting right distortions (Dagens Industri Sept 23 1995, Dagens Industri 
May 29, 1997).
63 Yet, this lobbying did not lead to any perceptible change in 
governmental policy concerning this issue (Reiter 2003). Moreover, as I will   79 
show in the next section, during most of the 1990s, a large part of Swedish 
companies also appear to have resisted these pressures. 
 
Corporate Practices and Managerial Preferences 
Since the late 1980s, Swedish companies – contrary to Swiss companies – have 
increasingly adopted CMS, such as cross-shareholdings and voting caps, and 
did not – up until the late 1990s – abolish their voting right distortions (see 
Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006; Skog 1994; Högfeldt 2005). In order to prevent 
the anticipated opening up of Swedish equity markets to direct ownership by 
foreigners, family-controlled firms increasingly introduced dual-class shares in 
the late 1980s and even more so in the 1990s (Högfeldt 2005; Henrekson & 
Jakobsson  2003).  Figure  6  shows  that  dual  class  shares  have  flourished  in 
Sweden throughout the 1990s. This evolution is remarkable if we consider the 
increasing degree to which Swiss companies introduced unitary share structures 
during  the  same  period.  Certainly,  in  relative  terms,  in  Sweden  also  the 
proportion  of  companies  using  voting-right  distortions  started  to  decrease  at 
some point during the mid-1990s. The percentage of listed firms with dual class 
shares  peaked  around  1992  when  87%  of  the  companies  were  protected  by 
voting-right distortions (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006: 23, table 9); by 1998, 
this share had decreased to reach 63%. By 2006 ‘only’ 64% of the firms listed 
companies still had voting right distortions. However, this decrease in relative 
terms is largely due to the impressive increase  in the number of companies 
listed on the SSE. In absolute terms, the number of listed firms with dual class 
shares actually increased up to the late 1990s, and was at the end of the last 
century – despite a reversal of the trend – still substantially higher than at the 
beginning of the 1990s. More precisely, in 1992, 202 companies with voting 
right distortions were quoted on the SSE, in 1998 there were 304 and in 2006 
there were still 271 (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006: 23). Even in relative terms, 
despite an important decrease between the early and the late 1990s, as late as 
2006  a  clear  majority  (64%)  of  listed  companies  in  Sweden  had  dual  class 
shares  with  voting  right  distortions,  which  compared  to  less  then  10%  in 
Switzerland (see figure 4 above). In addition, almost 50% of the 120 companies 
which  went  public  during  the  period  1998  to  2002  issued  shares  with 
differential voting rights (Veckans Affärer April 7, 2003). This evolution can 
hardly be interpreted as a fundamental change in Swedish companies’ corporate 
governance practices in the sense of an increased openness towards financial 
markets and a growing shareholder orientation.
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Source: Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006: 24, table 9 
 
One explanation of the reluctance of Swedish insiders to abolish voting right 
differentials as compared to the evolution in Switzerland consists in differences 
in the degree of ownership concentration and – more generally – the prevailing 
type of owners. The extraordinary degree of concentration in corporate control 
in  Sweden  does  not  go  together  with  a  particularly  pronounced  ownership 
concentration.  LLSV’s  (1998)  concentration  index  of  the  three  largest 
shareholders  in  the  10  largest  domestic  non-financial,  non  state-owned 
companies  shows  a  mean  of  28%  for  Sweden,  as  compared  to  41%  for 
Switzerland. Yet, this captures very incompletely the Swedish reality in which 
corporate  control  is  mainly  exercised  through  pyramids  and  voting  rights 
distortions.  Sweden  is  probably  the  European  country  with  the  most 
concentrated  corporate  control  structure,  with  most  of  the  major  companies 
being controlled by a very limited number of actors.  
 
This latter point becomes clear when we compare the role of owner-families in 
Switzerland and Sweden. La Porta et al’s (1999: table V) data show that in the 
mid 1990s 30% of the 20 largest
65 Swiss firms were controlled by families. For 
Sweden the corresponding figure was 45%.
66 The percentage of total market 
capitalisation of the sample of twenty firms that were controlled by families was 
28.7% for Switzerland and 35.5% for Sweden.
67 Thus family ownership was 
more common and more extensive in Sweden than in Switzerland. Yet, La Porta 
et al. (1999) also find that Swiss families were more often actively involved in 
the management of the firm than Swedish families. In all Swiss companies of 
their sample controlled by a family, a family member held a leading position in   81 
the management; in Sweden this was the case only in 56% of family-controlled 
companies (LLSV 1999: Table V).
68 The frontier between managers and owners 
is hence more blurred in Switzerland. Moreover, La Porta et al. (1999) show 
that in Switzerland each family controlled on average exactly 1 company. Of all 
family-controlled Swiss companies in the LLSV sample, no two were controlled 
by the same family. This finding is also supported by Nollert’s (2005: 427) data 
for 1995: among the 22 Swiss families or individuals with a fortune of CHF 1b 
or more in 1996 and who had important stakes in the 300 companies of his 
sample, only two (Stephan Schmidheiny and Martin Ebner who both controlled 
an  investment  company)  had  important  shareholdings  in  more  than  one 
company.  In  comparison,  in  Sweden,  the  average  family  controlled  2.5 
companies  (La  Porta  et  al.  1999).  This  average,  however,  certainly 
underestimates the extent of control by some Swedish families. In fact, certain 
families  and  individuals  –  such  as  the  Wallenbergs  –  control  a  very  large 
number of companies, which constitute very extensive spheres of influence (e.g. 
Carlsson 2007). As a result, while in both cases the insider-orientation of the 
corporate governance system goes together with a significant role for owner-
families in corporate governance, important differences exist between the two 
countries concerning the precise nature of this role. Each typical Swiss owner-
family seems to be directly involved in the management of one company, while 
Swedish families seem to play a more limited management role, but in a greater 
number of companies. Or in other words, Swiss owner-families appear to be 
more of the entrepreneurial type, while Swedish owner-families appear to be 
more owners and controllers of a vast empire of companies in which they have a 
more distant role. 
 
Control over the Swedish economy was concentrated in the hands of a very 
limited number of actors. Carl-Henrik Hermansson (1965), then leader of the 
communist SKP, spoke in 1965 of fifteen families which controlled the Swedish 
economy.  This  statement  appears  to  be  only  slightly  exaggerated  as 
contemporary  official  reports  on  ownership  structure  of  the  Swedish 
corporations largely confirm this point (Henrekson & Jakobsson 2003, Högfeldt 
2005). 
 
Due to the extent of their spheres of influence, Swedish family-owners relied 
much  more  on  CMS-like  pyramids  to  control  their  companies  than  Swiss 
families did. Thus, La Porta et al. (1999) find that in 78% of family-controlled 
companies, this control is exercised through the intermediary of at least one 
other company in Sweden (the corresponding figure for Switzerland is 0%). 
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The same is true for voting right distortions – the most important Swedish CMS 
– which reached levels that were unheard of in other European countries with 
voting right differentials between two share categories reaching proportions of 
1:1000 in some cases (Isaksson & Skog 1994: 294). At the beginning of the 
1990s, most Swedish firms had voting right distortions of 1:10 (156 out of 202 
firms); one firm had a ratio of 1:100 and three of 1:1000 (Isaksson and Skog 
1994:  294).  Table  2  below  confirms  the  importance  that  voting  right 
differentials had in the Swedish corporate governance system compared to other 
countries. 
 
Table 2: Voting right distortions in 1995 
Japan  20.00 
Spain  20.00 
United Kingdom   20.00 
Belgium  20.00 
France   19.99 
United States  19.19 
Germany  18.61 
Italy  18.04 
Netherlands  15.00 
Switzerland  14.18 
Sweden  12.62 
   
Average  18.56 
Source: La Porta et al. 1998, Table IV. 
 
Note: The table reports the minimum percent of the book value of common equity required to 
control twenty per cent of the votes. The average refers to a sample of 27 countries. 
 
Arguably, the discrepancy between ownership and control in Sweden made the 
business  elite  particularly  reluctant  to  liberalise  the  corporate  governance 
system. Henrekson and Jakobsson (2006: 31) consider that  
‘[…] the capital basis, on which the [insiders’] control is based, is 
smaller in Sweden than in other corporatist economies in Europe […]. 
This  latter  feature  renders  the  Swedish  control  model  particularly 
vulnerable to the threat of globalisation and the increasing domination 
of pension funds on international stock exchanges’ (my translation). 
The different attitude of Swiss and Swedish firms towards the liberalisation of 
their  capital  structure  can  therefore  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  Swedish 
controlling  shareholders  rely  more  on  voting  right  distortions  than  Swiss 
controlling  shareholders.  Liberalisation  –  for  example  the  introduction  of  a   83 
unitary share structure – would in many cases inevitably lead to a loss of control 
(Henrekson & Jakobsson 2006). To give but one example, Reiter (2003: 109) 
reports that the Wallenberg family’s voting rights in Electrolux would decrease 
from 95% to 16% were voting right distortions abolished.
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In Switzerland, although voting right distortions were common and substantial, 
the introduction of the unitary share did not necessarily lead to a loss of control 
as  capital  stakes  were  still  large  enough  to  guarantee  the  blockholders  a 
substantial  influence  in  the  company.  Eleven  of  the  forty  largest  Swiss 
companies introduced the unitary share between 1992 and 1994.
70 Only two out 
of these eleven companies were genuine public companies with no shareholder 
holding  more  than  5%  of  the  voting  rights  in  1990  (Nestlé,  where  the 
Bettencourt family held in 1990 only 4% of the voting rights, introduced the 
unitary share in 1993; Von Roll, which was in 1990 a genuine public company 
introduced the unitary share in 1994). Most other ‘early movers’ were family-
controlled  (Helvetia-Patria  Insurance,  Logitech,  Valora/Merkur,  Adecco, 
Oerlikon-Bührle,  Agie  Charmilles,  Zschokke);  one  company  had  a  bank  as 
major shareholder (Bâloise Insurance where the SBS held 17% of the voting 
rights);  Saurer  was  the  only  ‘early  mover’  controlled  by  one  of  the  ‘new 
investors’,  that  is,  by  Tito  Tettamanti  who  held  38.2%  of  the  voting  rights 
(figures based on Bank Bär 1991). Thus nothing indicates for the Swiss case 
that families were particularly reluctant to liberalise their capital structure. This 
is all the more remarkable as all but one of the companies which introduced the 
unitary share between 1992 and 1994 had substantial voting right distortions. In 
fact,  the  largest  shareholder  of  the  above-mentioned  eleven  companies 
controlled in 1990 on average 33.23% of the votes, but only 24.42% of the 
capital  (my  own  calculations  based  on  Bank  Bär  1991).  The  exception  was 
Zschokke, which did not have any voting right distortions but was controlled by 
two related families that held together 60% of the capital. 
 
For the companies with voting right distortions, the introduction of the unitary 
share implied a considerable decrease in control of the traditional blockholders 
over  the  company.  A  comparison  of  ownership  structure  between  1990  and 
1995 shows that those companies for which the introduction of the unitary share 
implied  the  abolishing  of  voting  right  differentials,  this  move  resulted  on 
average  in  a  decrease  of  14.5%  of  the  stake  controlled  by  the  dominant 
shareholder in terms of votes (my own calculations based on Bank Bär 1991 
and  1996).  Yet,  only  the  controlling  families  of  Zschokke  –  ironically  the 
company without voting right distortions in 1990 – had lost control completely 
by 1995. In all but two of the other companies the former blockholder remained 
the largest shareholder with an average stake of 18.6% (figures based on annual   84 
reports and Bank Bär 1991 and 1996). Abandoning voting-right distortions was 
hence less costly for Swiss blockholders than for Swedish ones. This may help 
to  explain  why  important  Swedish  actors  were  more  reluctant  to  liberalise 
corporate governance practices. 
 
Recently, voting right distortions in Sweden began to be reduced as well, and in 
some  instances  dual-class  shares  were  abolished  altogether.  This  was 
particularly the case with the most extreme voting right differentials of 1:1000, 
which have now been abolished in all companies. The last company to do so 
was Ericsson. Ericsson’s board and owners (Industrivärde and Investor) agreed 
in 2002 with institutional investors (notably ISS) on a transformation of golden 
shares into standard differential voting right distortions (1:10) (Reiter 2003). 
 
Agnblad et al. (2001: 255) consider, that, as a result of these developments: 
‘There  are  clear  signs  that  the  old  structures  are  already  breaking  down  in 
response to these pressures. Cross-holdings have all but disappeared from the 
Swedish corporate scene. Many large corporations are gradually relinquishing 
the system of dual-class shares. In particular, the largest firms controlled by the 
Wallenberg family, such as ABB, Astra, Electrolux, and SKF, have over a very 
short period, either directly or after an international merger, eliminated dual-
share classes that most efficiently differentiated votes from equity ownership. 
Given the traditional stability of the ownership structures in Sweden over the 
last 60 years, the recent changes have been dramatic; more has happened during 
the last few years than over the previous 60 years.’ (Agnblad et al. 2001:255) 
It has to be underscored, however, that no study of the Swedish case provides 
any systematic data for a supposedly dramatic change in corporate governance 
practices. It seems rather that beyond the often-quoted examples of a handful of 
very large companies (SKF, Ericsson, Electrolux), no such change has taken 
place so far. This is clearly supported, for instance, by the evolution of voting-
right  distortions  quoted  above.  Some  large  companies  may  very  well  have 
abolished – or reduced – the most extreme forms of voting differentials, but this 
cannot – given the limited evidence cited in most studies – be interpreted as a 
general trend in the Swedish corporate governance system. In 2007 Carlsson 
(2007: 1045) stated that 
‘[Differential voting rights] enjoy solid support from most parts of the 
Swedish  community  at  large  –  from  the  business  and  financial 
community as well as from the government and the general public’. 
In addition, the evidence quoted by Carlsson (2007: 1043) shows that in the 
fourteen ’core holdings’ of the Wallenbergs, the ratio between the percentage of 
voting rights and the capital stake is on average 1:2; in other words, the family 
controls twice as many votes as the capital it owns. Only in five out of these   85 
fourteen companies are there no voting right distortions. Again, this can hardly 
be interpreted as a dramatic change in Swedish corporate governance practices. 
 
This is further supported by the fact that in relation to the debates about the EU 
takeover directive, the Wallenberg family made it very clear that they had no 
intention of abandoning the control over ‘their’ companies completely. In an 
interview with Dagens Industri of March 13, 2003 Marcus Wallenberg declared 
that the family would find other ways than dual class shares in order to maintain 
the control over their sphere, should the EU prohibit the use of super-voting 
shares during takeovers (quoted in Ahlqvist 2004: 4-58). A draft of the EU 
takeover directive which was tabled in Winter 2001/2002 contained a clause 
that  would  have  prevented  minority  shareholders  holding  less  then  25%  of 
capital from opposing a takeover through the use of dual class shares (Reiter 
2003, Ahlqvist 2004). The traditional Swedish owners, and in particular the 
Wallenbergs,  lobbied  MEPs  and  Commissioners  as  well  as  the  Swedish 
government  in  order  to  persuade  them  to  oppose  the  directive  (Reiter 
2003:118). This strategy worked: according to Högfeldt (2005: 565, note 30), 
‘[t]he Social Democratic government announced that it would do everything 
within its power to back the Wallenbergs and fight the proposal. The right to 
use dual-class shares is declared to be a national interest.’ 
 
In  short,  the  preferences  of  the  most  important  Swedish  actors  were 
fundamentally different from their Swiss counterparts. Trade unions and Social 
Democrats  in  Sweden  preferred  insider-control  over  firms  over  outside-  and 
market-control.  The  same  is  true  for  the  business  elite.  Sweden  did  not 
experience  the  emergence  of  a  ‘transparency  coalition’,  but  neither  did  she 
experience  the  above-mentioned  convergence  of  interests  between  managers 
and shareholders that took place in several European countries. The Swedish 
case  seems  much  more  to  be  characterised  –  at  least  as  far  as  corporate 
governance is concerned– by the persistence of a corporatist coalition uniting 
corporate insiders (mangers, blockholders) and labour. This broad and stable 
coalition explains why shareholder-orientated legal reform did not gain much 
support in Sweden and why the legal reforms remained very limited. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The present study shows that a simple partisan model (strong social democracy 
=  insider-orientated  corporate  governance;  weak  social  democracy  = 
shareholder-orientated corporate governance) does not allow us to explain the 
evolution of corporate governance systems in all circumstances, as it fails to 
account for the variety of factors that influence different economic and political   86 
actors’  preferences.  The  Swiss  and  Swedish  cases  show  that  both  a  clearly 
centre-right dominated polity and a clearly centre-left dominated one can lead to 
an insider-orientated corporate governance system with concentrated ownership. 
At the same time, the stability of political power relations in Switzerland did not 
prevent  change.  Legal  changes  in  Switzerland  took  place  under  a  clearly 
bourgeois dominated government and an equally clearly bourgeois dominated 
parliament. Therefore, not changing power relations, but changing preferences 
explain  why  legal  MSP  increased  in  Switzerland  during  the  early  1990s. 
Sweden, on the other hand, experienced during the 1980s and 1990s episodic 
changes in the governmental coalition, which could have – but did not – lead to 
changes in policy concerning the protection of minority shareholders. None of 
the  major  partisan  blocks  in  Sweden  considered  shareholder-orientated 
corporate governance reform to be a priority. 
 
Moreover,  in  both  cases  central  political  actors’  preferences  only  partly 
correspond to what we would expect to find based on Roe’s (2003) theory: the 
Swiss left was favourable to pro-shareholder policy, where we would expect it 
to  be  opposed.  The  Swedish  right  was  opposed  to  pro-shareholder  reform, 
where we would expect it to be favourable. 
 
The same is true for the emergence of different coalitions: while Roe’s theory 
would lead us to expect a left-right divide over corporate governance reforms, 
we find that this was the case in neither of the two countries. The configuration 
of  coalitions  in  Switzerland  is  more  appropriately  characterised  as  the 
opposition between a cross-class ‘transparency coalition’ and a ‘conservative 
coalition of insiders’; in Sweden, the prevailing configuration was a cohesive 
‘corporatist coalition’ with virtually no political force – outside of shareholder 
lobbies – being favourable to increasing the shareholder orientation in corporate 
governance. 
 
Therefore, political power relations as such do not explain national corporate 
governance systems or their reform. Political power relations become a valid 
explanatory variable only in conjunction with an analysis of different political 
actors’ (and their constituencies’) preferences. 
 
This  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  social  democratic  power  does  not  matter 
concerning  corporate  governance  reform.  On  the  contrary,  while  social 
democratic  power  does  not  directly  determine  the  outcome  at  the  level  of 
corporate  governance  structures,  it  is  an  important  determinant  of  power 
relations in the struggle over corporate governance reform. Thus, the exclusion 
of  the  weak  left  from  the  Swiss  corporate  governance  system  made  them  a   87 
ready  ally  of  outside  investors  in  their  struggles  with  insiders  over  the 
liberalisation of Swiss corporate governance. At the political level, the left was 
even  the  main  force  driving  the  Stock  Corporation  Reform  into  a  more 
shareholder-orientated  direction  between  1965  and  1985.  Conversely,  the 
particular role of social democrats in Sweden, their political strength and hence 
their  influence  over  the  definition  of  the  terms  of  the  Swedish  ‘corporate 
governance  deal’,  made  them  much  more  reluctant  to  attack  the  prevailing 
system. Had they been favourable to extensive reforms, this would probably 
have led – due to the political power of the left in Sweden – to quite profound 
changes in the Swedish corporate governance system, as can be illustrated by 
the legislation of the early 1970s in the area of work relations. 
 
Therefore, the position of the centre-left in the reform process was of central 
importance in explaining why reforms took place in Switzerland but were very 
limited in Sweden. Other studies suggest that this finding – that the position of 
the left within corporate governance arrangements determines to a considerable 
degree the transformation of those arrangements –probably has a more general 
validity than just the two cases analysed in this paper (see Cioffi & Höpner 
2006, Gourevitch & Shinn 2005). My analysis provides additional elements for 
understanding the preferences of the left in the process of the political reform of 
corporate  governance.  In  particular  I  have  shown  that  these  preferences  are 
determined  not  only  by  economic  factors  (e.g.  increasing  shareholdings  by 
employees),  but  also  by the  left’s political  strength  and hence  the  nature  of 
relations  that  exist  in  a  country  between  employers’  and  employees’ 
organisations. 
 
Another  central  point  is  that  in  Switzerland  centre-left  support  was  not 
sufficient to make reform possible. It was increasing centre-right support for 
pro-shareholder  reform,  which  eventually  tipped  the  power  balance  in 
parliament in favour of the pro-reform actors and made legal change possible 
during the early 1990s. This hints at another important point of my study: the 
direction of causality between changes in the business system and changes in 
the legal framework. Clearly, in Switzerland, changes in the business system 
explain legal changes, not the other way round as mainstream ‘law and finance’ 
theories  would  suggest  (LLSV  1998).  This  is  because  the  very  consensual 
political system with many veto points and the weak political position of the 
pro-reform actors, made changes in corporate practices necessary before any 
legal change could happen. More precisely, the Swiss case can be interpreted as 
a Katzensteinian case (see Katzenstein 1985 and 2003) of a small European 
states with a ‘dual economy’, where a highly adaptive sector of internationally 
orientated  MNCs  exists.  The  opposition  between  a  developed  sector  of   88 
internationally orientated companies on the one hand and a dominantly inwards-
orientated sector of SMEs on the other, led to frictions within the business elite, 
which explain why pro-market reform became possible in spite of the fact that 
the left was politically too weak to impose reforms alone. 
 
In  the  Swedish  case,  however,  no  such  split  took  place.  In  fact,  during  the 
1990s,  Swedish  companies’  corporate  governance  practices  seem  to  have 
changed  much  less  than  Swiss  companies’  practices.  Nothing  indicates  that 
Swedish companies changed their corporate governance structures significantly 
in favour of shareholders during the 1990s; rather they seem to be as determined 
as ever to oppose threats to the central instruments of insider control. This is 
surprising, as Sweden is characterised by a comparable duality of the economy 
–  although  the  SME  sector  is  considerably  weaker  –  and  many  Swedish 
companies depend heavily on international markets. 
 
This suggests that insider-orientated corporate governance arrangements may 
very  well  resist  the  centrifugal  forces  caused  by  new  opportunities  and 
constraints that impact on the most internationally exposed actors. This finding 
qualifies  accounts  of  the  ‘irresistible  force’  of  market  liberalisation  and 
competition and points, once again, to the importance of contextual factors in 
order to understand the business elite’s and the centre-right politicians’ stance 
towards reform. 
 
I have identified a number of different factors as playing a (potentially) major 
role in business system change in the Swiss case and hence in determining the 
centre-right actors’ preferences; and I have analysed the importance of the same 
factors for explaining the absence of major changes in the Swedish case. Table 
3 summarizes the findings for the two cases.  
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Table 3: Explanatory variables for changes in national business systems 
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The table shows that the most likely explanations for the differences in changes 
in the two countries’ business systems and the legal framework – away from 
insider-  towards  shareholder-orientation  –  are  the  fact  that  Swiss  –  but  not 
Swedish – managers and insiders became themselves increasingly favourable to 
reform and that Switzerland had powerful universal banks, but not Sweden. The 
existence  of  a  dual  economy  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  to  make  change 
happen. Nor is the existence of corporate raiders and of a takeover threat. The 
presence of institutional investor activism is neither a sufficient nor a necessary 
condition for such changes to happen. 
 
I  have  argued  that  the  differences  in  the  variable  ‘managerial/insider 
preferences’ can be explained by looking at a) who exactly the insiders were 
and b) how they exercised control over ‘their’ companies. I have shown that in 
Switzerland the ‘coalition of insiders’ was dominated by blockholders of an 
entrepreneurial  owner-manger  type  (with  bankers  and  professional  managers 
playing an important role as well). In Sweden, the circle of insiders is more 
restricted and dominated by a very small number of investor families, which 
have interests in a large number of industries. More importantly, insider-control 
was  achieved  in  Switzerland  mainly  through  ownership  concentration, 
combined  with  Vinkulierung  and  hidden  reserves.  In  Sweden,  the  power  of 
insiders was less based on concentrated ownership, but much more on CMS 
such as pyramids and very marked voting right differentials between different 
share classes. 
 
These particularities of each case impacted the preferences of the business elite 
concerning corporate governance reform in important ways. Put simply, the fact 
that insider-control in Sweden was more dependent on instruments separating 
ownership from control than in Switzerland, where ownership (but not control) 
was more concentrated, may explain why the Swedish business elite resisted 
pressure for reform for such a long time. Liberalisation without control over the 
equivalent  capital  base  is  very  costly  for  the  ‘controllers’  as  it  implies 
necessarily a loss of control. In Switzerland instruments of insider-control could 
be abolished without necessarily leading to a loss of control by the traditional 
owners.   90 
 
Yet, there was certainly also a more genuine change in the Swiss managerial 
elites preferences leading to an increasing acceptance of market mechanisms, 
such  as  hostile  takeovers.  The  spread  of  investor-orientated  management 
techniques  and  ideas  (VBM,  shareholder  value)  and  the  convergence  of 
managers and shareholders’ incentive structures played an important role in this 
respect. In fact, changes in managerial preferences and the arrival of a new 
generation  of  managers  have  led  to  a  convergence  of  preferences  between 
managers and investors, thus leading to a new pro-market coalition. In Sweden, 
no  comparable  convergence  between  mangers’  and  outside  shareholders’ 
interests  can  be  observed.  This  is  explained  by  the  particular  approach  to 
industrial ownership that prevailed in Sweden for historical reasons and by the 
integration of most companies in vast business groups. 
 
The existence of large and powerful banks is the second major explanation – 
which is not independent from the question of the prevailing type of insiders – 
for  change  in  the  Swiss  business  system  and  for  absence  of  change  in  the 
Swedish  business  system.  Swiss  banks  are  powerful  and  widely  diversified 
financial  conglomerates  and  they  constitute  an  important  part  of  the  Swiss 
economy.  The  financial  sector  constitutes  a  powerful  sector  with  numerous 
actors who increasingly define their interests based on the needs of the financial 
sector alone. The situation is fundamentally different in Sweden where banks 
were during most of the 20
th century limited in their activities and controlled by 
actors with much more varied interests than those of the financial sector. The 
increasing pressure on the profitability of financial institutions in a liberalised 
environment  (and  opportunistic  behaviour  to  take  advantage  of  new 
opportunities) explains why Swiss banks defected from their formerly central 
role  in  the  insider-orientated  corporate  governance  system,  increasingly 
exposing other companies to market pressures and pushing them to adapt their 
practices as well. Swedish banks did not experience a similar change as they are 
part of more tightly knit spheres of influence in which industrial and financial 
interests  blur.  In  other  words,  in  Switzerland,  the  financial  sector  –  notably 
through its peak organisation the SBA – was an important pro-reform actor in 
its own right promoting the financialisation of the economy from the mid-1980s 
onwards. The Swedish banking sector – on the other hand – did not play any 
comparable role. 
 
It is also interesting to note the difference in the impact that the existence of a 
hostile  takeover  threat  had  in  the  two  cases.  This  factor  was  of  major 
importance  for  triggering  change  in  corporate  governance  practices  in 
Switzerland. In Sweden, the emergence of corporate raiders during the 1980s   91 
did not have a similar effect on the business system, which can be explained by 
the fact that genuine ‘corporate raiders’ were a rather short-lived phenomenon 
in Sweden due to the financial crisis of the early 1990s. Yet, takeovers – not 
necessarily  carried  out  by  raiders  –  still  became  a  common  phenomenon  in 
Sweden approximately at the same time as in Switzerland without leading to 
similar  changes  in  Swedish  companies  practices.  One  explanation  for  this 
observation may be that the increasing number of takeovers in Sweden were 
less directed towards financial aims – as was the case in Switzerland due to the 
existence of the corporate raiders throughout the 1990s – but followed instead 
an  industrial  logic,  which,  as  a  result,  did  not  necessarily  lead  to  the 
implementation of a pro-shareholder agenda in the firms that were taken over or 
threatened by takeover. 
 
Yet,  one  important  element  of  the  changes  of  the  1990s  that  I  have  not 
discussed  so  far  concerns  the  fact  that  despite  a  large  number  of  difference 
between  the  two  cases  concerning  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders 
during the 1990s, the evolution of the financial markets in the two countries did 
not diverge  much.  Figure  7  reports  the development of financial  markets  in 
small European states and shows that both cases experienced very pronounced 
increases in total market capitalisation, regardless of the absence of change in 
the instruments of insider control in Sweden (figure 6). To be sure, Switzerland 
sticks out as the increase in stock market capitalisation over GDP was far more 
pronounced and set in earlier than in any other small European state (from 44% 
in  1980  to  193%  in  1990  to  323%  in  1999).  However,  Sweden  too  has 
experienced a more important increase in stock market capitalisation than most 
other small corporatist states (from 11% in 1980 to 39% in 1990 and 177 % in 
1999) and now has very well-developed equity markets. This finding would 
seem to contradicts the ‘law and finance’ argument concerning the correlation 
between  the  quality  of  corporate  law  and  financial  development,  as  the 
impressive  development  of  financial  markets  was  not  preceded  by  any 
comparable increase in legal MSP, nor by a change in corporate practices, in the 
Swedish case. 
 
The different reforms of financial market regulations account in part for this 
phenomenon. Other factors included, for the Swedish case, the devaluation of 
the Krona at the beginning of the 1990s (Skog 1994), tax reforms (reducing the 
‘public  benefits  of  political  control’  imposed  on  investors)  and  informal 
mechanisms of shareholder protection (Stafsudd 2006)
71. It could also be argued 
that  investors  anticipated  Sweden’s  entry  into  the  European  Union,  which 
would guarantee a certain adaptation of its company law to EU standards. 
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Source: Rajan & Zingales 2003, table 3, p.15; 
 
Note: Rajan & Zingales 2003 do not provide figures for Finland and Ireland, which is why I 
excluded these ‘small countries’ from the figure. 
 
Given that the outcome of the reform processes of the 1980s and 1990s appear 
to  be  comparable  at  least  if  we  take  a  snapshot  of  both  countries  in  2006 
(comparable increase in market capitalisation, but even some convergence in 
levels of legal MSP if measured by the SPI (see section 3)), one might wonder if 
the differences in the trajectories of change analysed in this paper do really 
matter.  In  fact,  despite  the  important  differences  in  the  contextual  variables 
between the two countries, the outcome appears to correspond fairly well to the 
‘convergence’  argument  of  the  end  of  national  differences  (Hansmann  & 
Kraakman 2004). 
 
Yet,  my  study  shows  two  important  points.  Firstly,  despite  certain  common 
trends, differences between national contexts persist in particular at the level of 
corporate  practices  and  are  of  significance  in  order  to  understand  corporate 
governance regimes (e.g. the persistence of the Swedish system of dual class 
shares vs. the withering away of Vinkulierung in Switzerland).  
 
Secondly, in order to develop accurate theories of corporate governance, it is 
essential to understand the determinants of different stakeholders’ preferences.   93 
More generally, understanding the precise nature of the process of corporate 
governance reform, the forces that drive it and the reasons for differences in the 
processes across countries allows us to learn a great deal about the way in which 
capitalist economies evolve and about what drives economic actors’ behaviour. 
The  main  lesson  from  the  comparison  of  Switzerland  and  Sweden  is  that 
‘stakeholder groups’ are not homogeneous and it is not possible to attribute a 
priori a given set of preferences concerning corporate governance reforms to 
these groups. As actors’ preferences are malleable and highly contextual, it is 
only by analysing this context that we are able to explain a particular trajectory 
of change in a particular country. Beyond attention to the specificities of each 
case,  this  study  also  aimed  to  contribute  to  the  formulation  of  mid-range 
theories of corporate governance reform by singling out factors which can be 
expected to play a role across national contexts. This small-number study does 
not  allow  us  to  generalise  our  findings  concerning  the  impact  of  a  given 
variable. It does allow us, however, to make suggestions concerning the causal 
mechanisms  through  which  different  explanatory  variables  –  the  position  of 
banks, the types of insiders, and so on – can be expected to affect corporate 
governance systems in different cases. This in turn will allow us to understand 
why social democracy matters as a force of change in some cases but not in 
others. 
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Sources: 
Switzerland 
Federal Archives (FA), Bern 
Federal Office of Justice (Reform of the Stock Corporation Law of 1936) 
Fund no. G.4; E 4110(B); 1992/75; vol.1-62 
Fund no. G.4; E4110(B), 1989/129, vol.1-3 
Fund no. G.4; E4110(B), 1989/197, vol.32-74 
Fund no. G.4; 4110(B), 1992/175, vol.1-62 
Fund  no.  JI.212  (-);  1989/196;  Gautschi  Georg  (Arbeitsgruppe  f.d. 
Ueberprüfung des Aktienrechts) 
Archives of the parliamentary Service, Bern 
Minutes of the preparatory committees of the NC and of the CoS (1983 – 1991) 
Official documents: 
Official bulletin (OB) of the National Council (NC): 1985-1991 
Official bulletin (OB) of the Council of States (CoS): 1985-1991 
 
Federal Bulletin (Bundesblatt; BB): 
BB 1983 II 27 
BB 1983 II 844 
BB 1989 I 1289 
Other publications: 
Annual report of the Swiss Bankers Association 1985/86 
Annual report of the Swiss Bankers Association 1986/87 
Sweden: 
National Archive Marieberg 
Fund no. SE/RA/324002 Ägarutredningen 
Fund no. SE/RA/323778 Röstvärdeskommitté 
Fund no. SE/RA/325044 Aktiebolagskommitté 
Governmental directives and proposals 
Dir. 1990:46 Översyn av aktiebolagslagen  
Dir. 1991:89 Direktiv till aktiebolagskommittén 
Dir. 1991:98 Direktiv till aktiebolagskommittén 
Dir. 1994:143 Direktiv till aktiebolagskommitté 
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Prop. 1975:103 Aktiebolagslag m. m. 
Prop. 2004/05:85 Ny Aktiebolagslag 
 
Reports by parliamentary committees 
Betänkande 1989/90:LU3 
Betänkande 1990/91:LU2 Aktiebolagsrättsliga frågor 
Betänkande 1997/98:LU26 Aktiebolagtes organisation m.m. 
Betänkande 2004/05:LU23: Nya aktiebolagslagen 
Official Reports (Statens offentliga utredningar, SOU) 
SOU 1981:78 Löntagarna och kapitaltillväxten – röstvärdesdifferenser i 
svenska börsbolag 
SOU 1986:23 Aktiers röstvärde 
SOU 1988:38 Ägande och inflytande i svenskt näringsliv 
SOU 1990:1 Företagsförvärv i svenskt näringsliv 
SOU 1992:13 Bundna aktier 
SOU 1992:83: Aktiebolagslagen och EG 
SOU 1995:44 Aktiebolagets organisation 
SOU 1997:22 Aktiebolagets capital 
SOU 1999:36 Likvidation av aktiebolag 
SOU 2001:1 Ny aktiebolagslag 
SOU 2004:130 Swedish Code of Corporate Governance.  
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Notes 
 
1 See notably Cioffi & Höpner 2006. 
2 CEIF have issued a limited number of shares, which are held by a limited 
number of known shareholders. 
3 Roe’s uses the term ‘social democracy’. This term is not limited to social 
democratic parties as such but to a more general tendency within a society to be 
dominated by a political culture which tends to favour a wider distribution of 
wealth and the protection of employees than is the case in the US or the UK. 
Roe  (2003:  24)  speaks  also  of  ‘stakeholder  society’.  Yet,  in  order  to 
operationalise this variable, he mainly uses – in addition to the strength of legal 
job protection and the Gini coefficient –an indicator for political orientation 
developed by Cusack (1997), which in turn uses survey data from Casles & 
Mair (1984). This indicator measures the dominance of left vs. right parties over 
both  parliament  and  government  in  different  countries  according  to  the 
judgment of experts. Ultimately, Roe’s political variable measures mainly party 
strength. 
4 This can be based on a specific provision in statutory or case law. It can also 
be  based  on  contract,  for  instance,  if  the  company  has  to  conclude  an 
employment contract with the director and this contract cannot be terminated 
without good reason. 
5 This restricts dismissal because either (1) an immediate unilateral termination 
of this contract may not be possible or (2) the directors have to be compensated 
in case of immediate unilateral termination of this contract. 
6 We have also given intermediate scores, e.g., ¾ for a 1 % hurdle, ¼ for a 10 or 
15 % hurdle. A 5 % hurdle led to the score ½.  
7 The datasets with full description of variables as well as comments on the 
coding of each case are available at : 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm 
8 It could be argued that different aspects of corporate law, which are often 
taken  together  in  order  to  assess  the  ‘shareholder-orientation’  of  a  given 
corporate  governance  regime  or  of  company  law  should  be  weighted. 
Instruments which allow insiders to distort voting rights – and affect power and 
control directly – are more significant indicators of insider vs. outsider control 
than  for  instance  information  rights  or  legal  instruments  to  hold  insiders 
responsible ex post. 
9 In La Porta et al.’s (1998) terminology ‘normal stock’ can be either shares with 
normal  voting  power  or  super-voting  shares  and  are  distinguished  from 
‘preferred’ stock (Spamann 2006: 47). Here, I use the term ‘normal stock’ in a 




treatment  or  do  not  imply  any  restrictions  concerning  cash-flow  and 
participation rights, in other words, shares that are not super-voting shares. 
10  The  term  Vinkulierung  is  a  translation  from  Latin  and  used  to  render  the 
meaning of ‘bound’. Shares that are submitted to Vinkulierung are hence said to 
be ‘bound registered shares’. 
11  The  term  ‘management’  was  used  in  Switzerland  only  from  the  1950s 
onwards (Schluep 1955). Before that date, the legislator and jurisprudence did 
not  generally  distinguish  between  the  board  of  directors  and  a  possible 
management board or executives. This is explained by the fact that no legal 
obligation existed to separate the operational from the strategic management 
and control functions (banks, for which a strict separation of the management 
and the supervisory board exists from 1934, constituted an exception from this 
rule). A company could either be managed directly by the board of directors, by 
one of its members (the so called délégué) or by a proper management board. In 
order to capture this variety, it was common to summarise the organs that were 
in charge of strategic and operational management in the term ‘Verwaltung’ 
(administration). In this section I use the term management to translate the term 
‘Verwaltung’. It includes, unless otherwise stated, the board of directors. 
12  The  doctrine  of  the  separation  of  financial  and  associational  rights  was 
established  in  Switzerland  by  the  supreme  court,  the  Federal  Tribunal,  in  a 
ruling dating from 1957 ATF (ATF 83 II 297 ff) (see below).  
13 This interpretation of the Lex Koller is disputed however, as the Lex Koller 
does not aim to prohibit foreigners from acquiring real estate in Switzerland for 
productive reasons. 
14 The Federal Government submitted a repeal proposal for the Lex Koller to a 
consultation  procedure  in  2006.  The  federal  parliament  refused,  however,  in 
June 2008 to follow the government’s proposal to abolish this law as efficient 
alternative  measures  against  speculation  with  real  estate  and  the  boom  of 
‘second homes’ in the Alps are considered to be lacking (see NZZ Online, June 
11, 2008). It is also interesting to note that Implenia – a Swiss construction 
company – has explicitly referred to the Lex Koller in spring 2007 in order to 
refuse to register a part of a stake which had been acquired by the British hedge 
fund Laxey Partners in an attempt to take the control over Implenia. Thus the 
existence of the art. 4 transitory provisions has still a certain practical relevance 
today. 
15  The  AGM  can  decide,  however,  to  opt-out  from  this  mandatory  bid  rule 
before the shares are listed (art. 22 al.2 SESTA) or to increase the threshold for 




16 State controls over investment flows, which obliged foreign investors to ask 
for  governmental  approval  for  investment  in  Swedish  companies,  existed  as 
well. However, this instrument was abolished in the late 1980s, in relation to the 
very  extensive  liberalisation  of  the  Swedish  financial  system  (Berglöf  1997; 
Reiter 2003). Following this reform, foreign investors were for the first time 
allowed  to  acquire  Swedish  stock  without  governmental  approval  (cf.  Pro 
memoria no. 18 ‘Fria och bundna aktier – effekter av en EG-anpassning’ of 
December  4,  1992,  which  can  be  found  in  the  Swedish  State  Archives  at 
SE/RA/325044 vol.5, henceforth quoted as PM 18). 
17 The Swedish parliament abolished the prohibition on companies to acquire 
their own shares for certain public companies in 2000, following SOU 1997:22. 
Although  this  measure  can  be  used  in  favour  of  shareholders  (increasing 
earnings per shares EPS, pay back excess cash to shareholders), it can also be 
used as a takeover defence and was actually advocated as such in the early 
1990s by the agrarian centre party (see Motion 1989/90:L208 Olof Johansson 
m.fl.  (c)).  The  impact  of  this  measure  on  the  protection  of  shareholders’ 
interests is therefore ambiguous. 
18 While Lijphart’s (1999) findings for the period between 1967 and 1997 show 
a  very  marked  and  stable  consensual  system,  Vatter  (2008),  shows  that 
significant  changes  have  taken  place  since  1997  and  that  Switzerland  has 
become clearly less consensual measured by Lijphart’s 1999 criteria. By 2007, 
Switzerland still is a consensus democracy, but it has moved form an ‘extreme’ 
case of consensus towards an average consensus democracy (Vatter 2008: 37). 
19 Trade union density (percentage of unionized employees as a percentage of 
total wage and salary earners) has decreased from 31.1% in 1980 to 17.8% in 
2001 (Visser 2006). 
20 24.4% of total of votes for the lower house in 1979 to 23.3% in 2003, with a 
considerable decline during the 1980s (18.4% in 1987 and 18.6% in 1991) but 
an increase thereafter (22.50% after the elections of 1999 and 23.33% after the 
elections of 2003). 
21 The current Centerpartiet. 
22 The Communist Party changed names several times during the 20
th century: It 
was  called  Sveriges  Kommunistiska  Parti  (SKP)  between  1921  and  1967, 
Vänsterpartiet  Kommunisterna  (VPK)  between  1967  and  1990  and  is  now 
called Vänsterpartiet. 
23 During the consultation procedure different actors – including business and 
employees  associations,  political  parties,  and  cantonal  governments  –  are 




24 The Swiss direct democratic instruments include – in addition to the popular 
referendum  and  cantonal  referendums  and  initiatives  –  the  popular 
constitutional initiative, which provides that 150,000 Swiss citizens can submit 
a proposal for a constitutional change to a popular vote. 
25 The collection of newspaper articles in the Federal Archives at E4110 (B), 
1992/175,  vol.56  concerning  the  reform  give  a  good  overview  of  this 
opposition. 
26 The letter was sent to the National Councillors Blocher (SVP), de Capitani 
(FDP), Couchepin (FDP), Feigenwinter (CVP), Fischer (SVP), Schüle (FDP), 
Stucky (FDP) and Villiger (FDP). It can be found in the Federal Archives at 
E4110 (B); 1992/175; vol.3 
27 Literally ‘shareholders remain the stupid’ in reference to the famous one-liner 
attributed  to  the  German  banker  Carl  Fürstenberg  according  to  which 
shareholders are stupid and impertinent. Stupid, because they buy stock and 
impertinent because they expect a dividend for their stupidity. 
28 A look at the power relations in the Council of States during the period when 
the Stock Corporation Law reform was debated, shows that the left – if we 
include the Alliance of Independents in this category – held after the election of 
1983 and 1987 6 out of 46 seats (13.04%) and after the elections of 1991 only 4 
out  of  46  (8.70%)  (source:  http://www.parlament.ch/homepage/ra-raete/ra-
fraktionen.htm). 
29 The hypothesis can be suggested that in the future this ‘layering’ may be 
supplanted by a process of ‘displacement’ through which the new rules start to 
increase in salience, making the old rules meaningless (Thelen 2003). If more 
and more firms use the new rules, support for the old ones will vanish and they 
will  eventually  become  superfluous.  As  I  will  show  below,  such  a  process 
seems indeed to have started in Switzerland as more and more Swiss companies 
do  not  use  Vinkulierung  anymore,  but  have  introduced  during  the  1990s  a 
voting cap of typically 5%, which applies to all shareholders alike. 
30 The economic crisis of the 1970s – entailing many corporate failures and 
layoffs – has certainly contributed to the left’s increasing interest in questions of 
transparency and corporate control. 
31 SOU 1992:13 ‘Bound Shares’, SOU 1992:83: ‘Stock Corporation Law and 
the  EC’,  SOU  1995:44  ‘The  Organisation  of  the  Stock  Corporation’,  SOU 
1997:22  ‘The  Stock  Corporation’s  Capital’,  SOU  1999:36  ‘The  Stock 
Corporation’s Liquidation’, SOU 2001:1 ‘The New Stock Corporation Law ‘. 
32  While  the  elaboration  of  the  new  ABL  by  the  AB  Committee  and  its 
intermediary reports are the most important source of change in the Swedish 




Particularly important changes were undertaken in the fields of accounting and 
auditing as well as concerning the functioning of the financial markets and of 
securities  trading.  Moreover,  in  2004  a  government-sponsored  corporate 
governance code was adopted, which entered into force in July 2005. These 
latter reforms, however, can only be treated marginally in this paper, in other 
words, when they impact directly on the MSP variables I am interested in. 
33 The precise source for the session of June 13, 2005 is: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=101&dok_id=GS09138&bet=2004/05:138. 
34  It  should  be  noted  that  Switzerland  can  by  no  means  be  seen  as  being 
independent  from  EC/EU  legislation.  The  question  of  EC-compatibility  has 
been  widely  debated  in  Switzerland.  At  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  Swiss 
government planned to ratify the EEA treaty at the beginning of the 1990s, and 
some kind of association to the Community and even a full membership were 
absolutely  conceivable  –  even  very  likely  –  for  the  political  elite  and  the 
situation  was  therefore  not  much  different  from  the  Swedish  one.  In  this 
context, the doctrine of the ‘autonmer Nachvollzug’ (‘autonomous follow-up 
implementation’) of EU legislation in Swiss law, that is, the practice of taking 
into account EU legislation when drafting Swiss laws, emerged, and this led to a 
situation in which EC directives have an important impact on Swiss law despite 
the  absence  of  any  formal  constraint.  However,  the  leeway  of  the  Swiss 
legislator  to  follow  or  not  the  EC  legislation  is  still  considerable  and  EU 
measures  which  are  politically  controversial  at  the  domestic  level  are  not 
implemented in Switzerland. 
35  The  debate  about  the  ‘lifting  of  the  corporate  veil’  (ansvarsgenombrott), 
which was very much promoted by the left, but opposed by the centre-right, 
goes in the same direction. This issue was the only instance where a clear left-
right divide existed during the reform. While most MPs stress the consensual 
manner in which the reform took place, this issue clearly opposed the SAP to all 
the  bourgeois  parties  and  was  –  together  with  the  proposal  to  introduce  an 
obligation for auditors to report suspicions of criminal behaviour to the attorney 
general – one of the most debated issues. Thus, the social democratic Carlsson 
government published in September 1991 a ‘supplementary directive’ to the AB 
Committee charging it to investigate cases in which the ‘corporate veil’ should 
be lifted, that is, in which directors and shareholders could be held personally 
liable  for  wrongdoings  (dir  1991:89).  When  the  SAP  lost  its  parliamentary 
majority in October of the same year, the Bildt government issued, in October 
1991, a new directive, which excluded the issue of the ‘lifting of the corporate 
veil’  from  the  AB  Committee’s  competences  (dir.  1991:98).  The  second 
Carlsson Government, which was in power between October 1994 and March 




directive’ in 1994 (dir. 1994:143). This example of ‘stop and go’ policy, hints at 
the impact that the de facto majoritarian functioning of the Swedish polity, with 
alternations  in  governmental  power,  could  have  had  on  the  corporate 
governance reform, had the preferences between left and right been different. 
Once again, the fact that politics did not play a determinant role in the direction 
that the reform took is explained by the fact that the preferences of left and right 
did not diverge much on most issues linked to MSP. 
36 It is interesting to note that the question of voting right distortions appears to 
be one of the only issues which led in Sweden at times to a constellation that 
resembles the ‘transparency coalition’ described above, that is, liberal actors 
from the right (the fp) and from the left (mp) promoting pro-shareholder reform. 
Yet, given that both the fp and the mp are small parties and that the major 
parties (SAP and m) did not support this claim, this was not enough to bring 
about any change. 
37 This scandal involved the company Fermenta created in 1981 by Refaat El-
Sayed through the acquisition of Astra’s Penicilinfabrik Strangnäs. In 1986, it 
was made public that El-Sayed did not have the doctorate in biochemistry he 
had pretended to have, which led to a general loss in confidence in the company 
and to a crash of its share price. When it became public in December 1986 that 
there were also irregularities in Fermenta’s financial reporting, the share price 
collapsed further, destroying virtually all the value of the company which had 
been  around  SEK  11b  before  the  outbreak  of  the  scandal  in  February  1986 
(Affärsvärlden (online edition), February 13, 2006). 
38 Interestingly a similar focus on the majority of the AGM had existed in the 
legal doctrine and in political debates in Switzerland for a long time (Schnyder 
et al. 2005a), but had become largely replaced by a minority shareholder view 
by the mid-1990s. 
39 Two other governmental committees had reached similar conclusions during 
the late 1980s rejecting a mandatory bid rule as well: the Ägareutredning and 
the  Värdepapersmarknadenkommitté;  see  SOU  1987:72 
‘Värdepapersmarknaden  i  framtiden’  and  SOU  1990:1  ‘Företagsförvärv  i 
svensk näringsliv’. 
40 More precisely, the distinction is not between public and private companies, 
but  between  kupongbolag  (‘coupon  company’)  and  avstämningsbolag  (or 
‘recording company’). The former companies hold a stock ledger of their own, 
while  the  later  make  the  exercise  of  shareholder  rights  dependent  on  their 
registration  with  a  central  securities  deposit  institution  authorised  by  the 
Financial  Supervision  Authority  (Finansinspektionen)  (Svensson  &  Danelius 




company should belong is left to the AGM (see chap. 1 10§ ABL 2005), listed 
companies have to be avstämningsbolag. 
41 Interestingly, the AB Committee charged with the reform of the 1944 ABL 
had discussed the introduction of a samtyckesförbehall as well (SOU 1971:5, 
p.161).  This  proposal  was,  however,  rejected  by  the  government  (prop. 
1975:103, p.228f) (see PM18, p.15, note 22). 
42 The ‘Leo affair’ was exposed in autumn 1985. Following the spin-off of the 
pharmaceutical company ‘Leo AB’ from its parent Sonesson, it became public 
that certain Sonesson board members – among others Volvo’s then CEO Pehr G 
Gyllenhammar  –  had  acquired  before  the  spin-off  Leo  shares  through  a  so-
called 'directed issue' (riktad emission), i.e. an issue of Leo shares, which was 
reserved  to  specific  persons  and  for  which  the  existing  shareholders'  pre-
emptive  right  to  new  issues  was  suspended.  Sonesson’s  shareholders  were 
outraged and a debate over 'directed issues' and MBOs in Sweden was sparked 
off, pushing finally the Prime Minister Olof Palme to establish an investigation 
committee  (Dagens  Nyheter  (online  edition)  January  4,  2008).  This 
investigation led to the adoption in 1987 of the ‘Leo law’ (1987:464) ‘on certain 
directed  issues  in  equity  market  companies’,  which  essentially  gave 
shareholders more influence over the selling of the company's assets to certain 
groups of actors close to the company. Ultimately the provisions of the Leo-law 
were integrated in the new ABL of 2005 (chapter 16, §§1-10). 
43 Reiter (2003:111) reaches a similar conclusion, pointing to the ambiguous 
stance  of  the  Swedish  government  at  the  end  of  the  1980s,  promoting  far-
reaching liberalisation of many aspects of the Swedish system, but opposing the 
abolition of voting right distortions. 
44 Concerning the regulation of financial markets, monetary policy and other 
economic policies, the SAP did however significantly change towards a pro-
market  approach  during  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  in  a  context  of 
permanent economic crisis (David & Mach 2004). 
45 This corresponds to Roe’s (2003) prediction of the social-democratic attitude 
towards pro-shareholder policy (see above section 2). 
46 Blyth (2002:211) however notes that there was still considerable resistance by 
the SAF to co-determination agreements. Following the adoption of the law, the 
SAF  declared  in  1976  the  abandoning  of  the  Saltjöbadavtal  and  threatened 
workers with mass ‘lockouts’. Yet, these threats ultimately failed due to the 
SAF’s own member companies refusing to join the lock-out, above all because 
the Swedish government subsidised companies that continued production during 




47 One remarkable change in that respect, which may presage a profound change 
in the Swedish coalition configuration, concerns the policy pursued by the new 
centre-right  government  led  by  Fredrik  Reinfeldt  (m).  A  recent  proposal  to 
privatise six of the largest partially or fully state-owned companies, which was 
approved  by  the  centre-right  dominated  parliament  on  June  20
th  2007,  was 
fiercely opposed by the left opposition (Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) online, June 
20, 2007). 
48  The  most  important  raiders  in  Switzerland  were  Werner  K.  Rey,  Martin 
Ebner, Tito Tettamanti, René Braginsky, and Ernst Müller-Möhl. 
49 His influence was important not only in the economy, but also in parliament. 
This  is  notably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  very  influential  SVP  PM  Christoph 
Blocher was a close ally of Ebner. Blocher – who was formerly clearly part of 
the conservative coalition – had become more and more open to pro-shareholder 
reform as his involvement in Martin Ebner’s investment company BZ Bank 
grew,  starting  in  the  mid-1980s  (see  for  details  of  this  involvement  Becher 
1996).  Blocher  –  himself  CEO,  chairman  and  main  shareholder  of  a  large 
chemicals company Ems Chemie – started increasingly to favour a ‘financial’ 
approach over his traditional entrepreneurial viewpoint. Given his influence on 
the  SVP,  this  constituted  a  non-negligible  factor  contributing  to  the  above-
mentioned  shift  between  the  conservative  and  the  pro-reform  coalition  in 
parliament during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
50 It should be noted that this first generation of raiders in Switzerland were all 
Swiss citizens. Foreign investors – notably foreign institutions – did not play 
any  active  role  in  the  transformation  of  Swiss  corporate  governance. 
‘Shareholder activism’ by (foreign) pension funds was essentially non-existent 
and only at the beginning of the 21
st century – at a moment when the corporate 
governance system had already changed a great deal – did foreign takeovers of 
Swiss firms increasingly take place (Schnyder 2008). In recent years, that is, 
since the early 2000s, foreign institutional investors such as Laxey Partners, 
Anova, and other hedge and investment funds have increasingly become major 
actors in the takeovers of Swiss mid-caps. 
51 It is interesting to note that the introduction of a unitary share, while generally 
a sign of increasing shareholder-orientation, was used in this particular case to 
fend off a hostile takeover bid by a Swiss investor. Overall, the introduction of 
the unitary share cost the existing shareholders CHF 3.7b and Ebner’s stake 
alone lost CHF 411m in worth (Loderer and Zgraggen 1998). 
52 The Interview can be found on the web page of the professional association of 





53 It should be noted however that this is also due to the coincidence of the 
adoption of the code with the onset of the recession of the early 1990s. The 
recession stopped M&A activity in general not only in Switzerland but in most 
countries (see e.g. for the case of the UK Deakin and Slinger 1997). 
54 A comparable evolution has been observed – some ten years earlier – in the 
US (Hirsch 1986). 
55 In this context, the activities of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ played a crucial role in 
translating  international  pressures  into  domestic  change:  accountants  and 
financial analysts were the most active actors in this respect and praised new 
practices  as  a  solution  for  existing  problems.  By  way  of  example,  the 
professional organisation of accountants developed, starting in 1984, a set of 
accounting standards (the FER – Swiss GAAP) based on international practice, 
but still adapted to the Swiss context. While these standards were first heavily 
criticised and opposed by the business elite, they gained quasi-legal status in the 
mid-1990s, when the newly created SWX Swiss Exchange decided to integrate 
them in the listing requirements and make them the compulsory norm for listed 
companies  (Schnyder  2008).  This  constitutes  a  telling  example  for  the 
increasing legitimacy of shareholder-orientated ideas. 
56  Moore  and  Rebérioux  (2007)  observe  such  a  ‘convergence  of  interests’ 
between managers and shareholders in the cases of the US and the UK. 
57 It should be noted that mangers are not the only insiders to have an incentive 
to support market-orientated reforms. Large blockholders may in fact favour an 
increasing valuation of their stakes when their ‘intrinsic interest’ in ‘their’ firm 
is  replaced  by  a  financial  one  (see  for  instance  Gilson  2005).  This  may  be 
particularly the case if the blockholders are not the founders themselves, but 
rather the second and third generation of the owner family which do not care as 
much about the company anymore, which can be seen as a form of the so-called 
‘Buddenbrooks effect’ (Kang 1998). 
58  Since  the  1980s,  the  concentration  in  the  Swedish  banking  industry  has 
created  two  new  large  banks,  the  partly  state-owned  Nordea  and  the 
Swedbanken, which emerged from a very extensive concentration within the 
sector  of  Swedish  savings  banks.  These  two  banks  cannot  be  considered, 
however, as universal banks in the same sense as the other large banks. The 
Skandinavbanken, on the other hand, had merged already in 1972 with SEB. 
59 CEIF have issued a limited number of shares, which are held by a limited 
number of known shareholders. These CEIF constitute a central element of the 
typical Swedish ownership pyramids, which consisted of three levels: at the top 
is  usually  a  bank-  or  family-controlled  foundation,  which  controlled  at  the 
intermediary level a (most of the time listed) CEIF, which in turn controlled the 




60 It should be noted that one of the authors, Justice Bo Svensson, was also the 
chairman  of  the  AB  Committee  and  the  other,  Johan  Danelius,  was  Deputy 
Director of the Ministry of Finance. They both had a considerable influence on 
the reform process. 
61  The  designation ‘institutional  investor’  is  usually  applied to  four  types  of 
organizations:  pension  funds,  mutual  funds  and  investment  companies,  and 
insurance companies (Anderson & Hertig 1994). Some authors include money 
managers  of  large  companies  in  the  definition  of  institutional  investors 
(Spillmann 2004). 
62 A significant change has taken place, however, with the creation of the Ethos 
foundation in 1997, which manages the assets of Swiss pension funds and has as 
explicit objective to promote shareholders interests at the AGMs of Swiss firms. 
63 However, domestic institutional investors such as the ‘4:e AP-fonden’ (the 
fourth  Swedish  National  Pension  Fund),  despite  being  public  funds  and  so 
independent from companies’ management, did not adopt a pro-reform stance. 
Björn Fronzen, deputy managing director of the 4:e AP-fonden, considered the 
Swedish system to be a ‘good system’ and mentioned the examples of Skandia 
and  Volvo,  which  both  had,  for  Sweden,  atypical  dispersed  ownership 
structures,  and  both  experienced  corporate  governance  scandals.  Fronzen 
follows the governmental argument by stating that a ‘strong ownership role’ – 
which can be achieved through voting right differentials – would probably have 
helped  to prevent  such  problems  (interview  quoted  in  Ahlqvist 2004:  4-59). 
Thus  even  public  pension  funds  –  in  many  countries  the  most  important 
shareholder activists (cf. e.g. the role of CalPERS in the US, Useem 1996) – 
were as late as the early 21
st century still favourable to instruments of insider-
control in Sweden. 
64 It is interesting to note that Signhild Hansen, vice-chairwoman of Svenskt 
Näringsliv, pointed during the debate about the EU takeover directive during the 
early 2000s to the fact that many Swedish listed companies relied still in 2003 
on  dual  class  shares  and  that  this  system  should  therefore  not  be  abolished 
(quoted in Ahlqvist 2004: 4-56). 
65 According to total market capitalisation of equity at the end of 1995 (La Porta 
et al 1999: talbe V). 
66 The average for the whole sample of 27 countries is 30% (LLSV 1999: table 
V) 





68 LLSV define involvement in management as occupying one of the following 
postitions: CEO, Honorary Chairman, Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Board 
(LLSV 1999: Table I). 
69 It is surprising to see however, that dual class shares did not seem to prevent 
many  takeovers  from  happening.  In  fact,  Veckans  Affärer  of  December  15, 
2003 reports that out of 280 takeover bids that took place in Sweden between 
1990 and 2002, 245 were successful although 56% of the targeted companies 
had  dual  class  shares.  Among  the  35  unsuccessful  bids,  63%  of  the  target 
companies had dual class shares (quoted in Ahlqvist 2004: 4-45). These figures 
do not distinguish, however, between solicited and hostile bids, which might 
explain why dual class shares did not play a decisive role in all of these bids. 
70 The figures are based on data collected for a sample comprising the forty 
largest  companies  in  Switzerland  measured  by  a  combination  of  market 
capitalisation,  turnover,  and  number  of  employees  (see  Schnyder  2008  for 
details). 
71 Lubatkin et al. (2005) even state that due to a certain set of values, Swedish 
managers  and  blockholders  behave  in  less  opportunistic  ways  than  their  US 
counterparts. In order to satisfy the three basic preferences that managers are 
commonly  considered  to  pursue,  that  is,  job  stability,  financial  gains,  and 
increased status, Swedish managers need to cooperate with other members of 
their  business  group,  rather  than  compete  with  them.  Opportunistic,  self-
interested behaviour at the expense of the organisation or the group is frowned-
upon and will not lead to any gains in the long run. 